The Function of the Shadow Banking Sector in the Chinese Financial System:A systemic analysis of China’s Third Financial Sector by Schmidt, Eric
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The Function of the Shadow Banking Sector in the Chinese Financial System




Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
The Function of the Shadow Banking Sector in 
the Chinese Financial System 



















Submitted by Eric Schmidt for a  
PhD Chinese Studies 






Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Jan 
Knoerich for the continuous support of my PhD study and related research, for 
his patience, motivation, and encouraging words, when they were needed. I 
would also like to express similar gratitude to Dr. Vanesa Pesque-Cela, who 
encouraged a postgrad student to develop a good essay into a PhD research 
proposal. I further owe tremendous gratitude to the Lau China Institute, King’s 
College London, for the scholarship, which I was awarded. Without the 
generous studentship, I would have not been able to reach for the stars and 
complete this PhD. 
I would like to thank the most important person in my life, my dear fiancée 
Maja. You supported me, where it was necessary and encouraged me, when I 
needed it. Words cannot describe how grateful I am.  
I would also like to acknowledge the tremendous support that my parents 
provided me with. My parents were the first in our families to pursue a higher 
education and have always encouraged my thirst for knowledge. Without their 
moral and financial support, I would have not been able to start or finish this 
PhD. I am eternally grateful to  you for supporting my PhD from the idea’s 
inception to the final stages. 
Besides my advisor, my alma mater and my family, I would further like to thank 
Prof. Peter Nolan and Dr. Dic Lo for serving as my examiners. I would like to 
thank them especially for their insightful comments, criticism and suggestions 
on where to take my research from here. I would further like to thank them for 
making my viva a thoroughly enjoyable experience. I am certain that examiners 
rarely receive credit for it. 
I would also like to thank my dear friend and fellow Queen Mary University of 
London alumni Mr. ZHOU Hai, without whom I would have not been able to 
gain access to such a broad range of different stakeholders during my fieldwork 
in Nanjing. 
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge that there is a long list of people – starting 
from my closest family to friends worldwide – who supported me in various 
ways throughout this PhD. The list would be too long, but you all know who 
you are. 
Dr. Eric Schmidt 
February 1st, 2019 

















I dedicate this thesis to the love of my 
life, Maja Oruba, and my best friend 










LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6 
LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND DIAGRAMS 8 
INTRODUCTION 9 
CHAPTER 1: FINANCIAL SYSTEM DESIGN THEORY 18 
1.1 THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 18 
1.2 THE FOUR ANALYTICAL APPROACHES FOR FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 20 
1.3 THE TWO IDEAL-TYPES: BANK-BASED AND MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 24 
1.3.1 BANK-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 26 
1.3.2 MARKET-BASED FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 30 
1.3.3 BANK-BASED VS. MARKET-BASED: IS ONE BETTER THAN THE OTHER? 34 
1.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 36 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 38 
2.1. RESEARCH DESIGN 39 
2.2 QUALITATIVE METHODS 45 
2.2.1 SAMPLE GROUP, RECRUITMENT AND RESPONSE RATE 45 
2.2.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 52 
2.2.3. ANALYSIS 54 
2.2.4. ISSUES 55 
2.3. QUANTITATIVE METHODS 56 
2.3.1 SAMPLE GROUP, RECRUITMENT AND RESPONSE RATE 56 
2.3.2. SURVEY STRUCTURE AND QUESTIONS 60 
2.3.3 ANALYSIS 65 
2.3.4 ISSUES 66 
2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 67 
CHAPTER 3: THE CHINESE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 69 
3.1 THE CHINESE BANKING SECTOR 69 
3.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHINESE BANKING SECTOR AND ITS REGULATIONS SINCE 1978 70 
3.1.2  THE OMNIPRESENT AND OMNIPOTENT STATE IN CHINA’S BANKING SECTOR: A MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL CONFLICT 
AND THE SOE LENDING BIAS 78 
3.1.3  COMMERCIAL BANKS 86 
3.1.3.1 STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS 87 
3.1.3.2 JOINT-STOCK COMMERCIAL BANKS 90 
3.1.3.3 CITY COMMERCIAL BANKS AND FOREIGN BANKS 96 
3.2 CHINESE FINANCIAL MARKETS 100 
3.2.1  EQUITY MARKETS 101 
3.2.2  BOND MARKETS 108 
3.3  CONCLUDING REMARKS 109 
CHAPTER 4: SHADOW-BANKING SECTOR IN CHINA 111 
4.1 WHAT IS SHADOW BANKING AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT? 112 
4.2. AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SHADOW BANKING SECTOR 119 
4.3.1 LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 121 
4.3.2 QUASI-LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 130 
4.3.3 ILLEGAL INSTITUTIONS 130 
4.4. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 131 
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 138 
4.6 PRESENTING THE KEY HYPOTHESIS: THE SUPPLEMENTED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 140 
 5 
CHAPTER 5: THE SHADOW BANKING SECTOR IN NANJING 143 
5.1 INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 144 
5.1.1 INTERPERSONAL LENDING 145 
5.1.2 MICROLOAN COMPANIES 152 
5.1.3 PEER-TO-PEER (P2P) LENDING PLATFORMS 156 
5.1.4 TRUST COMPANIES 159 
5.1.5 VENTURE CAPITAL 162 
5.1.6 WEALTH MANAGEMENT COMPANIES AND WEALTH MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS 165 
5.1.7 CREDIT GUARANTEE COMPANIES 167 
5.2 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 169 
5.2.1 FUNCTION I: ACCESS TO FINANCE 170 
5.2.2 FUNCTION II: ALTERNATIVE TO BANK DEPOSITS 174 
5.2.3 FUNCTION III: SERVICES TO THE FORMAL BANKING SECTOR 177 
5.2.4 FUNCTION IV: SERVICES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 181 
5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 183 
CHAPTER 6: THE SHADOW BANKING SECTOR IN BEIJING 188 
6.1. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SHADOW BANKING SECTOR IN BEIJING 189 
6.1.1. USAGE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OVER A 12-MONTHS PERIOD 190 
6.1.2. PREFERENCE VS. ACCESSIBILITY – THE USE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN BEIJING 202 
6.2. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: HOW HAS THE SHADOW BANKING SECTOR AFFECTED ACCESS TO FINANCE FOR 
ENTERPRISES IN BEIJING? 215 
6.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 218 
CONCLUSION 221 
APPENDIX 235 
APPENDIX I – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR BUSINESS EXECUTIVES AND ENTREPRENEURS 236 
APPENDIX II – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR FINANCE PROFESSIONALS 238 
APPENDIX III – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR INCUBATORS 239 
APPENDIX IV – SURVEY QUESTION TRANSLATION 240 
APPENDIX V – TRANSLATION PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 244 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 247 
 6 
List of Abbreviations 
ABC Agricultural Bank of China 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
AIC advanced industrialised country 
BJ Beijing 
BOC Bank of China 
BoCom Bank of Communication 
CBRC Chinese Banking Regulation Commission 
CCB city commercial bank 
CCB China Construction Bank 
CCP Chinese Communist Party 
CNY Chinese Yuan (Chinese domestic Currency) 
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission 
ECB European Central bank 
FSB G20 Financial Stability Board 
G20 Group of 20 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GRP Gross Regional Product 
HKSE Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Huijin Central Huijin Investment Company 
ICBC Industry and Commerce Bank of China 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JSCB joint-stock commercial bank 
MCC Microcredit Companie 
MoF Ministry of Finance 
NBFI non-bank financial institution 
NJ Nanjing 
NPL non-performing loan 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
p.a. per annum (annually) 
P2P Peer-to-Peer 
PBOC People's Bank of China 
POE privately owned enterprise 
PPP Purchase Power Parity 
PRC People's Republic of China 
RCC Rural Credit Cooperative 
RMB Reminbi (Chinese domestic currency) 
ROSCA Rotating Savings and Credit Association 
SME small- and medium-sized enterprise 
SOCB state-owned commercial bank 
SOE state-owned enterprise 
SSE Shanghai Stock Exchange 
 7 
SZSE Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
VC Venture Capital 
WMC Wealth Management Company 
WMP Wealth Management Product 
WTO World Trade Organisation 






List of Tables, Figures and Diagrams 
Diagrams 
Diagram 1 - The Financial System 19 
Diagram 2 - Tree Diagram of relationships between interviewees 51 
Diagram 3 - Multiple Principal Conflict 80 
Diagram 4 – Market share of groups of financial institutions in China 86 
Diagram 5 – Market Capitalization of Mainland Chinese Stock Markets 102 
Diagram 6 – Number of Listed Companies on Mainland Chinese Stock Markets 103 
Diagram 7 – Year on Year Increase of Total Number of Companies listed on Mainland 
Chinese Stock Markets 103 
Diagram 8 - The Supplemented Financial System 141 
Diagram 9 - The Third Sector in the Supplemented Financial System 231 
 
Tables 
Table 1 - Indicators for Financial System Development 25 
Table 2 - Interview Sample 47 
Table 3 – Survey Sample Distribution 58 
Table 4 - SOCB Ownership Structures in 2015 88 
Table 5 - Institutions in the Chinese Shadow Banking Sector by Legality 121 
Table 6 - Institutions in the Chinese Shadow Banking Sector by Function 138 
Table 7 - Use of Finance according to Group 191 
Table 8 - Use of sources of finance over the 12-months prior to the survey by group 192 
Table 9 - Sources of Finance ranked according to Preference 200 
Table 10 - Sources of Finance ranked according to Accessibility 201 
Table 11 - Ten Most Preferred Sources Of Finance 203 
Table 12 - Ten Most Accessible Source Of Finance 208 






Following the immensely insightful and encouraging comments during my viva, I was 
left with a conundrum. This work was accepted without changes for a PhD Chinese Studies 
from King’s College London. The two examiners made it clear from the beginning what they 
thought of this work and left me with a thesis they deemed sufficient to allow me to be 
awarded a PhD. As highlighted in my acknowledgements they made my viva a wholly pleasant 
experience. 
There are some points I would like to highlight in this foreword without changing the 
actual content of this thesis to address the criticism that some of my examiners have 
expressed. I address these points in my foreword, because I do not want to change the actual 
work for which I have been awarded my PhD. As any intellectual work, this thesis has its 
strength and its weaknesses. As for anything in life, one has to be able to understand and 
acknowledge these two.  
Dr. Dic Lo highlighted that this work has focused on financial systems design theory to 
analyse the Chinese financial system but that there are others, which might be equally capable 
of being used as an analytical prism. This point is highly valid and does provide a challenge. 
Yet I hope that Chapter Three will be able to convince the reader of why I chose this theory in 
particular. To anyone, who seek an all-encompassing answer to the theoretical foundation of 
the financial system of PR China and the role of shadow banking in particular, please kindly 
note that this work only provides an answer using one school of thought. No work on China 
can ever truly answer all questions, which you may have. 
My thesis provides an analysis of the function of the shadow banking sector in Nanjing 
and Beijing in the early 2010s. In this it provides a way to understand an often misunderstood 
sector through the functions it provides. If you are reading this, I encourage you to get in touch 
and discus your thoughts.  
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Introduction 
When we think about economic development, the impact of the financial system is 
rarely the first thing that comes to mind. That is not to say, that development economics does 
not appreciate the contribution that the financial system makes to development. The 
importance of it however is not contested. Lucas (1988) for example sees the role of the 
financial system in economic development as widely overstated. Robinson (1952) put it more 
bluntly when he said ‘where enterprise leads, finance follows’. In recent years the view of a 
positive impact of the finance-growth-nexus, the relationship between economic 
development and strong financial institutions, has gained wide prominence (e.g. Haber et al, 
2008; Rühle, 1997; Barth et al, 2006; Cihak et al, 2012; Beck et al, 2005, Krahnen & Schmidt, 
2004).   
Most literature on the finance-growth-nexus has focused on the relationship between 
the formal sector of the financial system and its impact on economic growth. It has categorized 
financial systems using a bank-based vs. market-based dichotomy (e.g. Aybar & Lapavitsas, 
2003; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 
2002; Levine, 2002). The shadow-banking sector, referring to all institutions that engage in 
bank-like activities without being regulated as a bank, has in the past often been overlooked 
or outright ignored in these discussions. It is the somewhat less attractive cousin of the formal 
banking system, considered to rarely provide anything positive and thus deserving to be 
marginalised. Its importance is less understood and analysed because it is assumed that it will 
wither away in time as the country moves along its development trajectory (e.g. Ayyagari et 
al, 2010;). Moreover, in recent years, it was precisely this part of the financial system that was 
quickly blamed for emergent financial instabilities. Certainly, following the 2008 financial crisis 
the potentially destabilizing qualities of certain parts of this sector should not be ignored.  
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Nevertheless, given the aforementioned positive role of the formal financial system in 
supporting economic growth, and in view of instabilities sometimes even faced by formal 
financial systems, there is good reason to believe that shadow banking has the potential to 
make its own meaningful positive contributions to economic growth and development. 
Scientific evidence on this shadow banking sector, the functions it provides and its impact on 
economic development is however still rare. Hence, the purpose of this study is to examine 
this issue in greater detail: What function does the shadow banking sector provide to the 
financial system in China?      
It is important to highlight that shadow banking is a feature of all economies, whether 
developed or developing. It is certainly strong in developing economies in general and of 
urban areas in particular (Hsu, 2009: 4), yet it exists in every economy and in virtually any 
place. Especially with reference to China, it was precisely this sector that provided the much-
needed capital to fuel private enterprise growth, as formal finance focused primarily on the 
financing of state-owned units. In 2009, loans from the formal banking sector to privately 
owned enterprises accounted for a meagre 3% of all bank loans (Yiu, 2013).  
Existing theories claim that once a country has developed strong financial institutions, 
the shadow-banking sector will be marginalised and will no longer play an important role. It 
never fully disappears but it becomes marginalised. In China, however, the shadow-banking 
sector continues to be a very prominent feature of the economy. This is the case despite China 
being a strong emerging economy and one of the largest economies in the world, with a deep 
financial system. Thus far, nobody has attempted to understand the function provided by the 
shadow banking sector for the financial system. In fact, when we examine China, we can see 
that not to acknowledge the role, importance and power of the shadow-banking sector is both 
dangerously short-sighted and outright ignorant.  
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There have been intense debates recently on the extent to which shadow banking 
poses a threat to overall financial system stability in China. This view was swiftly contested by 
the Director-General of the Shanghai Office of the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), Liao Min (2014), who said that the risk posed to the Chinese and the world economy 
was controllable. He even considered shadow-banking ‘a necessity to feed China’s investment 
that drives the economy, especially when the capital market offers less than 5 per cent of new 
lending and banks’ lending capabilities are limited by capital and provisioning requirements’.  
This debate highlights three important aspects. The first is that the financial community is split 
over the potential risks versus benefits emanating from the shadow-banking sector. Secondly, 
regulators emphasise the importance of shadow banks for the Chinese economy, as 
exemplified by the above statement of an important financial authority in China. Lastly, and 
most importantly for the present study, it demonstrates the need for an in-depth investigation 
into the way in which shadow banking is functioning and supplementing the formal financial 
sectors. The shadow-banking sector has to be understood from a macro-economic perspective, 
and existing theoretical frameworks need to be expanded to include its role in the economy. 
The shadow-banking sector comprises of a variety of different actors and institutions, some 
of which feed China’s investment, while others have destabilising qualities.  
It is not only the systemic role of shadow-banking that requires attention. The use and 
impact of shadow banking on the enterprise level is also important. Private sector use of 
shadow banking in China is widespread, with Tsai (2002) arguing that over 70% had 
participated in one way or another. While this clearly shows that shadow banking plays an 
important role in the Chinese financial system, the impact of using services provided by the 
shadow-banking sector on firm performance is highly contested. On the one hand, Ayyagari 
et al (2010) argue that the use of formal finance rather than informal finance had positively 
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affected firm growth. They argue that relying on formal finance allows enterprises to grow 
faster, incurring higher reinvestment rates while experiencing at least the same productivity 
growth as those who rely on informal finance (Ayyagari et al, 2010: 3051). Yiu et al (2013) 
argue on the other hand that the use of shadow banking is positively related to private firm 
performance in China. They stress that local networks provide better monitoring capabilities 
that allow debtors to pay closer attention to their creditors, which helps in overcoming the 
asymmetry of information1 between the two (Yiu et al., 2013: 836).  
This research project examines the properties and characteristics of the shadow-
banking sector in China, assessing the role it has had in promoting economic development and 
the overall functions it provides to the financial system. The aim is to provide a systemic 
account of the function of the shadow-banking sector in China. Although a shadow-banking 
sector exists in many countries throughout the world, its omnipresence and wide-spread use 
amongst ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs in China presents us with an interesting case. I 
am going to examine to what extent the shadow-banking sector has to be understood 
systemically as a component of the Chinese financial system and not as a general rival to the 
formal financial system.  
Financial systems design theory, a theoretical framework commonly used to map 
financial systems, in its current form does not account for the existence of the shadow-
banking sector and the relationship with other sectors of the financial system. My research 
and analysis in this study aims at shedding light on the extent to which this is a serious 
shortcoming of the theory. My key argument is that the shadow-banking sector’s continuous 
existence and evolvement is due to its important supplementary role in economic 
                                                        
1 The asymmetry of information exists, because they borrower has access to the most 
accurate information on her or his financial situation. The lender can only rely on external 
information on the borrower’s creditworthiness. 
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development next to the formal sector. Most importantly, shadow banks contribute to 
fulfilling certain credit needs of private enterprises that the formal sector do not provide. 
This study will consist of seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter One will 
introduce financial systems design theory as the theoretical framework for this study, and will 
discuss the difference between a bank-based and a market-based financial system. It will 
further provide a literature review of key concepts, such as the difference between the 
financial sectors and the financial system. It will discus the merits of bank-based vis-à-vis 
market-based financial systems. Understanding these concepts will allow us to comprehend 
the analytical tools for an analysis of the Chinese financial system, which will follow in 
subsequent chapters. Lastly, this chapter will conclude with a discussion of which, if any, of 
these financial systems are better for the development of an economy.  
Chapter Two will discuss the research design and the methodology used for this 
research. This study has adopted a mixed-methods approach, using both qualitative and 
quantitative sources. Through my empirical fieldwork, I have obtained both interview and 
survey data. The methodology chapter will provide a comprehensive overview over the the 
sample group and their recruitment. It will further discuss in detail the questions used for this 
study and how the data was analysed. In addition, it will also provide an overview of issues, 
which were encountered in the course of the research. A full list of interview and survey 
questions can be found in Appendix I.  
 Chapter Three uses financial systems design theory to produce a complex analysis of 
the financial system of the People’s Republic of China. I will use financial systems design theory 
to categorise the Chinese financial system as a predominantly bank-based financial system.  
The chapter provides a historical overview of the development of the Chinese banking sector 
and its regulatory environment since 1978, explaining evolution of banking supervision and 
 15 
regulatory authorities such as the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Chinese central bank, 
and the Chinese Banking Regulation Commission (CBRC), and analysing the emergence of 
different forms of commercial banking in China. Issues in corporate governance in China’s 
financial system are discussed in this context. The chapter will further analyse the country’s 
financial markets and discus in greater detail why they have not been able to effectively 
challenge the role of banks within the system or provide a valid alternative for those, who 
need capital to fund the country’s economic growth. This chapter will conclude that although 
financial systems design theory has been able to provide a thorough understanding of most 
financial systems around the world, it falls short of providing the tools of analysis for the 
Chinese financial system. China’s financial system is largely bank-based, yet not all banks are 
engaged in effective credit intermediation, which is their core and most important task. 
Chapter Four will engage in an analysis of the shadow-banking sector in China. It will 
first discus different definitions of shadow banking. I will further discus, why this sector is 
important and an understanding of it is paramount for any analysis of the Chinese financial 
system. This chapter will draw on existing literature as well as some of the data gathered 
through my empirical fieldwork. It will perform an institutional analysis, which identifies key 
institutions in the sector. The chapter will then further critically examine the different ways in 
which literature has grouped and discussed shadow banking institutions, namely as legal, 
quasi-legal and illegal institutions. It will further introduce a functional perspective on this 
sector2. I will provide a discussion on why it is better to understand shadow banks according 
to the functions they provide and not according to their formal or legal status. It will conclude 
that the shadow-banking sector is an integral part of the Chinese financial system and despite 
                                                        
2 Chapter One will outline different approaches for the analysis of financial systems. It will 
discuss in greater detail, why a functional approach was chosen. 
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of the dangers emanating from certain institutions within it, it has provided a valuable 
function for the system overall. Following the conclusion, this chapter will present the key 
hypothesis: the supplemented financial system. If the formal sectors of a financial system do 
not provide the functions, which economic actors desire and require, the shadow banking 
sector will provide a supplementary function. 
Chapter Five draws on my own empirical fieldwork and tests this hypothesis by 
applying it to the local financial system in Nanjing. Drawing on in-depth interviews, this 
chapter will analyse the local shadow banking sector from an institutional and functional 
perspective. Through my analysis of interview data, I will identify the key institutions within 
the local shadow banking sector in the city. The functional analysis will provide a new way of 
grouping existing institutions according to the function they provide: access to finance, 
alternatives to bank deposits, services to the formal financial sectors and services to local 
governments. This chapter will conclude, that examining the function rather than the legal 
status of a shadow bank allows us a better and more nuanced understanding of the sector as 
a whole. 
Chapter Six draws on my empirical quantitative fieldwork in Beijing. Using data of a 
survey conducted amongst the capital’s entrepreneurs, this chapter will seek to triangulate 
some of the findings of my qualitative fieldwork. Its institutional analysis will focus on mapping 
out the different institutions, which make up the shadow banking sector in Beijing. It will 
further compare and contrast if entrepreneurs use shadow banks, because they are readily 
accessible or whether they are the preferred source of finance. In order to ascertain the 
function of the sector in Beijing, the survey data is analysed to assess shadow banking’s impact 
on access to finance. The chapter will conclude that all entrepreneurs in the sample had used 
shadow banking. It will also conclude that although some entrepreneurs have access to bank 
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finance in Beijing capital, many are still driven to the shadow banking sector despite preferring 
other forms of finance. 
Chapter Seven will summarises the findings of this study and relates them back to the 
central aspects of this study’s title: the function of the shadow banking sector in the Chinese 
financial system. The rigid loan procedures of Chinese commercial banks as well as the 
corporate governance of the large SOCBs have shaped the need for a supplementary shadow-
banking sector. Financial markets, both by design and by policy, have been unable to change 
the general structure of the financial system and have not been able to address the shortages 
of finance for the majority of privately-owned enterprises. Born out of the need for additional 
credit intermediation, those with excess funds and those in need of extra finance turn to 
another sector in the financial system. This study will conclude with an extension of the 
existing financial systems design theory. While the bank-based vs. market-based dichotomy 
does allow us to discuss ideal types of financial systems design, an economy with a heavily 
regulated and state dominated financial system and a strong, vibrant, and growing private 
sector, will develop alternative ways for credit intermediation: a strong shadow-banking 
sector. Therefore, we need to speak of a supplemented bank-based financial system, when 




Chapter 1: Financial System Design Theory 
 Existing theories usually classify financial systems along a binary trajectory of bank-
based and market-based financial systems. This dissertation will use financial systems design 
theory as a tool for an initial analysis of the Chinese financial system. Does China have a bank-
based or a market-based financial system and are the two sectors performing the function, 
which they are ought to perform? Before this study can engage in a meaningful analysis of the 
country’s financial system, we have to define and understand some key concepts first. This 
chapter will therefore start with a concrete definition of what we mean by financial sector and 
financial system. It will further highlight, how the literature sees their respective functions for 
the economy as a whole. I will then discus four distinct approaches for understanding and 
analysis financial systems and highlight why the functional and the institutional approach are 
the best approaches to understanding the Chinese financial system. Following that I will 
present the theoretical framework for financial systems design theory. This section will draw 
on existing literature and how it defines the two ideal types. This chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of literature on the question if any of these two ideal-types are better at promoting 
economic growth. 
1.1 The Financial Sector and the Financial System 
As the terms financial system and financial sector will be used throughout this study, 
we have to provide a concise and concrete definition for them. The financial system includes 
all actors and institutions in the financial sector as well as their interactions with the rest of 
the economy (Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004; Boot and Thakor, 1997). A financial sector is part of 
the entire financial system and at the core it offers and provides financial services to other 
sectors, e.g. the primary, secondary or tertiary sector of the economy (Schmidt and Tyrell, 
2004). It consists of a range of different formal institutions; whose business it is to provide 
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financial services to other sectors. In this chapter, I focus on two broad financial sectors, the 
banking sector and the financial markets. These are two core financial sectors of the economy, 
as they provide essential financial services to other sectors. Their purpose is to gather excess 
capital from those who have accumulated it (surplus-spending units) and allocate it to those 
who need it (deficit-spending units).  
The financial system is the sum of interactions of all of the actors as illustrated in Figure 
1. The banking sector and the financial markets are at the core of the system in the middle 
and provide financial services to both surplus-spending and deficit-spending units on each side. 
Buckle and Thompson (1998:4) highlight three important functions of a financial system. The 
first is that it acts as an intermediary between surplus and deficit units within an economy and 
channels excess funds to the most efficient use. The second is that it provides a payments 
mechanism, in that it provides a mechanism for settling balances using currencies across space 
and time. Lastly, it also provides other financial services, such as insurance and pensions.  
 
 
Diagram 1 - The Financial System 
Farrell et al (2006: 25) identify seven crucial functions that a mature and well 
developed financial system serves. Like Buckle and Thompson, they see the mobilisation of 
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savings and allocation of capital from savers to users as the most crucial function, and they 
also highlight that it provides an effective payments system. In addition, they argue, a well-
developed financial system further provides price signals and information about the uses of 
capital, and it creates financial vehicles that enable trading and disaggregation of risk. It 
provides oversights over borrowers for investors. Lastly it improves incentives for companies 
to operate efficiently. Looking at the financial system in this way provides us with a more 
holistic approach to understanding how the financial sector interacts with the rest of the 
economy.  Cihak et al (2012: 5) argue that the make up of the financial system has a direct 
impact on the allocation of savings within an economy. A well-developed financial system with 
strong formal financial institutions should efficiently allocate funds to its most efficient use. 
Barth et al (2006: 8) see the financial institutions, which make up the core of the 
financial system, as part of a wider social fabric that binds a society together. The point is 
especially valid in the case of China. As we will see in later sections of this dissertation, the 
social network element, the concept of Guanxi, is omnipresent in China and very much 
interlinked with the financial system. Institutions within the shadow-banking sector and the 
informal segments of this sector in particular often use this social fabric to raise capital, 
provide an enforcement mechanism and also to find efficient uses for surplus capital.  
1.2 The Four Analytical Approaches for Financial Systems 
There are four distinct approaches for analysing financial systems (Schmidt and Tyrell, 
2004). The first, the institutional approach, focuses on existing formal financial institutions 
and the central bank as unit of analysis. This approach tends to provide a comprehensive 
overview of various banks, insurance companies, investment and pension funds as well as 
financial markets. It tends to be focused on how these different institutions interact within 
the financial system. Buckle and Thompson (1998) provide such a study for the British financial 
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system. While it provides a very detailed account, this approach can be criticised for being 
descriptive rather than analytical (Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004). Guo and Xia (2014) further argue, 
that this approach sees institutions as given, static entities, which ought to be supported by 
public policy. This approach can therefore not account of why these institutions may change 
over time (Merton, 1990). This may be problematic as it does not provide an account of 
whether these institutions are effectively providing the functions that are necessary to fulfil 
the financial needs of an economy.  
The second approach, the intermediation approach, focuses on the role of financial 
intermediaries, who facilitate the exchange of capital between surplus-spending and deficit-
spending units. Here, financial intermediaries provide a range of functions: they can provide 
liquidity, compensate for a mismatch of maturities and amounts, and due to their role as 
delegated monitors, they tend to have a better understanding in assessing the economic 
potential of enterprises (Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004). This approach emphasises the role of the 
financial sector as an intermediary between surplus-spending and deficit-spending units and 
looks at the role that financial intermediaries, i.e. banks and non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFIs), play in this process (Gurley and Shaw, 1960). This approach already provides us with 
a more extensive and inclusive framework for analysis. It aims to put the role of credit 
intermediation at the centre. On the other hand, it too suffers from the same shortcoming as 
the institutional approach: it displays a form of selection bias. Although we may include some 
aspects of the financial markets in this analysis, it focuses mainly on financial intermediaries. 
In this it ignores, for example, that the role of banks can change from that of a classical 
intermediary to assisting access to financial markets and designing financial products for 
financial markets (Allen and Santomero, 2001). As Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) ultimately point 
out, the problem of this approach is that it is stuck in narrative that measures how ‘good’ a 
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financial system is by degree of which banks provide credit intermediation. Thus it only 
focuses on two functions of the financial system, intermediation and transformation. As 
Chapter Three analyses and discusses in much greater detail and complexity, the banking 
sector in China is large comparatively to the financial markets. One might therefore be inclined 
to think, that this approach is clearly the ideal approach for an in-depth analysis of the 
country’s financial system. However, focusing on just a few intermediaries in both the formal 
and the shadow-banking sector bears the risk of ignoring other key actors. For example, if we 
would solely focus of formal NBFIs, we might ignore informal NBFIs as well as mezzanine 
capital, a form of equity finance, which it itself is not a clear case of financial intermediation.  
Merton (1990) developed a more holistic approach: the functional approach. Rather 
than seeing the institutions of a financial system as given, this approach places at the centre 
of analysis the functions that a financial system provides. The core of this approach is that 
financial functions are much more stable than institutions (Guo and Xia, 2014). Institutions 
evolve over time to fulfil certain functions needed in the economy. We could argue that the 
underlying functions remain the same across time and space but are simply provided by 
different institutions. The relevant literature identifies five core functions (Schmidt and Tyrell, 
2004). The core function of any financial system is the ability to transfer resources through 
time as well as across regions and industries. A financial system further ought to provide a 
payments system to assist the trade of commodities, services and financial claims. It has to 
ensure that resources can be pooled and that large indivisible enterprises can be subdivided 
through the sale of equity on the financial markets. It has to provide a method for the 
management of uncertainty and risk control. The financial system should further provide price 
information on investments. Lastly, it should provide a method to tackle the problems of 
asymmetric information. As the borrower has perfect knowledge of their business and 
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financial situation and the lender only has imperfect knowledge, there is an asymmetric 
distribution of information. One of the functions of a financial system is to assist minimising 
this, e.g. by collecting information through financial institutions or through pricing signals in 
financial markets. The functional approach provides more scope for analysis, because it is not 
focused on just two functions of the financial system. It further does not put particular 
emphasis on any particular institution or set of institutions. The starting point for an analysis 
here is to describe and understand how the functions are performed by different elements 
within a given system (Merton and Brodie, 1995). Nevertheless, the approach has not been 
without criticism. Schmidt and Tyrell (2004) highlight for example that this approach treats 
different functions as potentially separable. This assumption may be wrong, because an 
institution that provides a given selection of these functions might be more efficient and thus 
increase the performance of a financial system, than a financial institution that focuses on just 
one of them.  
The fourth is the systemic approach, which describes and analyses a financial system 
in terms of the interrelations between the different elements that constitute it and uses this 
analyses to evaluate its performance (Schmidt and Tyrell, 2004). Analysing the interactions 
and interrelations of various institutions, the theoretical conclusions that often derive from 
this approach tend to indicate that there are few, probably only two efficient financial 
systems: a bank-based or a market-based financial system. This approach is allows us to 
classify financial systems along a binary structure of bank and capital-market-based financial 
systems, depending on the complementarity of institutions. This approach is certainly suitable 
for comparisons of different financial institutions, but has one major drawback: It does not 
account for what happens, if complementary institutions, i.e. banks and markets, are 
performing some of the functions that we ascribe to them but not others. It fails to address 
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financial systems, which for example are bank-based but where banks do not provide the 
functions of a performing financial system. This approach is therefore clearly well-designed to 
analyse the financial systems of advanced industrialised countries (AICs), like Schmidt and 
Tyrell (2004) remarkably demonstrates. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study, it is not 
suitable. 
Two of these approaches will be used to analyse the structure of the Chinese financial 
system: the institutional approach and the functional approach. The former provides us with 
a good tool to outline the institutional landscape of a financial system. The latter provides us 
with a good prism, through which to understand the functions provided by different 
institutions within it. The latter is particular important to understand, which functions the 
current system provides and, more importantly, how. 
1.3 The Two Ideal-types: Bank-based and Market-based financial 
systems 
The level and degree of development of the financial system ultimately determines the 
rate at which resources are allocated to productive industries and firms (Wurgler, 2000: 188). 
As productive industries and firms are the most efficient users of resources, including capital, 
their development and progression will suffer if a financial system is not working effectively 
and efficiently. Beck et al (2005: 137) point out that an underdeveloped financial system can 
constrain a firm’s ability to fund investment projects. A well-developed financial system on 
the other hand determines the extent to which the individual entrepreneur’s skill and 
initiative, rather than their personal network, decide over their entrepreneurial fate (Cihak et 
al, 2012: 6). The financial system is the ultimate determinant for the effective allocation of 
financial resources to the most productive industries (Beck et al, 2005: 139). So how does the 
literature classify financial systems? 
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Table 1 - Indicators for Financial System Development 
Theories of financial system design have generally identified two ideal types: a bank-
based and a market-based financial system (Aybar & Lapavitsas, 2003; Chakraborty & Ray, 
2006; Demirguc-Kunt & Levine, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002; Levine, 2002). In 
their cross-country comparison of financial systems, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999: 2), use 
the ratio of bank sector development relative to stock market-development to establish 
whether a financial system is predominantly bank- or market-based. They identify a range of 
indicators, through which they measure the sectors’ development, which are compiled in 
Table 1. Depending on which of the two is more developed vis-à-vis the other, we speak of 
bank-based financial systems or market-based financial systems. It is important to emphasise, 





Indicators	for	a	bank-sector	development Indicators	for	stock-market	development - Liquid	Liabilities	of	Banks	and	Non-Bank	Financial	Intermediaries	to	GDP	- Bank	Assets/GDP	- Claims	 of	 Deposit	 Money	 Banks	 on	Private	Sector/GDP	- Claims	of	Other	Financial	Institutions	on	Private	Sector/GDP	
- Market	Capitalization	as	a	Share	of	GDP	- Total	Value	Traded	as	a	Share	of	GDP	- Turnover	Ratio	
Source:	Demirguc-Kunt	&	Levine,	1999	 	
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1.3.1 Bank-based financial systems 
In a bank-based financial system, the development of the banking sector is more 
advanced than that of the stock market development. We can use the indicators listed in Table 
1 to measure one vis-à-vis the other. Bank-based systems tend to be more prevalent in 
countries with a civil law tradition (Ergungor, 2003). Allen and Gale (1999) have argued, that 
bank-based financial systems are more likely to exist in situations when technologies are well 
established and understood. In those cases, investments just need monitoring. For example, 
when an enterprise wishes to engage in cross-border trade of consumer goods, a bank can 
easily assess the risks of said enterprise. Banks do not have to put a price on a new technology 
or innovation, if a technology or concept has been proven and established. Off course, this 
provides no account of how a proven concept or technology was financed at its inception. 
What we can take from their argument is that banks are not necessarily well-equipped to 
assess new technologies and their potential. 
As the name suggests, in a bank-based system banks play the integral role as financial 
intermediaries. They allocate and channel savings to productive uses of capital (Barth et al, 
2006; Fama, 1980; Purda 2008). Surplus-spending units, those who have access to more 
financial capital that they are willing to spend, save their money in their bank accounts. Banks 
will reward their deposits with a moderate return in the form of interest payments. Deficit-
spending units, those who do not have access to the amount of capital that  they are willing 
to spend, on the other side seek financial capital from banks. Banks will use the deposits from 
one group to extend loans to the other group. As they charge the borrower higher interest 
rates than the lender, they will in turn make a profit. This is the most basic and simple 
illustration of the core business of any bank.  
In addition to this very basic function, financial intermediaries perform a range of other 
functions: they provide liquidity, credit transformation, liquidity transformation, term-to-
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maturity transformations, and they have a better understanding/experience in assessing the 
economic potential of an enterprise (Schumpeter, 1939; Diamond, 1984; Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 2004; Guo and Xia, 2014). They provide liquidity by extending loans to economic 
actors. They provide credit transformation, by taking small deposits and extending large loans. 
They further provide liquidity transformation, by turning highly liquid assets, i.e. bank deposits, 
into less liquid assets, e.g. loans. They provide term-to-maturity transformation, by turning 
short-term deposits into long-term loans and other assets. They lastly have a better 
understanding and experience in assessing the economic potential of an enterprise, because 
they gather information on various industries and borrowers over time. 
Bank financing often involves long-term relationships between the borrower and the 
lender. The literature often defines this as relationship lending (Barth et al, 2006; Beck et al, 
2011; Berger & Udell, 1995; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Diamond, 1984; Hoshi et al, 1990a, 
1990b; Leland and Pyle, 1977). Relationship lending refers to a type of financing, where the 
bank seeks to overcome the asymmetry of information through continuous, personalised and 
direct contact with enterprises and their stakeholders (Beck et al, 2011: 36). This asymmetry 
exists, because the debtor will always have more information about the actual state of his 
business than the creditor. An enterprise might be highly profitable according to its balance 
sheets, yet these sheets do not necessarily reflect all the information available on the business. 
For example, a large customer might have just cancelled an order or is not meeting their 
scheduled payments. By collecting information on the business and its entrepreneur over time, 
a bank can partly overcome this asymmetry of information and therefore make more effective 
and reliable lending decisions. It is one of the particular strengths of a bank-based financial 
system and forms a mutually beneficial cornerstone of the entire system. A borrower benefits 
from this long-term relationship, because the longer the relationship, the more likely he is to 
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pay lower interest rates and less likely to pledge collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995). The 
creditor benefits from this long-term relationship most obviously by extracting profits over a 
long period of time but, more abstract, by collecting a wide array of information on the 
borrower, his business and his industry. All of this allows the creditor to overcome the 
asymmetry of information that naturally exists between a creditor and his debtor.  
In theory, a bank-based financial system should foster the development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SME) (Aybar & Lapavitsas, 2003; Beck et al, 2011; Chong et al, 2013, 
Shen et al, 2009). For example, if an SME owner seeks to secure a loan for a modernisation of 
his production facilities, the bank is able to assess the likelihood of profitability of such a 
venture based on the information gathered through relationship lending. In return this allows 
businesses to pursue long-term growth strategies, as the capital commitment is likely to be 
long-term. For a creditor, lending to successful SMEs with long-term capital commitment 
allows for the long-term extraction of profits. The investment is less speculative and thus safer 
in the eyes of the creditor.  
Purda (2008) further points out that in bank-based financial systems, banks often rely 
precisely on these relationships in negotiations with distressed borrowers, rather than legal 
and formal proceedings. If they fear that one of their debtors is running into financial 
difficulties, they tend to rely on their relationship with the debtor to renegotiate the terms of 
the loan, rather than pursuing their claim in court. In their study of credit-rating of enterprises 
in a bank-based vis-à-vis market based financial system, Aybar & Lapavitsas (2003) find that 
enterprises in the former tended to be perceived as less of a credit risk than the latter, because 
of this relationship. 
This role assumed by banks is defined in the literature as being the ‘delegated monitor’. 
Delegated monitors acquire and process information about firms and their managers to make 
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assumptions about their profitability (Berger and Udell, 1995; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Fama, 
1985; Purda, 2008). The surplus-spending unit, rather than relying on their own wits and 
knowledge, leave the allocation of capital to intermediaries. They thereby delegate the 
monitoring of investments and channelled resources to someone else. With regards to the 
level of information a bank is privy to, Fama (1985: 36) stresses that bank loans can be 
considered ‘inside debt’. The creditor, the bank, has a legal agreement with the debtor, which 
includes access to otherwise not publicly available information about the enterprise. The bank 
might even participate in certain decision-making. This allows the bank to monitor their 
debtor carefully and identify any repayment problem at a very early stage. The nature of the 
debt, as a bank loan from one or a handful of institutions, also makes efforts to restructure 
these obligations far easier (Purda, 2008:1179).  
Overall, the literature suggests that a bank-based financial system work especially well 
in the early stages of industrialisation (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). This is mainly due to the fact 
that in that developmental stage, industries are physical-asset intensive and legal systems 
tend to be less effective. Skill or idea-based industries are rare in this stage of development 
and therefore banks do not have to price new technologies. The case of China would support 
this, for the formal sectors of the Chinese financial system in its early stages of development, 
i.e. when it advanced its economic reforms in the early 1980s, were exclusively dominated by 
banks. On the other hand, there are cases of successful bank-based systems in advanced 
economies such as Japan and Germany. This would suggest that a bank-based financial system 
is also effective at channelling capital to its most efficient use even in later stages of 
development. Chakraborty and Ray (2006) also finds that economies benefit more from a 
bank-based financial system, if income distribution is a policy concern. This suggests that for 
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developing countries with often unequal distribution of wealth, this system might provide 
more benefits for a larger group in society.  
1.3.2 Market-based financial systems 
In a market-based financial system, stock-market development is relatively higher than 
the development of the banking sector. Comparative studies have shown that market-based 
financial systems are more prevalent in countries with a common law tradition, for example 
in the United Kingdom or in the United States (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Ergungor, 
2003). La Porta et al. (1997) adds that markets develop better in legal systems which provide 
adequate protection of minority shareholder interests. In countries following a common law 
tradition it is easier for minority shareholders to challenge management through courts. Aybar 
and Lapavitsas (2003: 33) argue that a market-based financial system is often the result of 
deregulation and financial liberalization. They further highlight that a market-based financial 
system is often shaped by existing soft and hard institutions. This includes the legal system 
but also other institutions.  
Chakraborty and Ray (2006: 332) add that a market-based financial system is more 
likely to develop either if the cost of monitoring is too high for banks to become delegated 
monitors or if general agency problems are not severe. Agency problems are not severe in 
economies with high degrees of transparency or well-developed legal systems. The idea is that 
this will compel the agent to always act with the principal’s best interest in mind. In these 
systems, the monitoring function is left to the market, which uses pricing signals to indicate a 
potential success of a business entity. Markets will efficiently and effectively examine 
information independently and therefore a market price will provide the best possible signal 
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for potential success3.  That is not to say that the markets are left to their own accords, without 
any oversight or regulation. There are rules that govern the workings of financial markets and 
all its actors. For example, listed companies are bound by law to publish an array of 
information. However, the monitoring of performance is left to the market via its pricing signal.  
Allen and Gale (1999) find that market-based financial systems are needed when 
technologies are new and rapidly advancing. In these cases, banks will find it difficult to 
adequately price a new technology. Their internal structures are designed to analyse past 
information. It is therefore more desirable, in theory, to rely on the market’s pricing signals. 
The information publicly available in those financial systems allows for a more appropriate 
assessment of the potential of new technologies. Rajan and Zingales (2001) add that because 
of this, market-based financial systems have a comparative advantage in financing industries 
with high levels of intangible assets. A bank will find it comparatively more difficult to price a 
new idea’s or industry’s potential, whereas the market does this via its price mechanism.  
In addition to providing financial resources for new technologies, we can say that a 
market-based financial system allows easier access to large amounts of capital for large 
enterprises (Berger and Udell, 1995: 351). Scharfstein (1988) argues that the existence and 
mechanics of equity markets encourage sound corporate governance due to the ever-looming 
threat of a hostile takeover of under-performing firms. Poor management decisions, if not 
challenged by shareholders in the first place, will lead to a fall in the share price, which 
ultimately encourages competitors to attempt a hostile takeover. To what extent this is always 
true is a subject of vivid debate and the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008 would 
suggest that this does not always hold true.  
                                                        
3  The author does not necessarily agree with this view or promoted the idea of an ever 
efficient market, but merely presents the standard argument for the natural efficiency of any 
market. 
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Rajan and Zingales (1998a, 2001) argue that market finance’s price signal will guide 
investors to the best possible investment. The individual investor can use all the information 
available in the market to make an individual investment decision. There is no need for him to 
delegate the monitoring of his investment to an intermediary. However, in a market-based 
financial system the investor may choose to do so by buying financial products, e.g. funds. 
Here the investor delegates the monitoring to another entity. 
As market-based financial systems rely on the historical inevitability of the victory of 
market forces, it is a very appealing system. Unlike banks, which rely on people and 
relationships between borrowers and lenders, the market will make independent decisions. 
Market forces know not one master, so in essence they should in the long-run guide 
investment to the most productive use. That is not say that manipulation or market failure 
cannot occur. Some would say that recent history, from the 2008 financial crisis to the recent 
Chinese stock-market turmoil indicate quite the opposite and highlight the potential volatility 
of markets. Nevertheless, in the long-run the actions of one actor in this system should have 
less of an impact on the collective decision, for the sum of actors will, in most cases, act 
rationally.  
The main challenge for with market-based financial systems is that it relies on well-
established institutions. There has to be a legal system, which is impartial and provides solid 
protection for the interests of minority shareholders. Ideally such a system should be based 
on common law; the same system, as in the two most advanced market-based financial 
systems in the world, the UK and the US. This is not to say that in the civil law tradition, 
minority shareholders’ interests are not protected. As Ergungor (2003) analyses in his study 
of rights and regulations in the two systems, the issue is that not one of existence or absence 
of laws, but one of interpretations and the ability of the judiciary to interpret legal documents. 
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There is much more leeway for the judiciary to interpret legal texts in a common law system 
than in a civil law system. This means that shareholders have more opportunities to challenge 
the actions of a particular companies’ management, which in turn means that said 
management is more careful with their decisions. Again, to what extent this always holds true 
is a subject of great debate and once more, critics of this argument would point towards the 
2008 financial crisis to highlight that this sounds more like an idealistic daydream than solid 
reality. While it would be interesting to engage in a further debate regarding the power of the 
market to compel the management of listed companies to always act in the shareholders’ 
interest, this would require and entirely new and complex research project. 
What we can take from this line of argument is that market-based financial systems 
need a high degree of transparency. This might be one of the key issues of this system for 
many economies throughout the world (Rajan and Zingales, 2001). The virtual prerequisite of 
a well-established legal and thus supervisory regime for market-based financial systems is 
precisely one of the key problems for many countries and developing countries in particular. 
Tadesse (2000) argues therefore that a market-based financial system has great potential for 
growth if the financial system itself is well-developed. But if a market-based financial system 
is forced upon an underdeveloped economy, then the overall impact on the economy could 
be problematic.  
An economy may start off with a bank-based financial system and as it develops, it can 
move towards a more market-based financial system. Empirical evidence seems to prove the 
point, as the US, still the largest economy in the world, operates under a market-based 
financial system. On the other hand, the East Asian Tigers, as well as some of the biggest and 
most successful economies in the World, e.g. Germany, have retained themselves as 
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predominantly bank-based financial systems even though they have elements of a market-
base system.  
1.3.3 Bank-based vs. Market-based: Is one better than the other? 
 After reading about the two ideal-types, one question immediately comes to mind: Is 
one better than the other? Can we say that one system is better than the other or are these 
not more than theoretical ideal types? Are the delegated monitors with their relationship 
lending, i.e. banks, better at channelling capital to the most efficient use? Are markets, which 
know not one master and rely on transparency and the wide dissemination of information, 
better than banks?  
Chakraborty and Ray (2006: 348) find in a global study comparing the two types of 
system, the bank-based systems have two key advantages: (1) they have higher levels of 
investment and GDP per capita, and (2) the system tends to provide more external finance to 
a higher number of entrepreneurs, which is likely to help manufacturing. On the flipside, we 
may argue that this is not necessarily evidence for a better financial system. Higher levels on 
investment as such can also indicate the existence of investment bubbles. Providing more 
external finance to a greater number of entrepreneurs could also just be a sign of the 
entrepreneur’s inability to finance their undertaking through retained earnings or simply just 
mean that the financial system is over reliant on banks, because there are no developed 
financial markets or other sources of finance. So while these two key advantages might sound 
convincing at first, they themselves are not necessarily indicators that a bank-based system is 
necessarily better than a market-based financial system. 
Levine (2002) highlights one major flaw in the existing research on this question. All 
research into whether one system is better than the other has in the past been largely centre 
around four countries, which all have similar long-term growth rates. Most research has 
traditionally focused on Germany and Japan as bank-based financial systems and the US and 
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the UK as market-based financial systems. It concludes, that in essence there is no cross-
country empirical support to argue that either one of the two systems is better or worse than 
the other. What matters rather than the financial system are the institutions, which govern it 
and the legal system, that individuals can use to enforce their claims and settle their disputes. 
Thus, more emphasis should be given to whether the financial system provides the functions 
it ought to rather than whether it is bank-based or market-based. The latter is not necessarily 
linked to economic growth. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) consider financial development as a whole as playing a major 
supportive role for economic growth. They define financial development of an economy by 
the ratio of domestic credit plus stock-market capitalization to GDP and sound and well-
developed accounting standards. The former looks in a more holistic manner at the 
development of the financial system by combining domestic credit through financial 
intermediaries with stock-market capitalization and puts that into relation with the economic 
capabilities of a said economy. This allows for a view that is not focused on whether a financial 
system is bank-based or market-based but looks at whether the two financial sectors are well 
developed. Lastly, sound accounting standards are further evidence of a well functioning 
financial system, as they tend to provide a more transparent picture of businesses, regardless 
of whether they are publicly traded or reliant on bank finance. 
In a wide-ranging study of credit risk and credit management, Purda (2008) has found 
significant differences between the two systems. The study looks at the credit risk across 
different financial systems and argues that due to the monitoring function of the banking 
sector, firms in a bank-based financial system are believed to pose lower risk to investors than 
firms in a market-based financial system. All of this is despite generally using higher 
proportions of debt. It further looks at the issue of debt and restructuring. Here it argues that 
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the bank-based financial system has a clear advantage over the market-based financial system. 
As a bank finance is usually in form of a bank loan from one or a handful institutions, this 
allows for much easier restructuring. Rather than involving hundreds or thousands of 
individual investors in the market, the restructuring amongst one or a handful of creditors can 
be done more swiftly and efficiently. 
 Despite these findings, it is not possible to establish conclusively whether one or the 
other system is better for economic development. In fact, the majority of the literature 
establishes no significant difference in long-term growth rates between both types of financial 
system. Consequently, we cannot conclude if one is better than the other, only that they are 
different. What is important for the purpose of this dissertation is that the existing literature 
has used a bivariate distinction in an attempt to classify financial systems. While this certainly 
makes for interesting comparisons about the different economic structures that the systems 
produce, I seek to highlight in this study a specific problem resulting from this binary 
distinction between the two ideal-type systems – the fact that it does not take account of the 
shadow-banking sector. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether the existing 
framework needs to be expanded to include shadow-banking as a third financial sector, one 
that supplements the two formal financial sectors. By examining the Chinese financial system 
in particular, we seek to determine whether the shadow-banking sector should be included as 
a separate and distinct sector of the financial system. 
1.4. Concluding Remarks 
 Financial systems design theory is a complex field. It deals not just with the 
interactions within financial institutions, but also with the complex network of interactions 
between financial institutions, the economy and the whole society. Its main contribution has 
been that we can broadly identify two ideal-types, that financial systems conform to. Its 
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main flaw is that data suggests, that both systems create very similar results. If this is the 
case, why should we spend time on analysing them? My literature review has indicated that 
the institutions governing financial sectors matter. The literature also demonstrates that it is 
important to look beyond the binary distinction of financial systems. It is not enough to look 
at only two financial sectors and attempt to neatly classify any financial system according to 
whether it has strong banks or strong markets. What happens, if banks are not governed by 
individuals, who see effective credit intermediation as the the most crucial function that 
banks should provide? What happens if markets exist but they are not free from outside 
interference? These are questions to which financial systems design theory does not have 
answers. The data analysed for this study confirms that we need to look beyond banks and 
financial markets to truly have an understanding of the financial system in a country like the 




Chapter 2: Methodology 
Researching and analysing potentially sensitive topics such as shadow banking 
provided me with a complicated research task. Due to the complexity of shadow banking and 
the potential legal implications of being involved in it, how can research into the role of the 
shadow banking sector be conducted? What methodology is best to safely research both legal 
and illegal institutions and activities, as well as experiences with them?  
This chapter will now firstly discus the research design adopted for this study. As 
Tressel (2003) notes in his research on informal finance, there is a lack of reliable quantitative 
data to study and analyse this particular form of shadow banking. Therefore, qualitative 
methods are much better suited to research informal finance. On the other hand, purely 
relying on qualitative methods might also pose a challenge, e.g. a selection bias. This chapter 
therefore seeks to discus the methodology adopted for this research project: a mixed-
methods approach. I will discus the merits and potential issues surrounding different potential 
research methods and highlight the steps taken to overcome them by employing a mixed-
methods approach. 
This chapter will then provide an overview of the qualitative and quantitative methods 
used in this study. Each section will further include a description of potential issues, which 
arose throughout the research as well as the steps taken to potentially overcome them. 
All research for this study was undertaken, during my time as a visiting researcher at 
the Renmin University of China between October 2014 and 2015. The King’s College Research 
Ethics Office approved the research on April 2nd, 2014 under reference REP/13/14-58. The 
ethics clearance covers the entire project for the whole of the duration. Ethics clearance was 
amended following a feasibility test in May 2014 to include verbal consent for interviewees, 
as written consent was not feasible for the research at hand.  
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2.1. Research design 
 The Shadow banking sector, as Chapter 4 explores and discusses in great detail, 
includes a range of different institutions and actors. Some of these actors wear suits and 
operate legal, formally regulated enterprises. Others may operate informally, lending money 
amongst friends and family or might be engaged in illegal activities, e.g. usurious loans. This 
begets the question, how we can plan to understand the function this sector plays in the wider 
fabric that is the Chinese financial system? Researching and analysing the function played by 
this sectors requires a complex and well-developed research design. 
 Qualitative methods are often the seen as the preferred strategy to analyse “why” and 
“how” research questions, especially when the research focuses on contemporary 
phenomena (Kohlbacher, 2006). They allow for a detailed investigation of a certain 
phenomenon within its specific context (Hartley, 2004). Since qualitative methods deal with 
the interpretation of words in their meaning and context, it is open to criticism for bias. 
Beuving and de Vries (2015: 171) said that at times, some regard qualitative research ‘as an 
art more than a craft’, i.e. somewhat inferior to other quantitative methods.  My experiences 
discussing my research with my colleagues at Renmin University’s School of Economics and 
Finance further underlined this scepticism, especially amongst financial economists. In the 
eyes of some, qualitative methods do not have a place in the study of financial systems.  
In order to generate knowledge about the function of the shadow banking sector, 
qualitative methods provide the right arsenal of tools. If used correctly and the research is 
conducted properly, they allow us to analyse pattern theory, an interpretation end 
explanation of phenomena by fitting them within a wider theoretical pattern (Beuving and de 
Vries, 2015). This study uses qualitative data on the experiences with shadow banking in order 
to fit them within the wider theoretical pattern that is financial systems design theory. 
Qualitative research can take on various forms, but the most applicable to the central question 
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of this study is the qualitative interview. Qualitative interviews allow us to see a research topic 
through the eyes of the interviewee (King, 2004). The purpose of these interviews is to collect 
descriptive evidence of the experiences of interviewees in order to interpret their meaning 
(Kvale, 1983).  Interviews allow us researchers to gather an understanding of a phenomenon, 
which might be impossible to express in numbers or for which data is unreliable. For reasons, 
which go far beyond the limitations and scope of this research, official data in China is often 
criticized for its validity and reliability4. Hence other approaches are better suited than a pure 
quantitative analysis. For this study, qualitative methods are further ideal, because the 
function of the shadow banking sector is hard to express in numbers. In order to generate an 
understanding of the potential functions of this sector, it is vital for us to talk to those, to 
whom it provides these functions, and analyse their interview data. 
 In order for interviews to serve this purpose and produce high quality data, interviews 
must adhere to certain criteria. Merton and Kendall (1946) identified four criteria for a good 
interview. The first criterion is non-direction. The interviewee must be able to express what is 
on their mind, rather than what the interviewer wants to hear. The goal of the interview 
should be to see the research topic through the eyes of the interviewee (King, 2004). The 
second is specificity. There is little insight to be gathered on the question of shadow banking, 
if the interviewee tells me about her or his favourite recipe or sports team. It is thus vital that, 
even when asking open-ended questions, the interviewer keeps the interview’s focus on a 
given topic. The third criterion is range. The interview should cover the widest range of aspects 
concerning the topic at hand in the time available for the interview. In this study, for example, 
                                                        
4 For a more detailed discussion on the lack of reliability of Chinese investment data, see Liu 
et al (2016). For a discussion on the reliability of Chinese economic data in general, see Xu, 
Wang and Gao (2013). For a more general discussion on the problems of obtaining reliable 
quantitative data on shadow banking, see Tressel (2003). 
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it is important that the interview covers a wide range of functions of the shadow banking 
sector. For example, an entrepreneur might have experience in borrowing money from 
shadow banks, but might have also invested his or her own personal funds in another. Both 
experiences provide us with valid insights and data on the functions of the sector overall. The 
fourth and final criterion is depth and personal context. Covering a wide range alone is not 
insightful, if the trade-off is to sacrifice on depth or personal context. The goal of the interview 
is to see how the interviewee experiences things and not simply list the things that the 
interviewee experiences. To relate this criterion back to our research question, it is not only 
interesting to see, which shadow banks entrepreneurs use, but also understand how they feel 
about the services they provide vis-à-vis other shadow banks and the formal financial sectors. 
These four criteria were taken into account and met, when the fieldwork for this study was 
undertaken. 
 In addition to the quality of data, there are additional challenges associated with the 
wider research design and analysis of it. Bleich and Pekannen (2013) outline three distinct 
challenges associated with interview data and its analysis. The first is accuracy of reporting. 
When we analyse interview data, we might selectively include references or quotes, while not 
reporting their context adequately. This is a valid concern and criticism, for which there is only 
one possible solution: full transparency. In order to be more transparent in research and 
analysis, thereby strengthening the findings of one’s research, is to include full transcripts of 
all interviews and make them available to readers. Transcripts are available from the author 
upon request. The second is the representativeness of the sample. This is a concern, which is 
often formulated by proponents of quantitative methods, who feel that studies should be 
based on a perfectly randomised sample. In the field of Chinese Studies, this concern is 
probably even more valid if research data is used to make broad claims about the whole of 
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China based on fieldwork conducted in one city. This concern is one, which is important to 
keep in mind, yet due to the limitations of this project, a fully randomised sample including 
every province of China would have not been feasible. Even within Nanjing, where only 
qualitative methods informed this research, a fully randomised sample would have not been 
possible, because interview partners were not easy to recruit. This is a limitation of both 
method and sample, which the author is aware of but had no opportunity to overcome it. The 
last potential problem, which might affect the analysis of interview data is the type and quality 
of the information obtained. In other words, can we trust what the interviewees have been 
telling us? Doubts about reliability are difficult, if not impossible, to truly overcome. We can 
only take at face value what interviewees have said. My analysis of interview data has hence 
sought to only make general statements, if several sources have relayed the same information 
to me. If only one source offered valuable insights, this is clearly marked as such. 
 In order to address and overcome the general problems associated with the analysis 
of interview data, I have taken certain measures. Firstly, transcripts are available upon request 
and a reference in the footnotes, where it is appropriate. The reader can therefore, if in doubt, 
see the quote or fact in its original context. Furthermore, in 3.2. this chapter will provide a full 
overview of the sample frame, including the response rate and type. As most of these 
interviewees were recruited through snowballing, I have further included a tree diagram of if 
and how the different interviewees are interconnected. This seeks to address some of the 
issues regarding the reliability and representativeness of my data. Lastly, I provide a full table 
of the format, length and location of the interview. All interviews used in the analysis were 
translated, recorded and transcribed to enhance the quality of my research data. 
 As Thøgersen (2006:111) points out, foreigners with knowledge of ‘textbook Chinese 
run into language problems, as soon as they leave the protected world of educated informants.’ 
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Due to limitations of my language proficiency, all Chinese interviews were conducted with the 
aid of an interpreter. Apart from a few examples, e.g. Temple (2002), Fujii (2013) or 
Borchegevink (2003), not much has been written on the impact of interpreter on interviews. 
Fujii (2013) notes, that direct interviews, i.e. without the help on an interpreter, have clear 
advantages. First of all, they allow the interviewer to exercise better and more nuanced 
control over the interview process. They further allow the researcher to build better rapport 
with his research subject. All of this is said to enable a smoother and clearer interview, 
especially if the content of the interview is somewhat sensitive. Lastly, the translation and 
presence of the interpreter, might distort responses. All of these are valid points, which would 
make a direct interview without the aid of an interpreter the most desirable option.  
Using an interpreter on the other hand can also have benefits. Thøgersen (2006) notes 
that, in the context of China especially, there are a great deal of benefits of using a local 
interpreter. Textbook Mandarin might allow a researcher to conduct interviews with party 
officials, but soon reaches its limitations outside of those circles. Local interpreters can help, 
if they are proficient in the local dialect. For this study’s research, an interpreter was a 
necessity. I do not possess the necessary language skills to conduct interviews on the Chinese 
financial system in Mandarin. In order to ensure that the data gathered through my interviews 
was of the highest possible quality, I used an interpreter to improve interview conditions. I 
was aware of the issues described above and sought to alleviate them. In my dealings with my 
interviewees, I often made the first introduction in Mandarin myself, outlining my research 
project and my role as a researcher. I then kindly asked the interviewee if he objected to me 
switching to English and continuing with the help of my interpreter. Both of my interpreters 
were postgraduate students in international economics at the John Hopkins Centre in Nanjing.  
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This was particularly useful, because they also understood the context of both, 
questions and answers. As Fujii (2013) notes, the vocabulary used in academic research might 
be highly specialised, and words or ideas might not translate with ease across different 
languages. The latter was a particular problem, I encountered with this study. The literal 
translation of shadow banking into Chinese is (Yǐngzi yínháng). This is the term, 
which is found in official documents and is also used in the academic context. During a 
discussion with my local interpreter, I discovered that for many in Nanjing, this actually 
referred to informal finance, rather than any type of shadow banking. Subsequently, we 
adopted the word (Fēi yínháng), which literally means non-bank financial institution 
(NBFI) and informed the interviewee that the scope of the research covered all aspects of 
shadow banking, including NBFIs. Without an interpreter, I would have fallen into the pitfall 
so vividly described by Thøgersen’s quote above. Qualitative methods are well-suited for this 
research task for the reasons discussed so far. Despite some shortcomings, most of which can 
easily be alleviated if recognised and taken into consideration, they provide the best tools for 
this study. 
In addition to the steps outlined above, I further sought to reduce the shortcomings of 
relying purely on qualitative methods by including some quantitative data and adopting a 
mixed-method approach. Greene et al (1989) outlines three distinct purposes for adopting a 
mixed-methods research design, which are relevant to this study: triangulation, 
complementarity, expansion. Triangulation allows us corroborate or dispute the findings of 
one method through another. Complementarity describes the use of both methods to 
measure and evaluate overlapping but distinct aspects of a phenomenon (Carcelli and Greene, 
1993). Expansion refers to the extension of range and width of findings by applying different 
methods to a central research question. In order to utilise these three purposes, I decided to 
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use an online survey aimed at entrepreneurs and financial executives of privately owned 
enterprises. As this survey was anonymous and could be taken in the privacy of the research 
subjects home, I expected subjects to be open and frank about their use of the shadow 
banking sector. As this removes any influence that an interviewer or interpreter might have 
on the research subject, I expected the data collected to be accurate and thought-enhancing, 
yet not as rich in detail as that provided by interviewees. In other words, the survey data would 
complement the interview data in valuable ways.   
2.2 Qualitative Methods 
The following section seeks to outline and describe the interview data used in this 
study. It will firstly highlight the methods used in collecting data, the sample frame as well as 
response rate and type. It will then discus the coding method employed on this study’s data. 
Interview transcript are provided in the appendix of this study.   
2.2.1 Sample Group, Recruitment and Response Rate 
During my fieldwork in Nanjing and Beijing, I conducted a total of 46 interviews with 
entrepreneurs, key informants, finance experts and finance professional of all age groups, 
gender and socio-economic backgrounds. Due to the suspected function of shadow banking 
in the Chinese financial system, I identified three groups of stakeholders: entrepreneurs, 
finance professionals and academic key informants. I decided t to interview entrepreneurs, 
because they are likely to have been involved in shadow banking at some stage during their 
career. To determine the role, which the shadow banking sector plays in the Chinese financial 
system, it is best to seek information from those, who have come in contact with it. The same 
logic applies to anyone working in the formal financial sector. If shadow banking provides 
additional services to other economic actors within the financial system, then anyone working 
within the financial sector, e.g. loan officers in commercial banks, will have to possess some 
knowledge of the services they provide. It is vital for the research question to establish how 
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these actors see their own activities in shaping the role of the shadow-banking sector.  In the 
formal banking sector, I recruited loan officers and other finance professionals through 
personal and alumni networks. In the shadow banking sector, I sought to recruit actors in legal, 
quasi-legal and illegal subcategories. Lastly, I sough to recruit other key informants, e.g. 
academics or other leading experts on the Chinese financial system. 
Out of the 46 interviewees, 22 interviewees agreed to be recorded. These recorded 
interviews form the interview data analysed in this study. The other 24 interviews, which were 
not recorded, were not explicitly included in the analysis. There were not included in order to 
overcome issues surrounding the accuracy of reporting as well as the quality of information 
obtained. Some of these interviewees turned out to have limited knowledge or involvement 
with the shadow banking sector in China. Others would simply outline and repeat the legal 
aspects of shadow banking, which put into question the quality of information provided by 
them. Lastly, as there was no transcript of these interviews, it was not possible to use them 
during coding and the subsequent analysis of interview data. There was simply no physical 
evidence of what they had told me and thus I could not use them as evidence in my analysis. 
The information did influence this research nonetheless, for the often highlighted or shaped 
aspects, which were subsequently brought up by me in other interviews. All recorded 
interviews were assigned a unique identifier in the format of:  
(location)-(year)-(month)-(sequential number of interviews in that month) 
Interviews conducted in Beijing had the location prefix BJ. Interviews conducted in Nanjing 
had the location prefix NJ. An interview conducted in Shanghai had the location prefix SH. In 
order to ensure confidentiality and the interviewees anonymity, names and identifiers were 
store separately in encrypted files. 
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Table 2 - Interview Sample 
Identifier Role Date Location Interpreter Class Location Gender 
BJ-14-11-001 Expert 04.11.14 Cafe n Expert Beijing m 
BJ-14-11-002 Manager P2P 14.11.14 Cafe n Finance Professional Beijing f 
NJ-14-12-001 Entrepreneur 01.12.14 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-002 VC Project Manager 01.12.14 Office y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-003 Real Estate Developer 02.12.14 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-004 Deputy General Manager Microloan Company 02.12.14 Cafe y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-005 Entrepreneur & former Shadow Banker 03.12.14 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-006 Entrepreneur 03.12.14 Office n Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-007 GM Venture Capital Company 04.12.14 Office n Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-008 Investment Banker 04.12.14 Office y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-14-12-009 Professor 05.12.14 Office n Expert Nanjing m 
NJ-15-02-001 Incubator 09.02.15 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
BJ-15-03-001 Manager PE Fund 09.03.15 Office n Finance Professional Beijing m 
NJ-15-03-001 Entrepreneur 17.03.15 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-15-03-002 Incubator 18.03.15 Office y Entrepreneur Nanjing f 
NJ-15-03-003 Wealth Management Fund Manager 18.03.15 Office y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
SH-15-03-001 Loan Officer JSCB 21.03.14 Cafe n Finance Professional Shanghai m 
NJ-15-05-001 Entrepreneur 27.05.15 Cafe y Entrepreneur Nanjing m 
NJ-15-06-001 Venture Capitalist 16.06.15 Office y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-15-06-002 Loan Shark 18.06.15 Restaurant y Finance Professional Nanjing m 
NJ-15-07-001 Venture Capitalist 14.07.15 Office y Finance Professional Nanjing m 




Each interviewee was assigned an overarching category. The sample consisted of 
entrepreneurs, finance professionals and experts.  Finance professionals included all 
individuals, who work for financial institutions, whether they belong to the formal banking 
sector, financial markets or shadow banks. The two experts were a renown international 
expert of the Chinese financial system and a professor at a leading research institution based 
in Nanjing. In total, 50% of the interviewees were finance professionals, 41% were 
entrepreneurs and 9% were experts. The sample presented a strong male bias, with 20 
interviewees, or 91%, being male and 2 interviewees, or 9%, being female. This male bias 
within the sample might be the result of the recruitment strategy. The network of 
entrepreneurs I was introduced to were mostly male. The vast majority of interviews, 81.82% 
were conducted in Nanjing. I conducted the remainder in Beijing (13.64%) and Shanghai 
(4.55%). Almost one third of all interviews, or 32%, were conducted with the interviewee in 
English. The remaining 68% of interviews were conducted in Chinese using a local interpreter. 
The latter were translated simultaneously, allowing me to ask follow up question. After the 
fieldwork was concluded, the quality and accuracy of the translation was checked by a native 
speaker. The use of a local interpreter in Nanjing in two cases allowed for a greater rapport 
with the interviewee, namely in the cases NJ-15-06-002 and NJ-14-12-005. The former was a 
local private lender and the latter was a former private lender, who now owned various 
businesses. The presence of a local interpreter, who spoke their dialect, created a more 
relaxed atmosphere and allowed for more fruitful interviews.  A total of 16 interviews were 
conducted in the offices of the interviewees, five in Cafes and one in a restaurant. Response 
rates for qualitative interviews are often neglected as part of their analysis (Bleich and 
Pekannen, 2013). In total, 70 interviewees were contacted for this study, of whom 46 agreed 
to be interviewed. Their gross response rate was 66%. However only 22 interviewees agreed 
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to be recorded and only recorded interviews were subsequently transcribed and used in my 
analysis. I personally transcribed the English translation of the interviews.  The net response 
rate was therefore 31.5%. 
Below is an organisational chart of my relationship with each interviewee. The first 
group of interviewees were selected due to their accessibility and some of the contacts were 
subsequently used for snowballing. Interviewee BJ-14-11-001 was known to me before the 
fieldwork commenced and is regarded as a leading academic expert on the Chinese financial 
system. Interviewee BJ-14-11-002 was not known to me before, but was recruited through a 
mutual friend in London. Interviewee SH-15-03-001 and NJ-14-12-007 are part of my alma 
mater’s alumni network and were recruited at an alumni event in Shanghai. At the time, NJ-
14-12-007 was the general manager of a venture capital fund in Nanjing. He willingly and 
voluntarily offered to introduce me to entrepreneurs, incubators and financial professionals, 
whom he knows. He subsequently became my gatekeeper in Nanjing and through him, I was 
able to recruit interviewees, NJ-14-12-001, NJ-14-12-002, NJ-14-12-003, NJ-14-12-005, NJ-14-
12-006, NJ-14-12-008, NJ-15-2-001, NJ-15-06-001, NJ-15-07-001 and NJ-15-08-001. None of 
these interviewees were previously known to me. Through NJ-14-12-001 I was able to recruit 
NJ-14-12-004, who was a personal friend of the former and was the deputy general manager 
of one of the largest microloan companies in Nanjing. NJ-14-12-005 was initially introduced to 
me as an entrepreneur. During the course of the interview, I discovered that he had been 
involved in informal finance before he became an entrepreneur and still had a large network 
in the field. Through him I was able to recruit NJ-15-03-001, NJ-15-03-002, NJ-15-05-001 and 
NJ-15-06-002. None of these interviewees were previously known to me or my initial 
gatekeeper in Nanjing. Interviewee NJ-14-12-009 was recruited through a talk on shadow 
banking in Shanghai, where he was the key speaker. He was not known to me prior to the 
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interview. Interviewee BJ-15-03-001 was introduced to me through a mutual friend, who 













NJ-14-12-006 NJ-14-12-008 NJ-15-2-001 NJ-15-06-001 NJ-15-07-001 NJ-15-08-001
NJ-14-12-009 BJ-15-3-001 SH-15-03-001
Diagram 2 - Tree Diagram of relationships between interviewees 
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2.2.2 Interview Questions 
 All interviews were semi-structured interviews. A few general questions were used 
across all interviews to allow for an easier comparability of answers. Where appropriate and 
insightful, Interviewees were asked follow up questions. Entrepreneurs were mainly asked 
about their personal experience in obtaining loans from different types of financial institutions. 
The aim here was to assess, if entrepreneurs felt it was easier or more difficult to obtain bank 
loans vis-à-vis shadow bank loans. It was further important to establish, which financial 
institutions entrepreneurs used and why. While the main aim of these interviews was to 
gather information on the experiences of entrepreneurs, they also aimed at gathering 
information about the way in which shadow banking operates and on what terms and 
conditions loans are extended. A full list of core questions for interviewees is included in the 
appendix of this study. The interview questions broadly sought to address three core themes: 
regulation, competition and experiences. The first theme sought to establish, if regulation 
plays a role in shaping the function of the shadow banking sector. Directly related is the 
question, whether shadow banks compete with the the formal financial sectors. Interview 
questions lastly sought to gather data on experiences with the shadow banking and the 
banking sectors. These experiences included, for example, loan approval times, interest rates 
or internal procedures. 
 Entrepreneurs were first asked as an opening questions, whether the financial sector 
in China was too heavily regulated when it comes to private enterprise finance. This question 
sought to establish whether the interviewee saw the problems associated with access to 
finance as a regulatory issue or whether they felt there were other reasons. Interviewees were 
further asked, if they felt that a lack of competition made it more difficult to obtain access to 
bank loans. Entrepreneurs were further asked about their own experiences with the formal 
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banking sector vis-à-vis the shadow banking sector. For example, entrepreneurs were asked if 
they had heard of initiatives to allow banks to accept collateral for loans in the form of 
intellectual property. The questions, which provided the most interesting insights, asked 
entrepreneurs whether China needed a shadow banking sector and if so, if the interviewee 
could name three distinct reasons for this need. In interviews towards the end of the fieldwork, 
this was one of the first questions asked by the interviewer. It helped to give the interviews 
scope and structure, because it provided an opportunity for follow up questions. 
Entrepreneurs were further asked, how they would obtain a loan from a shadow bank. This 
question sought to establish the different ways, in which borrowers secure loans from shadow 
banks. Lastly, entrepreneurs were asked how much interest they paid for loans from different 
shadow banks, if they had used them.  
 Interviews with finance professionals and academic key informants mainly centred on 
assessing the extent to which regulation and the corporate governance of SOCBs are shaping 
the functions of the shadow banking sector in the Chinese financial system. Questions aimed 
to establish the extent to which the regulatory framework and ownership structure of the 
formal financial sector shaped the role played by the shadow banking sector. Interviews with 
finance professionals, both in the formal financial sectors as well as the shadow banking sector, 
further aimed to generate an understanding of how loan decisions are being made. 
Interviewing various actors within the shadow banking sector, both formal and informal 
lenders, provided me with invaluable insights into the inner workings of the sector and its 
relationship with the formal financial sectors. Finance professionals and shadow bankers were 
firstly asked what their institution accepted as collateral. The scope of this question was to 
establish, whether one institution had a competitive advantage over the other by accepting 
different forms of collateral. This group was further asked, whether they had encountered 
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initiatives to accept intellectual property as collateral for loans and if this system could work 
elsewhere. In addition to questions on the internal procedures of their respective institutions, 
the interviewees were also asked more broadly about the function of the shadow banking 
sector within the financial system. In particular, I was interested in establishing whether they 
thought that shadow banks were competing with regular banks. Can shadow banks effectively 
challenge the role of banks and possibly even replace them?   
2.2.3. Analysis 
 Following transcription, all interviews were coded using NVivo for Mac. The first round 
of coding aimed at identifying emergent categories in the data (Beuving and de Vries, 2015: 
163). Emergent categories allow the researcher to identify meaningful categories in the data. 
The aim was to understand experiences of and with the financial system as a whole. In order 
to engage in a meaningful analysis of the function of the shadow banking sector, it was 
important to understand the inner workings of the financial system as a whole. Therefore, the 
data was coded broadly into categories. During the second and third round, I engaged in axial 
coding (Beuving and de Vries, 2015: 166). Axial coding means that ‘categories emerge into new 
higher order categories’ (Beuving and de Vries, 2015: 166). The two main themes, which 
emerged subsequently highlighted the functions of the formal financial sectors, namely 
financial markets and formal banks, vis-à-vis the shadow banking sector. Another theme, that 
emerged through axial coding were distinct supplementary functions, which the shadow 
banking sector provides. Out of the emergent categories identified in the early rounds of 
coding came four distinct functions. Other key themes were regulation and the role of 
government. The tree map diagram below shows coding for different key themes across the 
entire sample.  
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What became apparent after the analysis of all material was concluded and interviews 
had been coded for a third time was that there were certain shadow banking institutions, 
which were used frequently, e.g. microfinance or P2P. Others, which had been frequently 
referred to in the literature review did not play a role in the financial landscape of Nanjing, 
e.g. pawnshops or rotating credit and savings associations. The institutional analysis of 
Nanjing’s shadow banking sector subsequently focused on the most frequently coded 
institutions in the sample. It further became apparent, that the shadow banking sector 
provided a range of functions to the entire financial system not just to entrepreneurs or other 
borrowers.  
2.2.4. Issues  
 Through the fieldwork and analysis, I encountered two main issues. The first issue was 
identified early on during the fieldwork. During the interview NJ-14-12-001 it became 
apparent, that the interviewee understood the term shadow banking (	) as referring 
solely to informal and even illicit finance. He proceeded to say that he had never used ‘shadow 
banking’ but had often used ‘non-banks’ (
	). In subsequent interviews, I personally only 
used the term for shadow banking after explaining that in academic literature it refers to any 
form of non-bank financial institution and is not limited to informal or illicit finance. 
 The second issue, which had an impact on the analysis is the relatively small sample 
size. While it is important to note that the quality of information I was able to obtain was good 
and all interviewees provided valuable and important insights into the role of the shadow 
banking sector, the low number of recorded and transcribed interviews does affect the 
representativeness of the sample. Furthermore, I was unable to recruit a large number of 
interviewees in Beijing. This means that the findings on Beijing are largely informed by the 
findings of the quantitative fieldwork. 
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2.3. Quantitative Methods 
 Due to the nature of the shadow-banking sector and the various institutions that 
constitute it, quantifiable data on shadow- banking is scarce. To supplement the findings 
derived through the above-mentioned methods, I decided to also use survey methods and 
attempt a triangulation of my findings. From October 2014 to August 2015, I ran an online 
survey for entrepreneurs. The survey was written in simplified Chinese characters to allow an 
easy access for all entrepreneurs.  
2.3.1 Sample Group, Recruitment and Response Rate 
 The survey was aimed at entrepreneurs and business executives. Participants were 
recruited online and offline. Online recruitment was done by proxy, through entrepreneurs, 
with whom I had previous encounters or friendly relationships. These entrepreneurs were 
asked to forward the link to the online survey to their friends and peers through online social 
media. Two platforms were particularly useful in the recruitment process, Tencent Weibo (
 ) and WeChat ( ). The latter platform also has large chat groups for 
entrepreneurs in Shanghai and Beijing. Through personal contacts, the link for the online 
survey was posted in these groups. Offline, participants were recruited using personal social 
networks.  I personally send the link to the survey to entrepreneurs, with whom I had friendly 
relationships. 
As the link was shared widely across the country, and through various social media 
outlets, it was viewed by 1187 potential participants. Out of this potential pool of participants, 
206 started the survey subsequently. A total of 126 participants completed the survey. In total, 
61.16% of those, who commenced the survey ultimately completed it. Part of this low rate of 
successfully completed responses is that the first two questions included knock-out criteria 
for the participants, which were not previously known to them. Participants were given a 
choice of different professions and potential positions, which they might hold within a 
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commercial enterprise. Any participant, who answered that they were not an entrepreneur 
was subsequently excluded from taking part in the rest of the survey.   
Overall, respondents came from 14 different locations throughout China. The largest 
group of respondents within the sample came from Beijing. This was particularly useful, 
because I had not been able to recruit many interviewees in Beijing. A total of 27 participants 
from Beijing completed the survey. The table below outlines the distribution within the 
dataset according to sorting criteria used in the World Bank Investment Climate Survey. As 
this is the most comprehensive dataset on enterprise finance available, I have used the same 
criteria to potentially allow for comparability. 
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Table 3 – Survey Sample Distribution 
Gender Count %  More than 10% foreign Ownership Count % 
Male 19 70,37%  Yes 4 14,81% 
Female 8 29,63%  No 23 85,19% 
Age of Participant Count %  Annual Turnover Count % 
20-29 Years 10 37,04%  <10,000 CNY 4 14,81% 
30-39 Years 15 55,56%  10,000 - 100,000 CNY 8 29,63% 
>40 Years 2 7,41%  100,000 - 999,999 CNY 9 33,33% 
Sector Count %  >1,000,000 CNY 6 22,22% 
Chemicals 1 3,70%  Age of Enterprise Count % 
Construction 2 7,41%  N/A 1 3,70% 
Consulting 5 18,52%  ≤ 1 year 10 37,04% 
Food 2 7,41%  ≤ 5 years 12 44,44% 
Garments 1 3,70%  ≤ 10 years 2 7,41% 
IT 4 14,81%  ≤ 15 years 2 7,41% 
Machinery and Equipment 3 11,11%     
Other 5 18,52%     
Other Manufacturing 2 7,41%     
Textiles 1 3,70%     
Transport 1 3,70%     
No. of Employees Count %     
self-employed 5 18,52%     
1 to 4 Employees 3 11,11%     
5 to 9 Employees 10 37,04%     
10  to 19 Employees 6 22,22%     
20 to 99 Employees 1 3,70%     
Over 100 Employees 2 7,41%     
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 Just like the sample of qualitative data, this dataset too presents a clear male bias. In 
total, 19 participants identified as male and eight participants identified as female. The 
majority of participants were between 30 to 39 years old, when they took the survey. The 
second largest group were participants between 20 to 29 years of age. Overall, participants 
worked in a range of different industries. The largest two sub-samples worked in IT, consulting 
and other. The size of the participant’s enterprise was measured through two proxies. The 
first is the number of employees and the second the annual turnover in Chinese Yuan (CNY). 
In terms of their number of employees, the full range, from self-employed to over 100 
employees, was represented in the sample. The three largest sub-groups were enterprises 
with five to nine and ten to nineteen employees, as well as self-employed entrepreneurs. In 
terms of their annual turnover, the sample too included enterprises with a turnover under 
10,000 CNY to over 1,000,000 CNY. The sample also presented a strong bias against 
enterprises with foreign shareholders. Only 4 out of 27 participants declared that their 
enterprise had more then 10% foreign ownership. The threshold of 10% was adopted from 
the World Bank Investment Climate Survey. The vast majority of enterprises had been in 
operation for under five years. Almost half of all participants had been operating for between 
one to five years.  
 The research design of this study does not allow us to independently verify the 
information provided by the survey respondents. This might be considered as a shortcoming, 
because we cannot verify that all information provided is accurate or genuine. I am aware that 
this is a potential shortcoming. An alternative was not feasible, because entrepreneurs were 
unlikely to fully disclose their business accounts to an outsider for research. Furthermore, the 
anonymity of an online survey was necessary to obtain any information at all. 
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2.3.2. Survey Structure and Questions 
The aim of the survey was to establish, which lines of credit private enterprises used. 
The goal was to enhance our understanding and comprehension of whether the formal 
banking sector was competing with the shadow banking sector or whether participants used 
the latter out of necessity. It was further the aim to of the survey to establish, if the source of 
finance used changed over time. For example, it is understandable that an enterprise in the 
start-up stage may not have access to bank finance. A colloquial saying amongst 
entrepreneurs and scholars of business goes, that in the beginning only the ‘three Fs’5 invest 
in an enterprise but not banks. Entrepreneurs were therefore asked to indicate, which sources 
of finance they had used in their initial start-up phase. Entrepreneurs were further asked to 
indicate, which sources of finance they had used in the twelve months prior to taking the 
survey. Entrepreneurs were further asked to indicate, what percentage of their total finance 
had come from these sources. It generates little insight into the role of the shadow banking 
sector to only see, that an entrepreneur had used both bank loans and shadow bank loans, 
but not know, where most of the capital originated from. For example, if 99.99% of finance 
had come from bank loans and only 0.01% from shadow bank loans, the function of the 
shadow banking sector is different than if it is the other way round. Simply asking if an 
institution had been used is not enough.  
In order to establish if entrepreneurs used shadow banks, because they were 
accessible or because they preferred using them, participants were asked to rank a range of 
institutions according to their preference and according to their accessibility. It may be that 
entrepreneurs use shadow banks, because the banking sector is not providing adequate loan 
facilities. It may also be the case that they use shadow banks, because the quality of service 
                                                        
5 The three Fs refer to friends, family and fools.  
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provided by the shadow banking sector. In order to ascertain this, the survey also asked 
participants to rate the services provided by formal financial institutions and the shadow 
banking sector. Lastly, the survey sought to establish, if the access to finance has had a positive 
or negative impact on the individual enterprise’s development. For example, we may find that 
the shadow banking sector has been successful at alleviating problems connected to the 
access to finance and that overall, through a use of different and various institutions, 
entrepreneurs felt that access to finance was not an issue for them. 
Lastly, participants were asked for comments regarding the role and state of the 
shadow banking sector in the Chinese financial system. This open-ended question was 
included to allow participants to highlight and add aspects, which they felt were important 
but were not covered by the standard survey. 
The final ten questions of the survey allowed us to group the responses, by asking 
about the entrepreneurs age, gender, place of residence (hukou), place of business and level 
of education. The participants were further asked about the sector their business operates 
and size of the company, in terms of employees. 
I developed the survey and participant information sheet in English. In order to 
broaden the pool of participants, it was important that the survey was made accessible in 
simplified Chinese characters. As they were already involved in the research and confident in 
the necessary vocabulary involved, my interview interpreters also translated the survey. Their 
translation was further cross-checked by another native speaker. The translation of the survey 
is included in the annex of this study. Below are the questions and possible answers in plain 
English. 
1. In your initial start-up phase, which of the following financing options did you use 
a. Internal funds or retained earnings 
b. Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 
c. Bank loans from of the SOCBs 
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i. Agricultural Bank of China 
ii. Bank of China 
iii. China Construction Bank 
iv. Industrial Bank of China 
d. Bank loan from a JSCB – Please specify 
e. Bank loan from another Chinese bank – Please specify 
f. Bank loan from an international bank – Please specify 
g. Loan from a non-bank financial institution 
i. Formal 
1. P2P Finance 
2. Microloan 
3. Venture Capital 





3. Other company 
4. Other 
h. Purchases on trade credit 
i. Other 
i. Personal loans from members of my family 
ii. Personal loans from friends 
iii. Loans from a hui 
iv. Loans from a money lender 
v. Venture Capital 
j. Other (please specify) 
2. In the last 12 months, have you used any of the following financing options and if so, 
please provide the proportion of the total? 
a. Internal funds or retained earnings 
b. Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 
c. Bank loans from of the SOCBs 
i. Agricultural Bank of China 
ii. Bank of China 
iii. China Construction Bank 
iv. Industrial Bank of China 
d. Bank loan from a JSCB – Please specify 
e. Bank loan from another Chinese bank – Please specify 
f. Bank loan from an international bank – Please specify 
g. Loan from a non-bank financial institution 
i. Formal 
1. P2P Finance 
2. Microloan 
3. Venture Capital 
4. Private Equity 





3. Other company 
4. Other 
h. Purchases on trade credit 
i. Other 
i. Personal loans from members of my family 
ii. Personal loans from friends 
iii. Loans from a hui 
iv. Loans from a money lender 
v. Venture Capital 
j. Other 
3. How do you perceive the services provided by formal financial institutions? 
a. 6-point scale from positive to negative 
4. How do you perceive the services provided by informal financial institutions? 
a. 6-point scale from positive to negative 
5. If you received a loan from a bank, could you please indicate which bank 
a. Agricultural Bank of China 
b. Bank of China 
c. China Construction Bank 
d. Industrial Bank of China 
e. Other (please specify) 
6. Please rank the following financing options according to your own personal 
preference. 
a. Internal funds or retained earnings 
b. Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 
c. P2P Finance 
d. Microloan 
e. Venture Capital 
f. Private Equity 
g. Loans from Friends 
h. Loans from Relatives 
i. Loans from other companies 
j. Loans from a money lender 
k. Purchases on trade credit 
l. Other (please specify) 
7. Please rank the following financing options according to your own accessibility: 
a. Internal funds or retained earnings 
b. Owners’ contribution or issued new equity shares 
c. P2P Finance 
d. Microloan 
e. Venture Capital 
f. Private Equity 
g. Loans from Friends 
h. Loans from Relatives 
i. Loans from other companies 
j. Loans from a money lender 
k. Purchases on trade credit 
l. Other (please specify) 
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8. Has the access of finance had a positive or negative influence on your firm’s 
development? 
a. 6-point scale from positive to negative 
9. Please indicate your age 
a. Under 20 
b. 20-29 
c. 30-39 
d. above 40 




c. Prefer not to answer 
11. What is your place of residence (hukou)? 
12. What is your place of business? 
13. What is your level of education? 
a. Primary School 
b. High School 
c. University 
d. Postgraduate (Master or PhD) 




d. Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
e. Fabricated Metal Products 
f. Machinery & Equipment 
g. Motor Vehicles 




l. Hotels & Restaurants 
m. Basic metals 
n. Chemicals 
o. Electronics & Communications Equipment 
p. IT 
q. Plastics & Rubber 
r. Services of motor vehicles 
s. Transport 
t. Other 
15. How many employees do you have? 









17. What was your turn-over in the last 12 months? 
a. Less than 10,000 RMB 
b. 10,000 – 100,0000 RMB 
c. 100,000 – 999,000 RMB 
d. over 1,000,000 RMB 
18. How long has your business been operating? 
 
2.3.3 Analysis 
 The number of participants in the survey severely limited my ability to conduct an 
analysis using statistical models or regression. The geographical fragmentation of the sample, 
which at times only included one or two responses per city, made it difficult to use the data 
for a large n-scale analysis of the the role of the shadow banking sector for the entire economy. 
The data was therefore analysed to produce a descriptive analysis for the chapter on the local 
shadow banking sector in Beijing.  
In order to conduct a local institutional analysis and map out the local landscape of the 
sector, I used data on the use of shadow banks in the 12 months before the survey and the 
preference/accessibility of financial institutions overall. Analysing the use pattern of various 
financial institutions allowed us to see, which institutions were indeed relevant in Beijing. If 
entrepreneurs are using them, they must be relevant. This data was then used to see if there 
are different usage patterns across industries, size of the enterprise or industries. Once we 
had established a usage pattern, we could establish, if these institutions were used because 
they provided a service that was better than their counterparts in the formal financial sectors 
(preference) or whether they were only used, because they provided easier access to finance 
(accessibility). Comparing the two across different kinds of enterprises would further give us 
a better understanding of the institutional make up of the shadow banking sector in Beijing. 
The quantitative data only allowed us to focus on one function of the shadow banking 
sector: Access to finance. In order to measure if the shadow banking sector had provided 
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additional access to finance to entrepreneurs, I sought to establish if enterprises, who relied 
more on shadow banking felt that access to finance was less of an obstacle for them. If this 
was the case, we could conclude from this that shadow banks provided a supplementary 
function to the real economy by supplementing the functions of the formal financial sectors. 
2.3.4 Issues 
The key issue for the use of the survey data in our comparative study of Nanjing and 
Beijing was the low number of survey participants from Nanjing. While the recruitment of 
interviewees in Nanjing was fruitful, the same cannot be said about the recruitment of survey 
participants. For Nanjing, the dataset showed only a handful of started surveys and even fewer 
completed surveys. For Beijing, the recruitment of survey participants was more successful, 
than the recruitment of interviewees.  
Another issue was the low number of completed survey questionnaires. This further 
limited my ability to conduct an analysis using complex statistical models or regression. In total, 
27 survey were completed for Beijing and I therefore only used them for a descriptive analysis. 
The sample size casts doubt over the generalizability of its findings. Due to the the method, in 
which participants were recruited, a quasi ‘digital-snowballing’ we can further not ignore the 
chances that there is a selections bias within the sample. There were no possible steps to 
overcome this potential issue. 
Another issue arose from a flaw in the wording of survey question three and four. I had 
initially intended to use these questions to gather data on a potential comparative advantage 
that one financial sector has over the other. The question however asked participants to rate 
their experiences with formal and informal financial institutions. These two categories 
provided little insight, because they overlap in the shadow banking sector. There are formal 
financial institutions, which operate like banks but are considered shadow banks. One 
example of such an institutions are microloan companies. These institutions are formally 
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regulated business entities and hence should be regarded as formal financial institutions. 
Chapter 4 will discus the varying degrees of formality in the shadow banking sector in much 
greater detail. Informal financial institutions can all be regarded as shadow banks, but not all 
shadow banks are informal. Therefore, the data gathered for these two questions could not 
be used in our further analysis. 
2.4. Concluding Remarks 
 Throughout this chapter, I have discussed the the merits and shortcomings of using 
qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative studies on shadow banking are difficult, 
because reliable data on the use of shadow banking is difficult to obtain. Purely relying on 
qualitative methods is also problematic, because independent verification of the data is 
difficult. Due to their respective shortcomings, I adopted a mixed-methods-approach. The aim 
is to overcome the shortcomings of one method through triangulating and correlating it with 
the findings of the other. This approach has gained wide prominence in academic research for 
producing more reliable and trustworthy results.  
 I collected the empirical data for this study the form of interview and survey data over 
the course of a 12-months period in China. In order to address any issue surrounding the 
research design of this study, I have included a comprehensive research appendix. This 
includes a list of interview questions and the full translation of survey questions. In order to 
address some of the issues surrounding the accuracy of reporting, interview transcripts are 
available from me upon request. They were not included in the research appendix. 
 The research design of this study was challenging for me as a researcher, because of 
the broad variety of research subjects. Some of my interviewees were well-educated 
professionals, while others were low- to mid-level money lenders, who had a questionable 
understanding of the rule of law or business ethics. The biggest achievement of the research 
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for this study was that I gained access to them and they openly talked about their experiences 
and business activities. 
 Despite my precautions, this research design comes with a challenges. The first applies 
to both the survey and the interview data: reliability of information and a self-assessment bias. 
I had to rely on my research subject’s honesty and integrity, when it came to their answers. I 
had no means to independently verify all information provided by participants. The second 
challenge was the recruitment of research participants. In the two cases at hand, Beijing and 
Nanjing, I had mixed success in this endeavour. In Nanjing, I was able to recruit a large number 
of interviewees, who provided me with high-quality information and good insights. On the 
other hand, I was not able to recruit enough survey participants to triangulate the findings 
from the interview data with survey data. In Beijing on the other hand, I was able to recruit a 
large number of survey participants and but no significant interviewees. I was therefore not 
able to triangulate the survey data with interview data. 
 To conclude, the research design sought to allow me to research the inner workings of 
the shadow banking sector and its function within the Chinese financial system. The aim was 
to establish, if there is a core function provided by the sector. As this dissertation will 
demonstrate throughout, I was able to identify a core function and the linkages of the shadow 
banking sector with the other two financial sectors and the rest of the the real economy.  
 





Chapter 3: The Chinese financial system 
This chapter will analyse the Chinese financial system by applying the existing framework 
of financial systems design theory. It provides a detailed analysis of the state of the two 
financial sectors: the banking sector and financial markets. This chapter will first describe the 
historical developments, which significantly affected the development of the PRC’s financial 
system in the reform and post-reform era. It will also discuss some of the issues associated 
with this development, namely the problem of an omnipresent state. It will then critically 
discus the key actors in the banking sector: state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-
stock commercial banks (JSCBs), city commercial banks (CCBs) and foreign banks. This chapter 
will further discuss and highlight the development of Chinese financial markets. It will describe 
and analyse the development and current state of the equity and bond markets at both, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This chapter will then conclude 
that within the existing framework, the Chinese financial system can only be seen as a bank-
based financial system, but that banks do not necessarily provide all the functions, which the 
literature implies they should. 
3.1 The Chinese Banking Sector 
Within less than three decades, the Chinese banking sector has evolved from a Soviet-
style mono-banking system to banking sector within in a modern financial system. This in itself 
is a remarkable achievement. Reforms have been undertaken to ensure that banks provide 
the functions that the economy needs. On the other hand, China’s economy is still a socialist 
market economy, demonstrating what Ding (1994) calls institutional amphibiousness: a 
market-oriented economy based on a strong involvement and control of a one-party state. 
In China, banks are important. In 2014, China’s total bank assets amounted to over 
270% of GDP (CBRC, 2015). In the economy, their financial power, role and ownership 
 70 
structure makes them integral to economic activity. Despite the rise of other investment 
products and opportunities through the growth of the equity markets and financial 
engineering, banks are and will continue to be important. The following section discusses the 
development and reforms of China’s banking sector since 1978, including the important 
milestones, which have shaped the banking sector in the second largest economy on earth. It 
examines how a multiple-principal problem in the Chinese system has been at the core of one 
of China’s most endemic banking problems: the SOE lending bias. 
3.1.1 Development of the Chinese banking sector and its regulations since 1978 
In the early reform era, the Chinese banking sector was marked by its history of state-
led development under Communism. During the Mao era, the state was the only creator of 
wealth and investment. Between 1948 and 1978, the state actively pursued a strategy of 
destruction of the remnants of the private financial sector in its pursuit of a planned economy 
model of development (Collins and Gottwald, 2011).  China’s economy operated under a 
mono-bank financial system (Sufian and Habibullah, 2012). The PBOC absorbed deposits from 
households, SOEs and government units and provided short-term working capital back to SOEs 
(Shih, 2009). Banks were foremost there to distribute money to various state-owned 
enterprises. Their task was to extend non-interest bearing grants and not interest-bearing 
loans. They role and function differed fundamentally from those described by theories on 
financial systems design. At the beginning of the reform era, the PBOC controlled 93% of 
China’s total financial assets (Guo and Xia, 2014). Banks were not equipped to fulfil the core 
services of banks outlined by Schumpeter (2011): to mobilize savings, evaluate projects, 
manage risks, monitor managers or facilitate transactions. Their staff was made up of 
bureaucrats and the institution was not designed to provide any of these services. Following 
the opening of China in 1978 and the gradual development of private enterprises, this had to 
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change. The question is: how did it do that? The reform of the banking sector that unfolded 
can be divided into three distinct phases. 
In the first reform phase, from 1978 to 1993, the mono-banking system was changed 
to a two-tier system with the People’s Bank of China as tier one. The PBOC, initially the 
country’s only bank, was to be transformed to provide the functions of a central bank. Its focus 
had to shift from its previous duties of resource allocation towards that of central bank. It had 
to be fundamentally transformed to formulate regulation and provide oversight over the 
banking sector, while also focusing on monetary policy. Below the PBOC, in the second tier 
were the four state-owned commercial banks - the Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of 
China, the China Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. After 
the PBOC became a central bank, other institutions had to take over their banking operations. 
Direct government grants to state-owned enterprises were replaced by interest-bearing loans 
(Hsu, 2009). At the beginning, the operations of the newly established commercial banks 
resembled those of policy banks. Their role was mainly to execute the financial policies of the 
central government. The former strategy of active destruction of the private financial sector 
had been successful, as there was no institutional knowledge of how to conduct operations 
that resemble the workings of typical commercial banks. The state-owned banks were simply 
not equipped to operate like ordinary commercial banks. They lacked the expertise as well as 
the business acumen of banks in capitalist countries to provide the functions needed.  
 The second phase between 1994 and 2000 saw a further expansion of the banking 
sector and the rise of new actors in the banking system. The aim of the second phase was to 
reduce administrative banking operations and increase the independence of banks and the 
extent of their commercial operations (Cousin, 2011). Banks were to transform into 
commercial banks. At the core of these reforms were the changes to the legal framework of 
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banks, namely the 1995 Commercial Banking Law and the 1995 Law of the People’s Bank of 
China. The latter manifested the role of the People’s Bank of China as country’s central bank. 
Article 1 clearly outlined that the role of the PBOC was henceforth to be limited to that of a 
central bank, overseeing monetary policy, establishing macroeconomic control and 
strengthening the supervision of the financial system. It can be understood as the final 
completion of the first phase, as it created the legal foundation for the work of the PBOC. The 
1995 Commercial Banking Law established the legal basis for commercial banks in China. It 
defined the rules and responsibilities of banks in the country. It provided a legal basis for the 
rights and responsibilities of commercial banks, their depositors and other clients. Article 3 
outlined the functions that a commercial bank may provide to the general public, including 
accepting deposits and extending loans. This law was an important milestone, because it 
allowed the creation of new commercial banks by providing them with a clear legal framework. 
Commercial banks were henceforth meant to engage only in commercially sound lending. The 
effectiveness of this policy has been contested, with many arguing that this was little more 
than wishful thinking. Many have argued that to this day, SOCBs still display a lending bias 
towards state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Chen et al, 2013; Chong et al, 2013; Cousin, 2011; 
Levy and Meyer, 2012; OECD, 2006; Ray, 2002; Sen, 2005, Tsai, 2002). The law itself is even 
ambiguous in this respect and leaves the entire financial system open to direct government 
intervention. Article 34 of the 1995 Commercial Banking Law requires that banks conduct their 
loan business ‘with the need for the development of the national economy and social progress 
and under the guidance of the state industrial policy’ (Cousin, 2011: 62).  
Although the aim of the second phase and the legal changes it induced was to make 
banks function more like commercial banks, the legal framework left open a large backdoor 
for state intervention. The wording allows the state to command banks to lend to certain 
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industries or companies, regardless of whether the loans are commercially viable. Banks can 
be forced to comply with this legal requirement, if it is deemed in the interest of the ‘national 
economy and social progress’. The second phase further saw the establishment of the China 
Development Bank, the China Export-Import Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China as policy banks. Their purpose was to take over policy lending from state-owned 
commercial banks. In theory the idea was to move all policy-lending away from commercial 
banks into policy banks. For some operations, for example the implementation of export 
policy, this has worked well. Overall, policy banks only partially assumed this function in 
practice, as state-owned commercial banks continued to be involved in policy lending 
activities.    
The first Chinese non-performing loan (NPL) crisis occurred at the end of the second 
phase. Up until that point, loans had been extended to SOEs regardless of their economic 
performance. Tung (2002) estimates that 20% of loans in the Chinese banking sector were 
non-performing at that time. But Lardy (1998) suggested this number immensely 
underestimated the real scale of NPLs. According to the Chinese definition used for reporting 
NPLs, a loan is still performing if the borrower can service his interest payments but does not 
repay the principal loan. So as long as a borrower is able to pay the interest on a loan but 
never actually repays any of it, the loan is considered as performing. Lardy hence estimates 
that the real NPL stock in the Chinese banking sector was closer to 40-50% at the time (Lardy, 
1998). In an effort to rid the system of bad debt, asset management companies were 
established to assume these NPLs (Firth et al, 2009). This transfer of bad debt cleaned up the 
balance sheets of the SOCBs.  
If the first phase created a two-tier system, one could argue that the second phase 
expanded this to a three tier system. The first tier is the PBOC and the second tier is made up 
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of a large array of commercial banks. Through establishing the legal basis for the operation of 
commercial banks came the opportunity for financial institutions to establish themselves in 
the Chinese financial system. At the end of this phase, China’s banking sector had expanded 
beyond the four large state-owned commercial banks to approximately 100 commercial banks, 
42000 rural credit cooperatives, 300 urban credit cooperatives and 190 branches of foreign 
banks (Hsu, 2009). The third tier is made up of the two policy banks, which are directly 
responsible for policy lending to assist the execution of government policy. 
 With the millennium came the third phase, which continues until the present day. With 
the desire to become a full member of the World Trade Organization, the Chinese leadership 
embarked on a reform path. Zhou Xiaochuan (2009), the former Governor of the PBOC, 
identifies three specific impetuses for reform that existed at the time. The first is the need to 
introduce more efficient accounting standards. The legal changes of the first and second phase 
had allowed commercial banks to develop and flourish. Effective regulation and oversight on 
the other hand was partly hindered by poor accounting standards. Improving these standards 
would allow banks to compete with their foreign counterparts in attracting international 
investment. Many commercial banks in China, including the large SOCBs and some JSCBs, have 
made this important transition since and have issued shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
The second is the need for adopting internationally accepted loan classification standards. 
Partly driven out of the experiences of the NPL crisis of the late 1990s, Chinese banks needed 
to improve risk control. Improving loan classification standards and oversight were key to 
achieve this. Chinese banks would now require collateral for all loans. Loan approval for most 
loans would also require approval from higher organizational branches. The third impetus was 
the central government’s aim to advance the reform of state-owned commercial banks 
(SOCBs). If the banking sector was not to continue in the same way it had for the 20 years 
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before then, further reforms of the banking sector were needed. Uncontrolled issuance of 
commercially questionable loans had led to the build-up of large NPLs. This created the 
necessity for asset management companies to assume the bad debt of SOCBs. In addition to 
improving accounting standards, improving loan classification, the central government further 
actively pursued ownership diversification through the issuance of equity on internationally 
respected financial markets, like the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. If international investors with 
expertise in the banking sector would become partial owners of Chinese commercial banks, 
these banks could learn from them. Authorities and regulators also understood that they 
needed to allow at least some form of competition between different types of commercial 
banks. The author is not blind to the the fact that while in theory these all sound like realistic 
and well-meant approaches to SOCB reform, many obstacles would occur on this path. All 
three impetuses lead to commercial bank reform through financial restructuring, ownership 
reform and lastly limited exposure to market controls by allowing foreign competition (Cousin, 
2011). 
The extent to which these impetuses were successful and led to lasting change is 
debatable. To this day, the Central Government still exercises great control over the country’s 
banking sector. This control is enshrined in the 1995 Commercial Banking Law. It is because of 
this that the OECD (2006) notes that Chinese banks are not well equipped to respond to 
market signals. As their primary role is being the being supporters of social, regional and 
industrial policies, banks lack the institutional knowledge to respond to the needs of the 
market. Tsai (2002) went as far as saying that SOCBs were not acting as profit-oriented 
commercial banks. The state ultimately produced a regulatory framework, which at times may 
supersede commercial concerns. On the other hand, the distribution of assets within the 
banking sector has changed drastically over the last years. As this Chapter discusses in great 
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detail, JSCBs have been able to take away some assets from their state-owned counterparts. 
This is an indication that allowing competition has had a lasting effect on the Chinese banking 
landscape.  
By allowing new foreign institutions into the market, the central government sought 
to increase competition and strengthen market control. After 2006, foreign banks were 
allowed to acquire equity in Chinese commercial banks and compete with them on the 
domestic market (Hsu, 2009). With China’s membership in the World Trade Organization all 
formal barriers of entry were meant to be removed. Foreign banks operating within China may 
now offer a wide range of banking services, such as deposit taking, financial leasing, payment 
and money transfer services and all lending activities (Cousin, 2011: 294, Yao et al, 2007). It is 
important to note that despite the removal of hard barriers to entry, i.e. laws and regulation 
outlawing foreign banking operations on the territory of the PRC, a huge array of soft barriers 
continues to exist to this day. An interviewee, a former executive of a big foreign bank in China, 
highlighted that foreign banks have a competitive disadvantage, because regulation tends to 
be implemented, followed and checked rigorously by supervising authorities.6   
“We do a business as a foreign bank, we will might be punished or they will withdraw 
our licence but with Chinese banks, they do not. Because of the connections.” - Former 
Bank Executive7 
It is hence important to note that while there might not be formal barriers to market entry for 
foreign banks in China, there are very strong soft barriers to market entry. This echoes the 
experiences of other large foreign banks, which have been struggling to become profitable in 
the Chinese market. Internationally established banks like Citigroup have long been struggling 
                                                        
6 Interview BJ-14-11-002 
7 ibid. 
 77 
to establish a profitable business in China (Areddy, 2016). We could ask, why this is indeed a 
problem, if China has been able to create a flourishing banking landscape? Does China need 
foreign banks in order to continue its impressive economic growth? According to Wang (2010: 
5461) the lack of inter-bank competition is one of the causes for a shortage in credit for private 
sector enterprises. It appears nonetheless, that competition by foreign bank has not been able 
to alleviate this issue. This is mainly due to the low asset share that foreign banks have in the 
market. At the end of 2014, all foreign banks had a combined asset share of 1.62% the total 
bank assets in China (CBRC, 2015). That would indicate that in the last 10 years, foreign banks 
have not risen to become significant competitors.  
 In addition to the three impetuses for change and the reforms, which went along with 
it, the mid 2000s saw further important developments:  the introduction of an additional 
regulatory and supervisory body. Henceforth the banking sector has been regulated by two 
authorities, namely the PBOC and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The 
PBOC, as previously noted, is the Chinese central bank. It is responsible for drafting and 
executing monetary policy, supervision of the domestic inter-bank loan and bond markets, 
formulating reserve requirements of banks, as well as other instruments that affect banks’ 
liquidity (Sufian and Habibullah, 2012). It has a ministerial rank under the leadership of the 
state council and manages the monetary policy of the People’s Republic of China.  This is an 
important difference to central banks in most developed countries, as the independence the 
central bank is often considered a key cornerstone in modern monetary policy. The PBOC on 
the other hand, requires state council approval for tasks like setting interest rates, setting 
money supply targets and managing the exchange rate.  
The CBRC was establish in the 2003 Law on Banking Supervision and Administration 
(Cousin, 2011). Its stated aims are to ensure that financial institutions adhere to the law, to 
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ensure the stability of financial institutions’ operations and to ensure the public’s trust in these 
institutions. Furthermore, Article 3 established that the CBRC should also aim to establish fair 
competition amongst institutions. The 2006 Law on Banking Supervision and Administration 
further gave the CBRC the power to foreclose loans and investigate allegations of fraud in third 
parties. The main objective of the CBRC is to close the gap between international and Chinese 
banking practices. As the responsibilities between the CBRC and the PBOC overlap at times, 
this is no easy undertaking (Cousin, 2011). The PBOC has a ministerial rank so in case of an 
overlap, its decisions trump those of the CBRC. Both of these institutions are institutions under 
the State Council. They report to it and their leaders are appointed jointly by the State Council 
and the National People’s Congress. The state has set up a regulatory framework, which puts 
the banking sector under strict state control and limits through laws and regulatory agencies 
the role that a market may play. 
3.1.2  The omnipresent and omnipotent state in China’s banking sector: a multiple 
principal conflict and the SOE lending bias  
De jure all regulators should be free from influence of local, national or other 
government departments. This does not necessarily translate into de facto independence 
(Cousin, 2011). This is not surprising, as the approach to regulation in China can best be called 
as following the public interest approach. This approach puts the public interest in regulation 
above the private interest is letting market forces reign supreme. It presupposes that market 
failures are to blame for interfering with the incentives and abilities of private agents to 
monitor, and discipline where necessary, the behaviour of banks (Levine, 2002). According to 
Levine (2002) we can further identify four core elements of a banking sector, where regulation 
follows the public interest approach. Firstly, the government owns much of the banking sector. 
Secondly, it restricts banks from emerging in non-lending activities. It further limits the entry 
of new banks and lastly, it creates powerful supervisory agencies, which oversee and discipline 
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banks. This is in stark contrast to the private interest approach. This second approach assumes 
that politicians and government supervisors do not maximise social welfare by regulating the 
banking sector. Instead, they seek to engage in regulatory activity for personal gain. It thus 
draws the conclusion that the governance of banks is best left to the private sector and market 
forces. Without much analyses, we can see how Chine is following a public interest approach. 
The market entry of new banks is restricted. There is a complex licensing system in place, 
which make it close to impossible to establish new banks. Both the PBOC and the CBRC hold 
immense power in overseeing and disciplining banks. As previously noted, these institutions 
are not free from direct political influences (Collins and Gottwald, 2014).  
The Chinese government has this a dual role in the financial system, as both the owner 
and regulator of banks (Fu et al, 2015). The five largest banks in China are state-owned. Their 
role is enshrined in the financial system. The Chinese commercial banking law potentially 
makes all commercial banks prone to state involvement. That is the legal basis for their 
operation and the central government has the right to intervene and compel banks to support 
their policy. The central government also directly intervenes in the operation of commercial 
banks. They operate loan quotas, which are set by the central bank on the basis of state policy. 
Lastly, the central government has set up regulatory agencies, which report to the state 
council of have ministerial rank, e.g. PBOC. This means that the regulator does not operate 
independently or can regulate this system without state interference.  
This bears the question as to why this might be a problem. After all this system has 
worked thus far and has fuelled a truly remarkable growth. The level of independence of 
central banks varies around the world. We can argue that albeit not being legally bound by 
the decisions of the government the US central bank, the Federal Reserve is not entirely free 
from governmental control. Other countries with a strong bank-based financial system, e.g. 
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Germany, also have powerful banks that are owned by the state (e.g. the Sparkassen). So why 
is this an issue in China? The issue is that the structure cements an integral conflict into the 




Diagram 3 - Multiple Principal Conflict 
Ong (2006) identifies the existence of a multiple principal conflict as a possible 
contributing factor for the lack of access to formal finance for privately owned enterprises, 
and small- and medium-sized enterprises in particular. In her analysis of private households’ 
poor access to credit provided by rural credit cooperatives (RCCs), she uses agency theory to 
argue that the existence of multiple principals is one of the key factors for the poor access to 
credit. These principals have different and sometimes conflicting goals and motives. Due of 
the penetration of supervisory organs by the local government and communist party officials, 
the interests of the other principals, households and cooperative members, were not 
protected. Out of the 200 household members she interviewed, less than 5% had ever 
attended a RCCs member’s representative meeting. These meetings are the highest organ in 
a cooperative financial institution, but despite this being their legal right they had not 
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participated in the meetings (Ong, 2006). Those who had taken part in such meetings 
happened to be village or township heads or party secretaries. The issue was further 
exacerbated by multiple types and numbers of principals.  
 In her analysis, she distinguishes between two forms of principals. The first is a 
collective principal. Collective principals display low levels of cohesion. In the case of financial 
institutions, we can classify depositors and shareholders as one collective principal. Their 
interest lies in the profitable operation of said financial institutions. If the institution is 
profitable, depositors will receive higher interest rates on their deposits and shareholder will 
receive a higher dividend on their investment. Their interest is therefore aligned. On the other 
hand, there is little more that binds these two groups together. Therefore, their ability to 
exercise control over the agent, i.e. the financial institution, is significantly lower than the 
ability of the single principal (Ong, 2006). The single principal can be broadly described as the 
political elites. In her study, this refers mainly to the local party cadre, however in the greater 
financial system, this includes the local, provincial as well as central level. The main objective 
of the central and local government has been to use the financial system to allocate financial 
resources to SOEs in order to manifest the political patronage from urban workers (Ong, 2006).  
When we turn our attention to the key cornerstones of the regulatory environment 
for China’s banking sector, we see why this is important. The entire system has reproduced 
this multiple-principal conflict. The state exercises direct control over the majority of the 
banking sector and the financial system as a whole. It does so in two ways: through direct 
ownership over the five largest commercial banks and through a regulatory environment, 
which in the past has favoured these institutions. The concept of a multiple-principal conflict 
helps us to understand the behaviour of commercial banks in China. It allows us to gain a much 
more precise understanding of the processes, which have led to an allocation of resources in 
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favour of state-owned over the more productive privately-owned enterprises, and small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in particular. The collective principal is unable to influence the 
agent in favour of their motives, i.e. higher profits, because the single principal has a 
comparatively greater power over the agent.  
The large power that the state exercising over the SOCBs has one direct effect on the 
functions provided by them in banking sector: it leads to an SOE lending bias. Ray (2002) notes 
that for Chinese SOCBs commercial concerns only rank second to political concerns, when it 
comes to lending decisions. Firth et al (2009) point out that government ownership of external 
financing sources, i.e. commercial banks, has led to a skewed capital allocation. It inherently 
favours SOEs over POEs. Existing literature has often pointed to this phenomenon, but apart 
from Ong (2006) and Levy and Meyer (2012) has provided little theoretical understanding of 
what causes this lending bias. In their analysis of the challenges of SOCB reform in China, Levy 
and Meyer (2012) similarly argue that the network governance of SOCBS has created an array 
of issues with credit intermediation. Network governance refers to the network of decision 
makers, namely financiers, government officials and communist party cadres, who all attempt 
to exert control to pursue a certain goal, mainly the support of transformation of SOEs (Levy 
& Meyer, 2012). SOCB Board members and executives are recruited from within the network 
of central and local government officials, the CCP, heads of SOEs as well as other business 
people. A large fraction of this network is formed of a group with a high degree of cohesion, 
namely those with network ties to the party state, and thus acts as a single principal. Because 
this principal can exert immense influence on lending decisions and corporate strategy, it 
comparatively more powerful than the other principals. It leaves little room for the interests 
of private enterprises without political connections. Private enterprises with good 
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connections to the government find it easier to obtain preferential treatment from banks and 
thus access to loans (Xu et al, 2013; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Li et al, 2008).  
As the Chinese banking sector is highly concentrated in the hand of SOCBs, the above-
mentioned influence affects the vast majority of loans and in great severity. Most SOEs do not 
face credit constraints (Chong et al, 2013). Lending decisions overall are largely determined 
by political connections and skew capital allocation in favour of SOEs (Bailey et a, 2011). Due 
to this preferential access to bank loans for SOEs, financing becomes a problem for other 
enterprises and ultimately leads to potentially suboptimal investment levels (Xu et al, 2013). 
Overall, the widespread government ownership of large parts of the banking sector creates 
poor incentives for lending and lead to biased capital allocation (Chen et al, 2013).  
Lu et al (2012) identify four main reasons of why SOCBs display an SOE lending bias. 
Firstly, it is due direct government ownership. Secondly, government officials have an 
incentive to fund SOEs, because successful SOEs create political capital. One of the easiest 
ways to rise through the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is to successfully manage 
economic development and meet provincial and national targets for employment and 
industrial output. It usually does not matter, whether the success of an SOE is fuelled by large 
loans or whether it is due to a successful business operation. Thirdly, bank managers have a 
high incentive to maintain good relationships with government officials, because essentially 
they are both state employees. Lastly, the state gives implicit loan guarantees for SOEs. Jiang 
et al (2013) find that because of the SOE lending bias, SOEs are associated with low efficiency. 
They have no incentive to maximise their efficiency. As the state is the owner as well as the 
largest recipient of loans, the other two principals, depositors and shareholders, cannot 
defend their interests against it.  
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The problem with the SOE lending bias is that it makes less capital available for POEs. 
When analysing the loan books of one of the large SOCBs, Sen (2005) found that ABC for 
example was only giving 10% as business loans and mostly lend to large borrowers. Yiu (2013) 
further found that in 2009, loans to private enterprises by SOCBs accounted for a mere 3.53% 
of all loans, despite their accounting for 50% of the economy. Firth et al (2009) puts this slightly 
higher, arguing that POEs account for 7% of total bank lending. In recent years, the importance 
of POEs and in particular SMEs in the economy has increased even further, but this has not 
been matched with a corresponding increase in lending from SOCBs. Huang et al (2016) state 
that despite SMEs are chronically underfunded in China, despite accounting for 99% of total 
number of businesses in China and generating 60% of GDP. Elston et al. (2016) also find that 
SMEs and many POEs still tend to rely on informal finance rather than formal access to capital. 
The shortage of lines of credit to POEs can therefore only be seen as a symptom of the SOE 
lending bias, as POEs are actively discriminated against in loan financing in favour of SOEs (Lu 
et al, 2012). This raises the question of how POEs in general, and SMEs in particular have been 
able to flourish and build up their importance, despite their financial restraints. Where did this 
the capital come from? 
It is important to not nonetheless, that this picture is not immune from criticism. Firstly, 
Sen’s example of the ABC might be ill-fitted to analyse the POE’s access to finance: The 
Agricultural Bank of China has a proclaimed focus on rural areas and borrowers. Thus we 
would expect them to lend more money to infrastructure projects in rural areas, household 
enterprises (farmers) and agribusiness. We would not expect them to engage in large-scale 
POE lending. The most prominent criticism probably comes from Lardy (2014). He argues that 
the entire underlying interpretation of statistics is flawed. Firstly, the dataset used by authors 
like Yiu (2013) only look at short-term loans. Other datasets, which include medium- and long-
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term loans demonstrate that short-term series tend to understate the importance of POE 
lending by a factor of ten. Secondly, the dataset classifies POEs in terms of their ownership 
and not in terms of their control. So a company, where the state holds any equity, is 
considered a state-owned enterprise. This means that even if 99% of equity is held privately 
and 1% is held by a state organ, the entire enterprise is classified as an SOE. He argues we also 
have to include those enterprises, where the majority or dominant owner is private. If we 
examine all loans, i.e. short-, medium-, and long-term, to the private sector, i.e. POE and 
privately-controlled enterprises, these loans account for 36% of total outstanding loans. This 
would also provide a part explanation of why the World Bank Investment Climate Survey 
(2012) found that only 2.9% of surveyed firms find access to finance as a major constraint on 
their business activity.  
 The omnipresent and omnipotent state is a key characteristic shaping China’s financial 
system. It has a firm grip on the financial system, through direct ownership of the largest 
commercial banks. This leads to the country’s very specific multiple-principal problem and 
ultimately the SOE lending bias. With a large proportion of the country’s banking assets held 
in the hands of just a few banks, the problem is further amplified. In order to grasp the extend 





3.1.3  Commercial Banks 
 
Diagram 4 – Market share of groups of financial institutions in China 
Having understood the path of development that the banking sector has taken since 
1978 as well as the role of an omnipresent state leaves us with a need to examine the status 
quo. Who are the major players in China’s banking sector today? The diagram above outlines 
market share measured in share of the total assets of the banking sector of each group of 
different institutions between 2004 and 2015.  
The largest banks in both relative and absolute terms are the Large commercial banks, 
or state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Between them, they controlled 71.014trn RMB in 
2014. The asset growth in the ten years following 2004 has been remarkable. SOCBs were able 
to grow their assets by over 440%, from 16.051trn in 2004. Their absolute growth is 
astonishing and does cement the widely held view that they are the most powerful banks in 
China. The state is the direct owner and regulator of SOCBs, so this fact alone is little surprising. 
What is interesting nonetheless, is that their power in relative terms is declining as has been 
steadily and significantly in the same period. In 2004, they controlled 58% of all bank assets 
Source: CBRC (2015) 
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but ten years later only controlled 41.21%. This would go against the view that the regulatory 
environment is heavily skewed in favour of SOCBs and does not promote competition 
between different types of commercial banks. 
The second largest group of banks are Joint-Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs). These 
banks were set us a joint-ventures between SOEs and private investors. In contrast to SOCBs, 
the last ten years have been successful for them in both absolute and relative terms. Between 
2004 and 2014, they experienced a tenfold asset growth, from 2.96trn RMB to 31.38trn RMB. 
At the same time, they were able to grow their assets share from 10.7% to 18.2%.   
The third largest group of banks are City Commercial Banks (CCBs). Initially confined to 
a certain city, these banks were set up as local banks with a very limited geographical scope. 
They too have experienced large relative and absolute asset growth. From 1.46trn RMB in 
2004 to 18.08trn in 2014. They expanded their asset share from 5.29% to 10.49%.  
As we can see from the diagram above, all JSCBs and CCBs have been able to expand 
their asset share and thus expand their market share. Depositors as well as borrowers have 
turned away from SOCBs and towards other commercial banks in the last decade. There is one 
exception nonetheless: foreign banks. Foreign banks have not been able to expand their asset 
share. Despite the fact that many thought foreign banks would induce more competition o 
the Chinese banking sector, the effects are not measurable. Even China’s membership of the 
WTO did not lead to an increase in market share for foreign banks in China. 
3.1.3.1 State-owned Commercial Banks 
The first reform phase saw the creation of four powerful state-owned commercial 
banks – the Big Four. These were the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), 
the China Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). These 
four institutions have immense important for China but also the rest of the world. As I have 
pointed out before, they are the biggest four commercial banks in the second largest economy 
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in the world. In addition, they are also the four largest banks in the world. (Forbes, 2015). 
While traditionally, these four banks have been referred to as the Big Four, the CBRC began 
to include the fifth largest bank, the Bank of Communications (BoCom) in the same group and 
groups them as Large Banks (CBRC, 2015). In my view, this inclusion is problematic. As we can 
see in the table below, BoCom has a totally different degree of state ownership. Furthermore, 
its total asset share is far below that of the smallest of the Big Four. However, in the interest 
of producing comparable findings, I have included them in the discussion.  
 ABC BOC BoCom CCB ICBC 
State 
ownership 
84.52% 70.13% 37.67% 59.88% 71.33% 
Total Assets 
(billion CNY) 
17,791 16,816 7,155 
 
18,349 22,210 
Market Share 8.93% 8.44% 3.69% 9.21% 11.14% 
 Source: ABC, 2016; BOC, 2016; BoCom, 2016; CCB, 2016; ICBC, 2016a 
Table 4 - SOCB Ownership Structures in 2015 
Although ownership has diversified especially since all of the SOCBs became publicly 
listed enterprises, the majority of equity is still held firmly by the central government. Shares 
are either owned through the Central Huijin Investment Co. (Huijin)8, the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), or various other state-owned legal persons. This table shows the aggregate state 
ownership of SOCBs, based on the information published in each bank’s annual report. 
Despite being listed companies, the complex shareholder structure as well as the complicated 
system of A, B and H Shares make it difficult to establish the actual degree of state control. 
                                                        
8 Central Huijin Investment Company (Huijin) is a subsidiary of the China Investment 
Corporation, the sovereign wealth fund of the People’s Republic of China. Huijin allows the 
central government to exercise direct control through owning equity in China’s Large Banks. 
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For example, Central Huijin Investment Company Ltd is the controlling shareholder of the Bank 
of China. Additionally, through other state-owned legal persons like China Securities Finance 
Co. Ltd the state controls other shared. Lastly the National Council for Social Security Fund 
holds H-Shares in Hong Kong. Analysing the different annual reports of the five Large Banks 
and the disclosed shareholder information has allowed me to establish to some degree the 
level of actual state ownership.  
This table further shows their asset share of the total banking sector assets. In 2015, 
the Big Four and BoCom controlled 41.41% of the entire sector’s assets. In comparison, the 
the largest genuinely privately-owned bank, China Minsheng Banking Corp. Ltd by itself only 
controls app. 2% (Minsheng, 2015).  
 The general literature review outlines four core functions of banks within the financial 
system: provision of liquidity, transformation of credit, term-to-maturity transformation and 
a better understanding in assessing the economic potential of an enterprise. Reviewing the 
existing literature on the functioning of SOCBs, we can see that they provide some of these 
functions. They certainly provide credit transformation and term-to-maturity transformation, 
as they take highly liquid deposits, pool them and extend them as loans to deficit-spending 
units. In this they also provide liquidity to said units. However due to the before-mentioned 
multiple principal issues and the selectivity with which access to loans is granted, it is there 
where we encounter the first shortcoming.  
SOCBs extend the majority of loans to SOEs, due to the fact that both the borrower 
and the lender are state-owned entities. Loans extended to SOEs carry and implicit credit 
guarantee by the state.9 Capital is therefore not directed to its most efficient use but rather 
to a a comparatively safer use. A loan officer told me that he does not like to extend loans to 
                                                        
9 Interview BJ-14-11-001 
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SOEs, because they have a lower profitability, yet he is forced to do so ‘because the state is 
always in the background’10. The officer further highlighted that the only non-performing loan 
in his sub-branch are those extended to an SOE. If loan officers are incentivised or in other 
ways encouraged to extend loans to SOEs over POEs, this can have a severe impact on a banks 
ability to build up experience in assessing the economic potential of an enterprise. If banks 
lend to SOEs, because there are implicit credit guarantees, then this means that as institutions, 
they do not have to build up institutional capacity to assess the economic potential of an 
enterprise. These banks simply will not need to establish procedures for lending to POEs, 
because it is much easier to extend a large loan to an SOE. We could even argue that this is 
the most rational and logic decision, for the administration cost of multiple small loans are 
greater than of one large loan to an SOE. If this is true in a banking sector, which is heavily 
concentrated in the hands of a few large banks, then this has an adverse impact on those 
banks’ ability to perform the function of a delegated monitor. This also begets the question 
that if the larges banks are unwilling or unable to provide POEs with funding, where to they 
get their funding from? 
3.1.3.2 Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 
JSCBs are commercial banks, in which the state holds an equity ownership next to 
other equity shareholders (OECD, 2006). Unlike SOCBs, which were spin offs of their 
departments in the PBOC, most JSCBs were established as commercial banks in the 1980s and 
1990s (Cousin, 2011). Throughout China, 12 banks are classified as JSCBs. By the end of 2014, 
they controlled 18.2% of the banking sector’s assets, vis-à-vis 41.4% controlled by SOCBs 
(CBRC, 2015). From the difference in market share alone, we can quickly estimate that their 
despite their importance within the sector, they are nowhere as important as SOCBs. All this 
                                                        
10 Interview SH-15-03-001 
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is despite previous efforts to induce competition in the banking sector with the help of JSCBs. 
For example, they can open branches countrywide. Allowing JSCBs to operate countrywide 
should mean that both compete in similar regions and, partly, for a similar customer base. 
Chong et al (2013) finds that JSCBs target a different customer sub-set than SOCBs. JSCBs 
usually exploit a market-niche and specialise in it (Cousin, 2011). For example, China Minsheng 
Bank is heavily focused on SME lending, whereas Merchant Bank is more focused on Credit 
Cards.  
The terms Joint-stock commercial bank and state-owned commercial bank suggest 
some form of dichotomy. It is important to note here that this is not necessarily the case and 
this choice of terms is potentially misleading. JSCBs are defined through a partial state 
ownership. They are meant to be joint-ventures between various state-owned actors and 
private enterprises. While this is true for all JSCBs, the degree to which they truly have private 
ownership can vary quite extensively. The examples of China Minsheng Bank and China CITIC 
Bank and their published shareholder structure illustrates this and is characteristic for the 
ownership structure of JSCBs. China Minsheng bank has a diverse shareholder structure. The 
only state-owned entity amongst its 10 largest shareholders is the China Securities Finance 
Corporation Limited, which holds 2.66% of all shares (China Minsheng Bank, 2016). China CITIC 
Bank on the other hand is an offspring of the CITIC Group, a well established state-owned 
enterprise. It hence comes at no surprise that it is the largest single shareholder, holding 
67.13% of equity, while other state-owned entities further hold another 3% (China CITIC Bank, 
2016). Both these banks fall under the category of JSBCs, despite the fact that in one the state 
owns 2.66% and in the other it owns 70%. We should hence ask if the concepts of JSCBs and 
SOCBs are an adequate analytical concept to analyse the two largest groups of banks in the 
world’s second largest economy. An alternative is hard to suggest for establishing the exact 
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degree of state ownership of JSCBs is a difficult task. Firstly, the degree to which JSCBs publish 
the nature of their 10 largest shareholders varies largely. Some identify the state or other 
state-owned legal persons clearly. Others, like Bohai Bank or China Zheshang Bank do not.  
Secondly, JSCBs often have amongst their 10 largest shareholders non-state legal 
persons, which are in turned owned partly by the state. The case of China Everbright Bank 
serves as a good example here. Its largest shareholder is China Everbright Group, which holds 
23.69% of all shares. Huijin owns a further 21.69%. Domestic Legal Persons, e.g. China Life 
Reinsurance Company Ltd., hold further equity in the China Everbright bank. Huijin, as the 
central governments investment company, further holds equity in all of these. It holds a 
controlling stake in the China Everbright Group and China Reinsurance. In total that means 
that only 44.42% of share are held by public shareholders (China Everbright Bank, 2016). The 
degree of state ownership is still considerably lower in China Everbright Bank than in China 
CITIC Bank but significantly higher than in Minsheng Bank. Based on publicly available 
information alone, it is a breathtakingly enormous task to truly establish the extent of state 
ownership of the banking sector in China.  
The degree of state ownership of JSCBs is important for a variety of reasons. Firstly, it 
highlights the shortcomings of the SOCB vis-à-vis JSCB dichotomy. JSCBs should in theory be 
in co-ownership between state and non-state owners. While this is the case for some of them 
it certainly is not for all of them. When we examine the ten largest shareholders of SOCBs and 
JSCBs, we can discover that the degree of state ownership is higher within JSCBs than within 
some SOCBs. For example, China CITIC Bank has 70% state ownership, while CCB has below 
60%. Both are in fact state-owned commercial banks. Secondly, based on this it would suggest 
that the degree to which multiple principal conflicts are prevalent in SOCBs might also further 
extends to some JSCBs too. It is important to note here that in the case of SOCBs, it is mostly 
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the central government that directly controls the equity share. In the case of JSCBs it is often 
through a proxy that is an SOE. This indirect ownership, if we can call it that, does have a direct 
impact on the prevalence of an SOE lending bias and commercial concerns.  
The above mentioned CITIC bank is such a case. It would be foolish to assume that the 
interests of the CITIC Group and of the central government are automatically and always 
congruent. After all, CITIC has worked hard to establish itself as a leading bank in the Chinese 
banking system, focusing on both personal and commercial finance for a broad range of 
customers. The CITIC Group might rightly run its bank as a profit-maximising business. Still, 
the degree of state ownership does expose the bank to the risk of interference of the state 
and the party apparatus. Such a risk is much smaller in the case of a bank like Minsheng, where 
only one SOE has a minor stake.  
To sum it up, the classification of banks in SOCBs and JSCBs is somewhat misleading 
for a three reasons. Firstly, the degree of state ownership varies largely across JSCBs. Certain 
JSCBs have an even higher degree of state ownership than some SOCBs, while the state is a 
small minority shareholder in others (see China CITIC Bank vis-à-vis Minsheng Bank). Secondly, 
the different institutions within this group vary largely in size. Thirdly, the various institutions 
grouped under the term JCSB are equally diverse, when we look at their profitability. For 
example, China Merchant Bank and Minsheng Bank for example have a healthy return-on-
assets (ROA) of 1.05% and 1.02% (China Merchant Bank, 2016; Minsheng Bank, 2016). Banks 
like China Zheshang Bank or Bohai Bank have ROA rates of 0.68% and 0.74% respectively 
(Forbes, 2016). All four banks are JSCBs with very different market shares, ownership structure 
and profitability.  
Having discussed why JSCBs as a group are very diverse, we ought to note that they 
have one central feature in common: JSCBs are much more likely to be involved in POE finance, 
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in particular SME finance, than SOCBs. Part of the niche strategy previously noted was born 
out of the necessity to target a completely different customer sub-set than the SOCBs. By the 
time JSCBs appeared on the banking landscape, SOCBs had already developed close working 
relationships with large corporations, so JSCBs had to work with SMEs and help them grow11. 
The reason they were often able to do that was their different ownership structure (Chong et 
al, 2013). This would mean that although it does exist, the multiple principal conflict is much 
less severe in JSCBs than in SOCBs.  
JSCBs could therefore be a valid solution to addressing the issues surrounding access 
to finance for POEs in China. Their niche market strategies have allowed them to supplement 
some of the functions, that SOCBs ought to provide. The problem is however, that bank-
branch distribution is very different throughout China. Sufian and Habibullah (2012) analyse 
branch distribution and they found that despite some JSCBs opening branches throughout the 
country, they tend to congregate around particular regions. They do not offer a truly nation-
wide branch network, contrary to most SOCBs. An industry expert pointed out that if they 
have not been able to do this thus far, rising real estate prices and staff costs are unlikely to 
allow it in the future12. This means that they can focus on those geographical areas that 
promise the highest return and do not have to burden themselves with loss-making branches. 
On the other hand, it also means that potentially lucrative borrowers might not be able to 
access loans provided by JSCBs, because they are based in areas, where they do not operate. 
JSCBs tend to have more flexibility over lending interest rates. Therefore, even if they do 
engage in more SME and POE lending, their ability to service the whole market is limited by 
their geographical scope. 
                                                        
11 Interview NJ-15-07-001 
12 Interview NJ-14-12-002 
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Despite the advantages of some JSCBs, which can operate like private profit-
maximising and creatively destructive commercial entities, their ability to actively challenge 
the role of SOCBs seems to be hindered by one common feature: lower market share. The 
largest banks in China are the Big Four and BoCom, with JSCBs ranking second. With total 
assets of 5.474trn RMB, the largest JSCB in 2015 was China Merchant Bank (China Merchant 
Bank, 2016). This translated into an asset share on banking assets of 2.75%.  We can compare 
this to the smallest SOCB, the Bank of China. BOC has a market share of 8.44% - three times 
the size of China Merchant Bank. We can take from this that the distinguishing feature of JSCBs 
is their relatively lower market share. It is important to note nonetheless, that within the 
group of JSCBs the size of each different bank varies immensely. If we take the Tianjin-based 
Bohai Bank for example. In 2015, this JSCB held total assets of 0.764trn RMB and had a market 
share of 0.38% (Bohai Bank, 2016). This illustrate the vastly different institutions, that all come 
under the term JSCB, with the largest JSCB being seven times the size of the smallest JSCB. The 
case of Bohai is further interesting, because it is actually smaller than some CCBs. 
Lastly, many JSCBs have very rigid procedures, which are geared towards servicing a 
few large clients than many small borrowers. Despite the fact that there are loan quotas for 
SMEs, banks tend to favour large SOEs and POEs. Regulation should in theory compel banks 
to lend to a larger variety of borrowers, but it does not. As a JSCB loan officer pointed out 
‘regulation is regulation but the actual business is the actual business’13. The government is 
actively encouraging all banks including JSCBs to lend to SMEs and more POEs. However, when 
this regulation is implemented, banks still favour lending to a large POE than too many SMEs. 
From the perspective of the individual bank, this is a very economic decision, for the cost of 
                                                        
13 Interview SH-15-03-001 
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due diligence in a loan application is likely to be similar, whether the amount of the loan is 
small or large14.  
Revisiting the four core functions of banks within the financial system and relating 
them bank to the role player by JSCBS, we can argue that most of them provide said functions 
for the Chinese economy. They provide credit and term-to-maturity transformation. They 
provide liquidity. In the case of banks, which are heavily involved in POE finance, we can also 
say that they provide the function of a delegated monitor. Loan officers at Minsheng Bank for 
example are encouraged to assess local businesses at a sub-branch level before those 
businesses seek a line of credit (Zhang, 2013). In other cases, especially those institutions with 
a high degree of state-ownership, one could expect the multiple principal conflict might be 
inhibiting the banks ability to provide this core function. Then this would result in the same 
negative externalities, i.e. poor protection of depositors’ and shareholders’ interests and poor 
access to lines of credit for POEs. 
3.1.3.3 City Commercial Banks and Foreign Banks  
 Despite the high degree of concentration in the banking sector, further smaller banks 
also exist in Mainland China. This last section will further look at two more types of commercial 
banks: City Commercial Banks (CCBs) and Foreign Banks (FBs). These two types of banks are 
discussed together not because they bear much resemblance in ownership structure, size or 
market share but because both for their very own reasons cannot pose significant competition 
to SOCBs or JSCBs. This means, that even if they do not exhibit a lending bias, their ability to 
change the systemic bias is severely limited by their size and market share. 
 City Commercial Banks (CCBs) originally developed out of urban credit cooperatives 
(Chong, 2013). There are currently 133 different CCBs operating around China with a total 
                                                        
14 Interview BJ-14-11-001 
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market share of 10.49% (CBRC, 2015). Their predecessors, the urban credit cooperatives 
developed in the 1980s to meet a growing demand for financial intermediation between 
surplus-saving units and urban small borrowers. They rose to immense importance in 
subsequent years. In 1996 they accounted for app. 75% or private sector lending (Tsai, 2002). 
Due to the poor management of these urban credit cooperatives and and a subsequent non-
performing loan problem, the PBOC ordered urban credit cooperatives to merge (Sun et al, 
2013). The different cooperatives were to merge to form one bank per city. The resulting join-
stock companies had local governments, urban collective and privately own enterprises as 
well as former cooperative members as their shareholders.  
Because of their shareholder structure and their role as the suppliers of capital to POEs 
and SMEs, they continue to focus largely on SMEs (Chong, 2013). My research supports this, 
for CCBs are often referred to as supporting local enterprises and their development15 or 
being a lot more familiar with local enterprises, than other forms of commercial banks16. The 
problem is just that their overall market share is too small to alleviate the negative 
externalities, i.e. the shortage of funding for POEs and SMEs, cause by large banks’ SOE lending 
bias. 
In their comparative study, Jiang et al (2013) found that CCBs by large have are more 
profit efficient than the SOCBs or JSCBs. Sufian and Habibullah (2012) argue that CCBs tend to 
have a better relationship with local business fraternities and retail customers. Until 2006, 
CCBs were only allowed to operate within the city, where their HQ is based (Sun et al, 2013). 
As these restrictions were phased out, many CCBs began venturing beyond the boundaries of 
their respective cities. Today, we can find branches of various different CCBs throughout China, 
                                                        
15 Interview NJ-14-12-008,  
16 Interview NJ-14-12-002 
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often far away from their initial home base. As with JSCB and SOCB, the term CCB is hence 
somewhat misleading. First, many of these CCBs now operate nation-wide. It is not 
uncommon to see branches of the Bank of Beijing in provinces across the country. Second, 
many CCBs are joint-stock companies. This means their shareholders include local 
governments, private enterprises, and foreign investors. Their history might be different, but 
to a certain extent they too are joint-stock commercial banks. Third, the term City Commercial 
Bank vis-à-vis Joint-stock Commercial Bank somewhat implies, that the former is smaller than 
the latter. This could not be further from the truth. For example, in 2015 the Bank of Beijing 
had total assets of 1.67trn RMB, which amounts to a total market share of 0.84%. Bohai Bank, 
a JSCB, had total assets of 764bn, which amounts to a total market share of 0.38%. The Bank 
of Beijing is thus almost twice the size of Bohai Bank, despite one being a CCB and the other 
being a JSCB.  
It is very important to highlight that the current terminology is vague and does not 
satisfactorily address the important structural variances between the different institutions. If 
we revisit the core functions of banks once more, we can certainly see that CCBs provide 
liquidity as well as credit and term-to-maturity transformations. Because of their diverse 
ownership structure and their institutional legacy as urban credit cooperatives, they further 
seem to also have a better understanding in local enterprises and as such provide the function 
of a delegated monitor. The only issue is that their total asset share and their geographically 
fragmented business scope means that they cannot effectively provide this function for the 
entire economy. 
 Foreign banks in China are also included here to demonstrate their lack of ability to 
challenge and creatively destruct the current status quo in the Chinese banking system. After 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, the banking sector was gradually opened 
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to foreign banks. Foreign banks operating within China may now offer a wide range of banking 
services, such as deposit taking, financial leasing, payment and money transfer services and 
all lending activities (Cousin, 2011, Yao et al, 2007). Following this influx of foreign banks, many 
feared that foreign banks would ultimately take over the market (Huang et al, 2013). Despite 
the disappearing discriminatory formal barriers to entry, Chan et al (2014) points out, the 
effects of this are yet to be seen. Between 1998 and 2010, the market share of foreign banks 
stagnated (Huang et al, 2013). If we examine more recent years, between 2004 and 2014, 
asset share of foreign banks fell from 1.84% to 1.62% (CBRC, 2015). Despite the changes that 
the WTO membership induced, foreign banks have not been able to make use on these new 
opportunities.  
While they have been able to expand their assets, they have not ben able to improve 
their position in the market. Interviewees have highlighted two possible: the lack of local 
knowledge of the financial landscape and the discriminatory application of existing 
regulation17. The lack of local knowledge is often paired with procedure, which are geared 
towards other markets. For example, if one applies for a loan at one of the largest foreign 
banks in China, the approval process is centralised in Hong Kong. Therefore loan approval 
times are the same as for domestic banks 18 . Furthermore, regulators tend to enforce 
regulation much more rigidly on foreign banks than on national banks. As the former executive 
of a large foreign bank in China pointed out, that foreign banks often face the threat of having 
their licence revoked, when national banks do not19.  
Because of the structure of the financial system and the uneven competition of 
national banks, most foreign banks pursue niche strategies in China. The two key issue that 
                                                        
17 Interview NJ-14-12-001, BJ-14-11-002 
18 Interview BJ-14-11-002 
19 ibid. 
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Chan et al (2014) identify are a lack of distribution channels and the emergence of new NBFIs 
that operate outside of the regulatory framework. The lack of distribution channels is mainly 
due to China’s geography. Rolling out an extensive network of branches and sub-branches is 
a costly and potentially unprofitable venture. Focusing on geographically limited areas is 
therefore a more cost-effective strategy. Pursuing this strategy also means a more limited 
access to bank deposits. Moving the operations away from traditional physical offices to an 
online-based system would certainly have been an option. Due to the arrival of new NBFIs, 
e.g. Alibaba’s Alipay or Tencent’s WechatPay, which are not bound by the same rigid 
regulations as traditional banks, would put foreign banks entering the same space at a major 
disadvantage. Foreign banks do therefore provide some of the functions that banks ought to 
provide to an economy, however to to their limited market share, they cannot be seen as 
providing this service to the entire economy. 
3.2 Chinese Financial Markets 
Regardless of their relative significance, we cannot and must not ignore that China is 
also home to impressive financial markets. The following section will therefore serve as an 
introduction to the Chinese financial markets, which will remain brief as the financial system 
is bank-based and even the most recent reforms in China have done little to fundamentally 
alter this key characteristic. Albeit shadow financial markets have existed in China, especially 
in Shanghai during the Republican era, they certainly do not play a significant role today 
should they still exist.  
The main financial markets in China are the two equity markets, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In addition to those, bond markets are 
developing in China. Commodity or derivative markets are however of lesser significance in 
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terms of size. They will not be discussed as their contribution to financial systems design 
theory and the role they play within the Chinese financial system are negligible. 
3.2.1  Equity Markets 
Equity markets provide long-term funding for enterprises in return for the sale of equity 
(Farell et al, 2006). During the Maoist era and before China’s opening, there were no financial 
markets under the planned economy. While banks were needed as allocators of funds and 
safe storage places for deposits, there was no use for financial markets in an economy, where 
the state owned all enterprises and factors of production. Enterprises were state-owned and 
there was no private ownership of commercial entities. Albeit commercial banks were 
established and developed throughout the 1980s, financial markets were not. It was not until 
1990, that the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was founded. It was soon to be followed by the 
Shenzhen Stock (SZSE) exchange in 1991. The goal of developing equity markets was to 
provide access to funds for SOEs and thereby taking pressure of the banking sector. To cope 
with the new regulatory tasks that these securities markets produced, the State Council 
established the Securities Committee of the State Council and the China Securities Regulatory 












Diagram 5 – Market Capitalization of Mainland Chinese Stock Markets 
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Diagram 5 shows the market capitalization in 100m RMB of both the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). For the SZSE data is only available 
after 2003, while the SSE has published all historical data since its conception. Judging from 
data available for the 1990s, we can see the Chinese equity markets developed slowly during 
the early period and developed more rapidly after China’s accession to the WTO in 2006. As 
many other financial markets across the globe, Chinese equity markets did experience in influx 
of capital prior to the global financial crisis as well as a stark slump following it. In the case of 
the SSE, it has since recovered, whereas the SZSE has grown significantly. In 2008, it market 
capitalization was app. 2.411trn RMB and rose to 23.611trn RMB at the end of 2015. The 
reason for this immense growth rate of almost 980% within seven years, was the launch of an 
SME board as well as a new trade link between the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the SZSE, 
which allowed international investors to invest in mainland Chinese shares through Hong Kong. 
Overall the SSE is still almost 25% larger than the SZSE in terms of market capitalization. 
As we can see in Diagram 6, by the end of 2015, there were 1081 companies listed on 
the SSE and 1746 companies on the SZSE respectively. So despite the SSE being larger in terms 
of their market capitalization, the SZSE is larger in terms of the total number of listed 
companies. What is truly striking in the comparison is the remarkable growth rate of listed 
companies on the SZSE. This is due to the same factors that caused a significant growth in 
market capitalization, namely the SME board, which allows small and medium enterprises to 
go public easier, as well as the increased trade links with neighbouring Hong Kong. 
International investors can therefor more easily invest in companies traded on the SZSE. We 
can further see this in Diagram 5, which shows the year-on-year increase of listed companies 
in both stock exchanges in China. While the annual growth of listed companies on the stock 
exchange has slowed on the SSE, the SZSE has seen significant growth since the end of the last 
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decade. Both stock markets experience a decline of listed companies in 2013, following 
general turmoil on China’s stock markets and fears over their general performance. Judging 
from the indicators, we see that China has a rapidly developing financial equity market, which 
should therefore provide at least some of the functions that equity markets provide in a 
financial system and allow entrepreneurs to get access to the type of finance that it provides. 
It does, however, do very little to improve the overall access to finance for smaller POEs.  
The development of financial markets should allow larger enterprises to seek finance 
through those markets and therefore allow greater finance for all (Beck et al, 2005). Larger 
enterprises should be able to gain access to large amounts of capital and therefore rely less 
on bank loans. Banks therefore have more capital to extend as loans, which should benefit 
especially smaller borrowers. Overall, equity markets prevent the crowding out of smaller 
borrowers from the market for bank loans. Farell et al (2006) note here, that despite their size, 
financial markets in China give large enterprises too few alternatives. Sufian and Habibullah 
(2012) have also noted the importance of the equity market is limited, with only 5% of 
corporate funding coming from equity issuance. As 95% of corporate funding still comes from 
bank loans and banks favour large enterprises, we can see that they are still crowding out 
smaller lenders. In an attempt to see why, Xu and Lu (2011) have argued that regulatory 
barriers make it immensely difficult to obtain finance through the equity markets in China. 
Durnev et al (2004) say that comparatively to other transition economies, China’s stock 
market performs poorly, due to weak property rights, corporate opaqueness and political 
rent-seeking.  
The reasons for China’s relatively small financial markets are manifold (Huang, 2013). 
First, China’s equity markets are heavily regulated. Apart from the complicated share structure, 
access to equity markets is heavily regulated. Farell et al (2006) point out that the driving 
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momentum behind the markets’ creation was a drive to implement government policy, 
namely raising funds for SOEs, which was disguised as privatisation. Therefore, many poorly 
performing companies are publicly listed. Similarly, Ayyagari et al (2010) points out that the 
role of the Chinese equity markets has been largely that of a vessel for SOE privatization. In 
the beginning, the initial public offering process was controlled by the government in almost 
its entirety. Another reason is that China’s largest and most profitable companies often prefer 
to get listed overseas. This phenomenon has often been referred to as ‘P Chips’ (Huang, 2013). 
These are Chinese companies, incorporated and listed outside China. If we take the largest 
IPO of a Chinese company, Alibaba as an example. An immensely successful Chinese firm 
chose to go public not on the mainland Chinese markets or the HKSE. They rather sought out 
go get listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), resulting in its largest IPO to date. The 
reason for this is certainly the ability to use it as an access to a larger pool of investors. Due to 
its transparency, rules and regulations, investors tend to prefer NYSE over the domestic 
Chinese markets. Furthermore, going public on an international stock exchange like the NYSE 
exposes a company to international standards of accounting and corporate governance. This 
one of the key benefits of a well-functioning stock market. The downside of this is that smaller 
and riskier companies, who shun exposure to international accounting standards, will go 
public on the domestic Chinese markets (Farell et al, 2006). This means that domestic 
investors, who often only have the choice to invest in the domestic equity markets due to 
capital controls, will be forced to invest in shares with inferior returns and sometimes 
questionable quality. This begets the question, where investors would turn in order to invest 
with moderate or higher return. The lack of investment opportunities due to the structure of 
the financial markets may well fuel the growth of alternative investment opportunities 
elsewhere. 
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The lack of institutional investors in the Chinese stock markets is another reason for 
their underdevelopment. Yao et al (2014) points out that in 2008, over 99% of all A shares and 
were held by retail investors and only with only 0.08% being held by institutional investors. 
Institutional investors serve two main purposes. They provide liquidity to the market and they 
tend to ensure that share prices are based on rational long-term future earning capabilities. 
Their lack of engagement in the Chinese equity markets therefore has two impacts: firstly, 
their absence limits the possible market capitalization. International institutional investors, 
e.g. insurance companies or hedge funds, so far shy away from investing the domestic Chinese 
equity markets and are actively kept out by quotas. Mainland Chinese shares are not included 
in leading indices, which means that institutional investors, which offer products that track 
indices, e.g. Exchange Traded Funds, will not invest. The absence of institutional investors on 
the Mainland Chinese markets further exacerbate monitoring and pricing issues.  Monitoring 
and influencing corporate governance is significantly harder for individual investors with low 
degrees of organization, than institutional investors with potentially larger stakes in a 
particular company. A high degree of retail investors further leads to volatility in the markets 
and makes pricing of equity insanely difficult. 
Chinese equity markets have demonstrated remarkable growth since their inception. 
They certainly provide the opportunity for some enterprises to go public and gain access to 
finance through the sale of equity. The turbulences in Chinese stock markets in recent years 
as well as popular anecdotal evidence of questionable businesses further seem to indicate 
that the equity markets do not provide the intended monitoring functions. This echoes my 
findings for the banking sector, which also does not provide the monitoring functions it ought 
to provide for the economy. 
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3.2.2  Bond Markets 
Bond markets allow issuers to get access to longer-term capital in exchange for paying 
an interest at a rate that is below of what a bank would offer for a loan. Before China’s opening 
under the planned economy, only a few bonds were issued. These were treasury bonds that 
people used as a form of saving and subscribed to out of patriotism rather than rational 
investment behaviour.  Since the opening of China’s economy this has changed. Huang et al 
(2013) explain that today, bonds are important for a variety of reasons: First, they are 
important for institutional investors to better match their maturity, manage risk, and manage 
liabilities. Second a well-functioning bond market would allow banks to diversify the risk of 
their holding. Lastly, it would provide an avenue for SOE finance outside of the banking sector, 
thereby liberating funds to be used for other forms of bank lending.  
 In China, there are six type of bonds traded: Government bonds, issued by the MOF, 
People’s Bank of China paper, financial bonds issued by financial institutions or policy banks, 
corporate bonds, commercial paper issued by securities firms or POEs, and medium term 
notes. All of these bond types are also traded at the SSE or the SZSE. In 2014, the market 
capitalization of the Chinese bond market was 32.716trn RMB (ADB, 2017). Government 
issued bonds were worth 20.693trn RMB.  Corporate bonds were worth 12.023 RMB. From 
this we can take that while the bond market is a fairly important source for the government, 
which sourced funding totalling 32.13% of GDP from them, they are much less so for the 
corporate sector. Corporate bonds only account for 36.75% of all bonds on the domestic bond 
markets. Ma (2006) and Suzuki et al (2008) both note that the total of outstanding bank loans 
is approximately 10 times larger than that of credit bonds. In 2014, the total of outstanding 
bank loans was 86.8trn, which means that the factor decreased slightly to just over 7 (CBRC, 
2015). This demonstrates that while bonds have become somewhat more frequently used in 
the past 10 years, the bond market in general is still not seen as a viable alternative for 
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corporate funding. The state of the bond market has led authors like Huang et al (2013) to 
denounce the corporate bond market as underdeveloped. It currently does not provide an 
adequate forum for firms to seek finance. This is especially true for small- and medium 
enterprises, which are currently unable to obtain funds on the bond markets. 
3.3  Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter presents an analysis of the Chinese financial system using financial 
systems design theory. At the core of this chapter are three distinct findings. The first is that 
if we use the theory’s binary distinction, the Chinese financial system has to be understood as 
a bank-based financial system. We can use two accepted indicators, total bank assets vis-à-vis 
stock market capitalization, to briefly illustrate, that China’s banking sector is larger than the 
financial markets. In 2014, China’s stock market capitalization as a percentage of its GDP was 
74.384% (World Bank, 2016). While there has been some development since 2010, when 
market capitalization was 67% of GDP, it still falls short of rivalling the size of bank sector 
development in China (Huang, 2013). If we use just two of the indicators of bank-sector 
development and financial market development, bank assets as percentage of GDP and if we 
compare this indicator of China’s financial market development to those for banking sector 
development, e.g. bank assets as percentage of its GDP, we can instantly see the remarkable 
difference. Even only the total assets held by China’s large banks combined amount to 111.6% 
and hence significantly more than the entire market capitalization of the various stock markets 
in China (CBRC, 2015). These are two indicators to measure financial market development vis-
à-vis bank sector development. They make clear that China has a bank-based financial system. 
The second finding is that although other banks, namely JSCBs and CCBs have been very 
successful at expanding both their total assets as well as their asset share, the banking sector 
is still dominated by China’s large banks. It was hoped that following China’s full membership 
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in the WTO and its associated pledges to phase out of protectionist regulation, foreign banks 
would be able to grow their operations in China. But these pledges have not been fulfilled, 
and their absolute and relative size remains inferior to the former three institutions. It is worth 
highlighting that this kind of separation of banks into different groups and the corresponding 
terminology used throughout the literature is misleading, as some JSCBs have a larger degree 
of state ownership than SOCBs and some CCBs are larger than JSCBs. Some foreign banks own 
stakes in SOCBs. The following discussion will focus on the lending bias favouring state-owned 
enterprises and how state ownership in the banking sector is actively enforcing it.  
 The third finding is that with the exception of some JSCBs and CCBs, the financial 
system falls short of expectations, when it comes to the provision of lines of credit and finance 
to POEs and in particular SMEs. The main reason for this is an ever looming multiple principal 
conflict within the five Large Banks and to some extend also in some JSCBs. Financial Markets 
further do very little to alleviate credit constraints of POEs. This begs the question that if not 
from banks or financial markets, where do enterprises get their funding from? Could there be 
another sector of the financial system, which supplements the functions of the two formal 
financial sectors, i.e. the banking sector and the financial markets?  
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Chapter 4: Shadow-Banking Sector in China 
Most people will have a somewhat concrete understanding of the workings of banks 
and financial markets. They will easily grasp, what these institutions do and why they are 
important. When we examine the formal financial sector, it is easy to comprehend what 
constitutes it. The shadow banking sector does not give us the same amount of clarity. We 
can broadly define it as any bank-like activity taking place outside of the formal banking sector. 
To the uninitiated, this might sound nebulous and all-encompassing. Yet, it is precise in the 
way that it outlines the amplitude of different institutions, which make up this sector. Shadow 
banking, as this chapter will clarify, exists in every economy throughout the world. China is a 
special case however, due to the sheer size and the amplitude of institutions, which make up 
this sector. Estimates of the size ranged from 5trn to 46trn RMB in 2015 (Elliot et al, 2015). 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) says that in that period, it amounted to over 40trn 
RMB or 66% of GDP (IMF, 2016). In 2014, total assets of the banking sector amounted to 270% 
of GDP and stock market development was just under 75% of GDP (World Bank, 2016; CBRC, 
2015). While the shadow banking sector cannot rival with the banking sector, its size surely 
rivals that of the financial markets. Yet, to the general public the term shadow banking is and 
remains a rather abstract term. As we will discover in the course of this chapter, this in itself 
is hardly surprising, for often the formal banking and the shadow banking sector have linkages. 
Thus it is impossible to fully say, where the one ends and the other begins. 
This chapter will now firstly engage in a brief discussion of different definitions of 
shadow banking by reviewing existing literature. It will then continue to highlight the integral 
importance of the shadow banking sector for the Chinese economy.  This chapter will then 
first employ an institutional approach to understanding this sector, discussing the various 
institutions that constitute it. This is based on both existing literature and my own research. 
It is first necessary to grasp what actual institutions constitute this sector and how authors 
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have attempted to classify them.  Following that, I will seek to employ a functional approach 
to highlight, why understanding the different institutions that constitute shadow banking is 
inferior to understanding the functions they provide. Legality and status of institutions 
changes over time, place and modus operandi. Especially in the Chinese context, we might 
have different institutions of the same nature engaging in legal, quasi-legal and illegal actions. 
Lastly this chapter will introduce the key hypothesis of this thesis and its main contribution to 
the field of financial system design theory: the supplemented bank-based financial system. 
The case of the Chinese financial system suggests that if the absence of the formal financial 
sector’s ability to provide the functions they ought to, the creative destructive powers of 
capital will find an alternative path through a third financial sector. 
4.1 What is Shadow Banking and why is it important? 
At first glance, the term shadow banking sounds like something out of a crime novel. 
It sounds more like informal finance and illegal banking, conducted in the shadows of the grey 
economy; just plain undesirable. Is this an accurate picture of what constitutes shadow 
banking or is this a grave misunderstanding of what this sector actually constitutes? This 
section will shed some light on why we refer to this financial sector as the shadow banking 
sector and what it is that makes it so important that we could not possibly ignore it.  
The definitions for shadow banking are manifold. The most basic definition is provided 
by Gennaioli et al (2013: 1331), which defines shadow banking simply as ‘financial activities 
occurring outside the regulated banking sector’. This rather wholesome definition would 
encompass any financial activities, e.g. money lending or deposit taking, by institutions, which 
are not registered banks. Every institution, hard or soft, which engages in these activities, 
should then be classified as a shadow bank. The definition provided by the G20 Financial 
Stability Board (2014:1) echoes similarly, that shadow banking is ‘credit intermediation 
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involving entities and activities (fully or partly) outside the regular banking system’. The 
emphasis here is that of credit intermediation, not merely financial activities. It further 
expands our understanding of what shadow banking is by adding that said activity can be 
carried out fully or partly outside the regular banking system. The latter element is very 
important, as this also includes activities, which are conducted partly in and outside the 
regular banking systems and thus involve formal banks. There is some linkage between the 
shadow banking sector and the other sub-sectors of the financial sector. Other definitions 
expand more on the functions provided by shadow banking, for example Plantin (2015: 146) 
defines it as all financial institutions belonging to the nexus, which perform the functions of 
traditional banks, i.e. loan financing with the issuance of money-like liabilities, while not being 
regulated as banks. 
In their paper on the characteristics of shadow-banking in China, Guo and Xia (2014) 
provide an excellent and thorough discussion of existing definitions of shadow banking. They 
review the legal definitions of the FSB, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York. They conclude that albeit the definitions vary slightly on some 
aspects, the common feature across all of them is that it encompasses credit intermediation 
that takes place outside of the regular banking system (Li and Xia, 2014: 391).  
The most relevant definition for China is provided by the PBOC. The most relevant 
definition for China is provided by the PBOC, which reviewed different international 
definitions of shadow banking, concludes that the most widely accepted definition is ‘credit 
intermediation engaged in maturity, credit and liquidity transformation, which cannot gain 
liquidity support from central banks or credit guarantees from public sectors’ (PBOC, 2013: 
199). It has henceforth used this definition in its Annual Financial Stability Report. This last 
definition is important for two particular reasons. Firstly, as the most obvious reason, it is the 
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official definition of shadow banking in China. It thus forms the backbone of what constitutes 
shadow-banking for the purpose of this study. It incorporates the aforementioned definitions 
and further expands on them by secondly adding a normative assessment. It incorporates, for 
better or worse, an assessment of the risks stemming from this sector. Shadow banking is not 
only bank-like activity outside of the formal banking sector. It is also potentially dangerous, 
for it could cause systemic risk or regulatory arbitrage. While the systemic risk stemming from 
a sector, which because of its definition includes institutions as diverse as financing companies, 
money market mutual funds or P2P lending platforms, remains to be seen, it is important to 
note that this is the only definition which explicitly takes it into account. In putting an 
emphasis on the very risk in relation to the benefits that this sector provides, this definition is 
distinctively different from others. 
What all definitions, whether stemming from International Financial Institutions (IFIs), 
central banks or academia, have in common is that shadow-banking is defined in contrast to 
banking. To use a commonly known metaphor, if it quacks like a bank, but is not defined as a 
bank, it is a shadow bank. Therefore, any institution that engages in activities that resemble 
this but is legally not a bank, is a shadow bank.  
Given the before-mentioned concepts of financial sector and financial system and the 
role that shadow-banking plays in China, I adopt the term “shadow-banking sector” to group 
all institutions of unregulated finance under one key term. Whether it is the internationally 
accepted definition or the China-specific definition, they all share that any institution that 
engages in credit intermediation outside the regular banking system is a shadow bank.  
This dissertation has adopted a functional approach to analysing the Chinese financial 
system. If the formal financial system is not providing the functions it ought to, it begets an 
important question. Is the shadow-banking sector, with the functions it provides, is a distinct 
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financial sector within the financial system? Does it form the third important sub-sector, next 
to the banking sector and the financial markets? Looking solely at any one or a handful of the 
specific institutions in this sector might run the risk of ignoring the supplementary function it 
provides to the system. For example, while informal finance20 might suffice in the rural parts 
of China and for small- and microenterprises, it is debatable whether it does in urban China. 
Formal institutions 21 , e.g. P2P lending, however equally supplement the existing formal 
financial sector. It is therefore vital to look at all institutions in the shadow-banking sector to 
generate comprehensive findings.  
The shadow-banking sector includes both formal institutions, e.g. hedge funds, 
financing companies and P2P financing companies, as well as informal institutions. The modus 
operandi of these two different sets of institutions is likely to vary. Nonetheless, shadow banks 
also turn excess funds of surplus-spending units into capital supplied to deficit-spending units. 
In doing so, they support both investment and consumption. Surplus-spending units may 
choose to invest their excess capital in this sector, because it might provide higher returns on 
their investment rather than saving it in a bank account in a commercial bank. Deficit-spending 
units may borrow from this sector, because of convenience or because of a restricted access 
to formal bank loans or financial markets. Banks might also interact with this sector for 
regulatory arbitrage, for example to circumvent provisioning requirements or interest rate 
regulation. The vastly different institutions, which make up this sector, provide a large array 
of different functions to several other sectors of the economy.  
                                                        
20 Informal finance refers to the financial transactions, which take place outside any 
formalised legal framework, e.g. interpersonal loans. 
21 Formal institutions refer to shadow banks, which are formal institutions working inside an 
existing legal framework but outside of the formal financial system. 
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While the institutions may vary, Meade et al (2012: 2) define four core functions of 
shadow banking. First, the sector provides alternatives for investors to classic bank deposits. 
Secondly, due to a higher level of specialisation of the individual institutions within the sector, 
it channels resources more efficiently to specific needs. It further provides an alternative 
source of finance to the real economy. Lastly, it can possibly present a source of risk 
diversification away from the banking sector. What is striking is that existing literature has 
often only attempted to classify this sector by legality (Tsai, 2002) or formality (Elston, 2016), 
rather than approaching it from the function it can provide within the financial system. The 
most informal institutions and legally problematic institutions, e.g. those charging 
extraordinary interest rates, may employ a different modus operando than the more formal 
institutions. At the core, this raises the question, of whether this sector provides a function 
for the economy, by supplementing the functions provided by the other two sub-sectors? A 
more systemic analysis of the different institutions that constitute the shadow banking sector 
in China will be provided in the main part of this study. As they vary largely in terms of their 
legality, formality and individual scope of business, this simply warrants a separate sub-
chapter.  
Having discussed what shadow banking entails, we have to ask ourselves, whether 
having a large shadow banking sector in any given economy has a positive impact on the 
overall development of this economy. Can it contribute to an ideal allocation of capital or is it 
maybe more of a burden for development? Authors like Meade et al (2012) have argued that 
shadow banking has the potential to assist the financial system in its core function, which is 
guiding excess capital to its most efficient use. On the other hand, Tressel (2003) argues that 
financial systems that are not able to develop a functioning formal banking sector will 
eventually reach a point of a stable aggregate wealth level; in other words, economic growth 
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will eventually stagnate. The issue here is that Tressel has looked solely at informal finance 
and ignored other forms of shadow banking. Informal finance is by its very nature reputation 
and relationship-based (Zhang, 2008). Therefore, it rewards personal networks and 
relationships, rather than entrepreneurial skill and initiative. This argument ignores, that 
financial innovation in this sector has led to the evolution of an array of institutions which are 
in fact heavily formalised and do not rely on personal networks. One example for this would 
be P2P lending platforms, which allow deficit units to directly acquire external finance from 
surplus-saving units with an online platform acting as an intermediary.  
It is important to review here, that none of the definitions discussed include any 
aspects of legality. While Tsai (2002) for example has used legality as a dimension for mapping 
out institutions in shadow banking, this study places emphasis on the function of different 
institutions within the shadow-banking sector. These institutions come in various shapes and 
formats, from interbank-shadow banking, e.g. securitisation, to retail shadow banking, e.g. 
microloan companies. As the following sub-chapters will elaborate in greater detail shadow 
banking has been and continues to be at the very core of private enterprise finance in China. 
 Its importance lies in the function it provides. It exists both between banks, alongside 
banks, and the financial markets (Lu et al, 2015). For those parts of the sector, that exists 
within and between banks, it provides an important alternative for investors to bank deposits 
and it provides an alternative source of finance for the real economy (Meade et al, 2012). As 
we have discussed in great length before, Chinese commercial banks display an SOE lending 
bias. Whether we see the extent to which it exists as optimistic as Lardy (2014) or as 
pessimistic as Yiu et al (2013), no expert on China would doubt that the access to bank loans, 
capital from bond markets or from public listings is not severely affected by an all 
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encompassing state ownership of capital as a means of production (Ahlstrom, 2015; Lu et al, 
2012).  
A rich abundance of literature sees in the this lending bias the very foundation upon 
which bank-like activities outside of the regular formal banking system have been founded. 
Jiang (2009) and Hsu (2009) say that due to the institutional constraints of the formal banking 
sector, POEs have to seek funding elsewhere. Private enterprises face four serious financial 
issues that they can only overcome through seeking financing in the shadow banking sector: 
They lack access to bank credit, often find it difficult to obtain finance from VCs, find it almost 
impossible to get publicly listed and often do not receive fiscal support.  
Tsai (2002) has even credited the informal financial sector with providing much of the 
financing needed to fund China’s impressive economic growth. Allen et al (2005) also found 
that there is an effective alternative financing channel outside the formal banking system, 
which supports the growth of the private sector, shadow banking. In their analysis of 
microcredit institutions in rural China, Turvey et al (2010) argue that informal finance has in 
the past had a comparative advantage of microfinance or formal bank loans. They argue that 
much of the microfinance sector in rural China cannot compete with informal finance, because 
loans are granted with low interest rates and at flexible terms.  
Defining shadow banking is in itself an easy task. What is more difficult is filling this 
definition with actual examples. For the Chinese economy, the shadow banking sector is of 
great importance for the function it provides. The next section will now engage in an 
institutional analysis of this sector and discus the various shadow banks that we can find in 
China. The next section will then engage in a functional analysis of this sector. 
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4.2. An institutional analysis of the shadow banking sector 
The institutional approach, when applied to the formal banking sector, focuses on 
existing formal financial institutions and the central bank as unit of analysis. This approach 
tends to provide a comprehensive overview of various banks, insurance companies, 
investment and pension funds as well as financial markets. It tends to be focused on how these 
different institutions interact within the financial system. Despite having been criticised for 
being too descriptive, this approach serves as a good starting point for our analysis. If we are 
to understand the Chinese shadow-banking sector, we first have to understand all institutions 
within it, just as we would with the formal banking sector. Which institutions make up this 
sector and can we group them in sub categories?  
Discussion on the shadow banking sector in China have largely been centred around 
two dichotomies: illegal vs legal and informal vs formal. Ayyagari et al (2010) discus what they 
refer to as formal and informal finance in China. They highlight that formal finance typically 
operates with a state charter. It consists of financial intermediaries as delegated monitors, 
which typically lend with collateral. In order to enforce payment, formal financial institutions 
rely of formal judicial system to enforce their claims. Informal finance operates without a state 
charter. It consists of individual lenders, non-delegated monitors and institutions, for example 
rotating-credit-and-saving organisations. Lending here rarely requires collateral. Their 
activities are deemed illegal and thus they cannot rely on judicial system to enforce their 
claims. This dichotomy divides institutions and actors along the lines of legality. Formal 
institutions always act within the confines of the law. Informal institutions always act outside 
it. Yiu et al (2013) also use a definition of informal finance to analyse how alternative financing 
affects private firm performance. The definition is based on informal finance being based on 
reputation and relationships rather than formal contracts. In their opinion, this includes 
retained earnings, interpersonal lending, underground finance and trade credit.  
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Tsai (2002) classifies institutions in the shadow banking sector along three lines: legal, 
quasi-legal and illegal. Her work was one of the first attempts to classify the institutions of 
what she referred to as informal finance – the credit channels entrepreneurs in China created 
in the absence of formal finance. She already pointed out that these were a good starting 
point but had one inherent flaw. These classifications change over time and place. For example, 
at the beginning of the Millennia, pawnshops were illegal in some areas of China, while being 
legal in others. Interpersonal loans were technically not illegal, but professional credit brokers, 
who bring together borrowers and lenders, were highly illegal. Today, interpersonal loans are 
still legal and so are pawnshops, provided they only extend mortgages with physical collateral.  
In Table 5, we have stuck to Tsai’s classification for purely practical reasons. I have 
amended her table by the other institutions, which are frequently mentioned in academic 
literature and also used my own research. This chapter will introduce each of these institutions 
in order to clarify the maze of shadow banks that exist and provide some very important 
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Table 5 - Institutions in the Chinese Shadow Banking Sector by Legality 
4.3.1 Legal Institutions 
Interpersonal lending, the extension of lines of credit from one person to another 
individual, is in itself not illegal in China just like in most of the world. There are limitations on 
how much interest an individual may charge another without the loans being classed as 
usurious. Therefore, we find this institution both as interpersonal loans in the legal and as 
usurious loans in the illegal column. Usurious loans charge more than five times of the base 
lending rate set by the PBOC. We can immediately see, how this example calls into question 
the underlying classifications of formal vs. informal and legal vs. illegal. An individual lending 
money to a friend or relative works outside a state charter, as there are no private 
interpersonal lenders with one. If they have good personal relationship with the borrower, 
they might see this Guanxi as collateral22. However, if they might also ask for a valuable 
personal possession.  
If the interest rate is below the threshold, this loan is perfectly legal and might be 
subject to a written agreement. To further protect his claim, the lender can even register the 
                                                        
22 The concept of Guanxi as collateral for loans was frequently mentioned in my interviews 
by bother lenders and borrowers, e.g. NJ-15-05-001 and NJ-14-12-003 
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loan with the government through an interpersonal lending and borrowing service centre (
	). As long as this loan is not usurious, the lender can choose to enforce their 
claim through the legal system. If we were to only classify lenders in terms of their formality, 
this example leads it ad absurdum. This is neither fully formal or fully informal, and as long as 
the interest rates stays within the legal limits it is a legal transaction. 
Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), also called hui () in Chinese, are 
associations, where individuals pay in a set monthly contribution and receive the total sum on 
a rotating basis. The rotation is determined either by chance, the random ROSCA, or by bid, 
the bidding ROSCA. For example, 15 individuals pay in a monthly contribution of five RMB and 
one individual receives the 75RMB every month. In a random ROSCA, one of the individuals 
randomly receives the money until everyone has received it once. In a bidding ROSCA different 
individuals make offers for interest rates and the highest bid receives the entire amount. This 
goes to demonstrate that while we call this sector the shadow-banking sector, there are also 
more market-based institutions. The individual bidder suggests a price, i.e. interest rate, for 
the loan. Another bidder, who believes he can get a higher return through obtaining this loan 
might be willing to pay a higher interest rate and ultimately secures the loan. The interest rate 
is therefore set entirely by the demand for capital and thus resembles more a market than a 
traditional bank.  
Other individuals who receive the funds later down the line are compensated for their 
waiting time by receiving a return on their investment through interest payments of other 
ROSCA members. This makes being a member of a ROSCA a very attractive investment, 
especially if it yields a higher return on investment than saving in the formal sector. ROSCAs 
were one of the financial institutions, which survived the Soviet style restructuring of the 
economy before the reform era. In those days, it was often used amongst factory workers to 
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purchase consumer products, e.g. bicycles, which otherwise would have required a lengthy 
time for saving. Today, they continue to exist in rural areas, but do not make up a large part 
of the shadow banking sector. Most of them are informal institutions. 
Pawnshops are entities, where a borrower uses a valuable possession as collateral to 
receive a loan. On pawning his possession, he agrees with the shop owner to later repay the 
loan plus interest and fees. He further agrees that on failure to do so, the pawnshop owner 
may sell his property to recover his losses. Pawnshops are legal in China and serve to a range 
of different businesses and private individuals. They are formal institutions and can use the 
formal legal system to enforce their claims. In recent years, technological advances have 
created new institutions, e.g. online pawnshop brokers. Rather than visiting a physical location 
to get a collateral appraised, individuals can use market platforms to submit pictures and 
receive offers from various pawnshops in close physical proximity. Pawnshops in China further 
do not only limit themselves to small objects like jewellery. Borrowers can also pawn cars or 
apartments to receive short-term and high-interest loans. The increased flexibility allows 
pawnshops to accept a greater range of collateral than traditional banks. Loan decisions are 
further made instantly and do not require a lengthy application and approval procedure.  
Venture capital (VC) firms provide finance in exchange for equity. They technically do 
not take deposits and extend loans. Therefore, one could argue, that they do not perform 
bank-like functions outside of the regular banking sector and thus should not be included in 
this list. I have still included them in this analysis, because in the case of China, things are not 
as clear cut. VC firms use capital from investors. Therefore, they do to some extend take 
deposits, albeit being in the form of an investment. They then use these funds for an equity 
investment, rather than the extension of a loan. In China however we find that this is often 
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Mezzanine finance23. This means that a loan is treated as an equity investment. Furthermore, 
as my research has discovered, local governments use VC firms to address the lack of access 
of finance for small- and medium enterprises 24 . As the case of Nanjing will show, local 
authorities there have set up VCs for investment in high-tech growth-stage enterprises. 
Microcredit companies (MCCs) were first introduced to serve those in the marketplace, 
who are unable to gain access to formal financial services. MCCs in China are by law non 
deposit-taking financial institutions. They may pool the assets of a limited number of investors 
and extend loans. They may also at times seek finance from the formal banking sector but are 
limited by very strict debt-to-asset ratios. In recent years the ability of microfinance 
institutions to acquire capital beyond their initial pool of investors has been greatly increased. 
Some of them have issued bonds on the capital markets or sought public listing. The group of 
MCCs further highlights the shortcomings of conventional classifications of shadow banking 
institutions along a spectrum of illegal versus legal or formal versus informal. These 
microfinance companies are legally operating institutions, which rely on formal contracts and 
operate with a state charter. They are regulated business entities and as such governed by 
commercial law in China. But there are also types of MCCs that are quasi-legal or illegal.  
Within the nexus of microfinance in China, the Asian Development Bank (2014) 
identified four different business models with varying loan sizes and interest rates. One sub-
set of MCCs are institutions, often with links to local governments, that emphasis on 
development and promote those goals through a broader access to finance. Then there are 
donor-supported MCCs, which usually have a development agenda. Their loan size tends to 
be relatively smaller, only around 50,000 RMB and they tend to charge slightly higher interest 
                                                        
23 Interview BJ-15-03-001 
24 Interview NJ-15-06-001 
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rates. The total number of these institutions is lower than for the first category and they tend 
to focus more on rural than urban areas. These two subset of MCCs are perfectly legal and 
desirable institutions. They provide access to finance to those, who cannot qualify for loans. 
Their negative externalities, both in terms of macroeconomic risk and negative social impact, 
are low. The debt-to-asset ratios limit the risk for investors, if they are applied rigorously. As 
they rely on formal and legal ways to enforce their claims, they also do not tend to have a 
negative social impact, i.e. criminal activity in the process of pursuing an underperforming or 
non-performing loan. The third group within the MCC are institutions engaged in online peer-
to-peer (P2P) lending. P2P financing platforms offer online credit mediation. They allow 
potential lenders and borrowers to exchange offers and mediate the transfer. Interest rates 
here exceed bank interest rates and the risk is substantially higher.   
MCCs also include institutions, which operate more like formal fronts for illegal money 
lenders. Here the loan sizes range from 10,000 to 500,000 RMB, with interest rates as high as 
40% per month. This somewhat leads of classification ad-absurdum. These are formal MCCs – 
regulated just like the former two. Yet with their high interest rates, their loans are clearly 
usurious. This means that they cannot pursue those claims through the formal legal system 
leading to potentially negative social externalities. If we are to group this MCCs using Tsai’s 
three categories, they would have to appear in every single one. 
P2P lending platforms are one of the most recent additions to the shadow banking 
sector. The underlying concept, the extension of a loan directly from one individual with funds 
to a person without it, is not new. In fact, interpersonal lending is nothing but offline P2P 
finance. These are online platforms just took a century old system to the 21st century. They 
mediate the exchange of information and funds from potential lenders to borrowers and vice-
versa. They provide information to the lender about the borrower and are therefore aiming 
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at providing more transparency. Until as recently as 2016, this sector was entirely unregulated. 
There were no entry requirements, industry standards or supervisory authority. This lack of a 
regulatory environment does explain the why there are almost 3000 different institutions in 
this market place, with very varying effects on surplus-spending, deficit spending units, and 
the economy overall. Before the introduction of a regulatory framework in 2016/2017, P2P 
lenders claimed to be operating on the same legal basis as interpersonal loans. Founders of 
platforms would often legally borrow the money from the lender and extend the loan to the 
borrower personally. In the next step, they would sell this debt obligation back to the initial 
lender. Because of this administrative trick, regulators in China were not entirely certain which 
agency was meant to supervise these platforms and on what legal basis. Furthermore, many 
of these platforms were pooling assets, meaning that the money given to the platform by the 
lenders would not be matched with one specific loan.  
In many cases this also meant that P2P platforms became giant pyramid schemes. The 
revenue generated by new investors was paid out as interest to existing investors. 
Unfortunately, this had not been an isolated incident and by the end of 2015, over 30% of 
platforms had been classified as ‘problem platforms’, meaning that repayments had stopped 
entirely, there were active police investigations, or the founders had absconded with the 
funds (Chorzempa, 2016). By the middle of 2016, the number of problem platforms had risen 
to 1778 or 43% of all platforms and the regulatory agencies introduced newer strict regulation 
for the industry (Wildau, 2016).  
New and stricter regulation included a ban on pooling of assets, a ban on interest or 
investment/deposit guarantees, ceilings on the amounts that deficit-spending units can 
borrow, and ceilings on the amounts that surplus-spending units can lend through P2P 
platforms. While all of this sounds somewhat alarming for the instability that it suggests within 
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the remaining P2P platforms, we should emphasise that the entire outstanding loan amount 
at the end of 2016 from all remaining platforms was 816.2bn RMB, 1.09% of GDP, or 2% of 
the entire shadow banking sector. It is however an interesting case for our debate on formal 
versus informal and legal versus illegal debate. How do we classify these institutions? 
Following Tsai’s grouping, we have to say that they too belong in various categories. Some of 
them are perfectly legal enterprises, which offer a valuable service to the economy. Based on 
the figures above however it would appear that at least 43% are not. P2P financing platforms 
are also formal enterprises, relying on contracts as the basis of their claims. Others are 
pyramid investment schemes and thus outright illegal. Some are also quasi-legal institutions, 
for they appear to abide by some but not all of the regulations set out by the government, e.g. 
pooling funds when they are explicitly instructed not to. 
Wealth Management products (WMPs) can be seen as a form of security, without 
being covered by and regulated under the PRC’s security law (Guo and Xia, 2014). The term 
wealth management in this respect is largely misleading for it might make us assume that this 
is a financial product for the wealthy of society. A variety of institutions in China issue WMPs: 
commercial banks, trust companies, investment banks, wealth management companies, fund 
management companies, insurance companies, and P2P lending platforms. As these securities 
are not regarded as such by law, there is no commonly available data for all products. In its 
Annual Report, the CBRC noted that commercial banks had issued 15.03trn RMB in wealth 
management products, which is equal to over 23% of GDP (CBRC, 2014). These products are 
not regarded as deposits and hence commercial banks can use the funds generated by their 
sale for investment without affecting their deposit-to-loan ratio. WMPs issued by banks are 
usually the tool for off-balance sheet lending.  
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At the point of purchase, many WMP investors do not know the underlying quality or 
composition of the assets in that product. Commercial banks can therefore move their loans 
off their balance-sheets into WMPs, much like they did with asset-backed securities before in 
the US before the financial crisis. The IMF as recently as last year has warned that WMPs have 
been used by commercial banks to move non-performing loans off their loan books rather 
than recognising them (Mitchell and Yang, 2016). The entire nexus of WMPs and off-balance 
sheet lending is therefore of great concern to the future of economic prosperity in China. If 
they had been bought by financially literate investors, this would be less of a concern, for they 
would have been likely to understand that and interest rate of approximately double of the 
annual deposit rate at commercial banks is likely to mean a riskier investment. As many retail 
investors have bought these products and often from banks, they often do not understand 
that these are not as safe as bank deposits. Despite the fact that they are not liable for WMPs, 
banks have in the past assumed liability and reimbursed investors for capital lost in a failed 
WMP. This has given investors the idea that they are liable after all. WMPs are formal and 
legal products. In themselves, they do enrich the financial landscape in offering more diversity 
in investment opportunities. However, they do carry an intrinsic and systemic risk for the 
entire system – much similar securities did in the US mortgage market in 2008. Different 
WMPs will have different underlying assets and business model. Some of these are simply 
securities, others a more like money-market mutual funds. Another category is also active in 
direct consumer loans and enterprise finance25. 
In addition to WMPs, there is a range of different forms of off-balance sheet lending. 
One such method is through the help of a trust company. As Lu et al (2015: 42) notes, a trust 
company is a ‘uniquely Chinese financial institution’, which comprises elements of private 
                                                        
25 Interview NJ-15-03-003 
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equity, banking and asset management firms. Commercial banks cooperate with trust 
companies on certain projects. Investors seeking to invest in, e.g. a real estate project, will 
supply funds to a bank, which will in turn pass on the funds to the trust company. The trust 
company will in turn invest the funds in the pre-arrange project. Income from that investment 
will be directed back to the trust company, which will take a commission and pass on the funds 
for income distribution to the bank. The bank at no point is liable for this investment or has to 
disclose it, because it is simply acting as an agent for the trust company. Similar arrangements 
however slightly more complex is the cooperation between banks and security firms in China. 
These include a complex transfer or beneficiary rights to allow banks to lend to enterprises, 
which they usually would not been able to lend to, due to credit rationing restraints or deposit-
to-loan ration requirements. The entire nexus of interbank shadow banking is a complex and 
interesting area. Future research in China would be duly warranted, especially since much of 
it is likely to bear intrinsic systemic risk for the world’s second largest economy. 
Although closely linked to the formal banking system, guarantee companies belong 
merely to the wider nexus. A potential borrower or enterprise seeks a bank loan. However, as 
it presents itself, it does not qualify for it. This may be the result of the quality of its collateral 
or the industry, that it operates in. Guarantee companies will assume the risk for default to 
the bank in return for a substantial fee – often a multiple of the annual interest rate. With this 
guarantee, the loan officer can approve the borrower’s application. However, it has not been 
uncommon in the past that loan officers have deliberately send applicants to guarantee 
companies in order to personally profit from a commission paid by said guarantee company. 
Once again, this leads or classification ad absurdum, for credit guarantee companies 
themselves and the services they offer are not illegal. Their business practices however might 
be. 
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4.3.2 Quasi-legal institutions 
 Private Funds are unregistered investment funds, which are managed often by high 
net-worth individuals for other high-net worth individuals. In itself, this is not entirely illegal. 
As we discussed right from the beginning, interpersonal loans in are not illegal in China. As 
long as the interest rates charged for loans is not usurious, this should surely not be 
considered illegal. However illegal fundraising in China is a crime and a capital offence for that 
matter. Absorbing funds without approval, making use of public means of solicitation (incl. 
text messages), engage in the undertaking to repay the ‘deposit’ plus interest, and absorbing 
funds from the general public are considered illegal fundraising. Exact figures are hard to 
establish but high-profile cases in recent years have resulted in death penalties. What appears 
to be the difference is that successful funds will result in content investors and therefore 
unlikely in capital punishment for their managers. 
 As discussed in the previous section, MCCs and P2P platforms, can be grouped across 
all three groups, depending on their modus operandi and their shareholder structure. 
Technically, at the moment most of the P2P platforms operate in a quasi-legal state. The 
regulation passed in 2016 gives them a legal status. However, many have been slow in 
implementing the regulation. For example, all platforms are required to set up a custodian 
account with a qualified bank commercial bank. The aim of this is to reassure investors by 
including a commercial bank. Until January of this year, less than 10% have actually followed 
this law (Weinland, 2017). 
4.3.3 Illegal Institutions 
 As noted when we discussed interpersonal loans in China, usurious loans, are illegal. 
Even if entered to in a contract, these claims are not formally enforceable through the formal 
legal system. Many of the reforms designed to formalise the shadow banking sector, e.g. MCCs 
or P2P platforms, have aimed to curb the power that loan sharks have over those without 
 131 
access to finance. The clear advantage that they have however remains: they offer an 
expensive yet flexible access to finance for the borrower. Illegal money lenders have been 
known to accept personal ID cards as a form of collateral for a short-term loan.  It is needless 
to say that this creates an amplitude of negative externalities and risks for the lender and the 
borrower. Not only does the nature of this industry mean that the lender has to rely on non-
formal and illegal ways to enforce his claims. It also means a very real risk to the personal 
safety of the borrower, should he be unable to meet his obligations on time and in full. 
Amongst the interviewees of this study, it was also mentioned that these individuals often 
form a network so they can pool their resources and extend larger loans. For very obvious 
reasons, this further amplifies the danger that this poses to society and the individual 
borrower. As discussed in the previous section, MCCs and P2P platforms, can be grouped 
across all three groups, depending on their modus operandi and their shareholder structure.  
4.4. Functional Analysis 
 Before we understand the functions provided by the sector, we need to fully grasp and 
understand that there is a maze of different institutions in it. Some of these institutions cater 
towards the needs of surplus-spending units. Others cater towards deficit-spending units, 
providing much needed access to finance. Yet again others allow for regulatory arbitrage in a 
very tightly regulated financial system. The functional approach puts at the centre of analysis 
those functions, which a financial system provides. If we ask, how the shadow banking sector 
is supplementing the Chinese financial system, we must identity the functions that it provides, 
and the extent to which it provides these functions. Is the lack of which specific function of 
the formal financial sector a necessary condition for the shadow banking sector to flourish, 
and vice versa? 
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If surplus-saving units do not find investment opportunities in the formal financial 
sectors, which adequately reward their foregone consumption, they will seek opportunities 
elsewhere. In China, formal investment opportunities are limited severely by rules and 
regulation. Individuals and households have two main channels for investment available to 
them. They can either save their money in a bank account or they can buy residential property. 
Residential property, with its high degree of cultural significance, is attractive and home 
ownership rates in China are high. Additionally, Surplus saving units can further invest money 
in the domestic equity and bond markets. There are individual issues attached to all these 
common forms of investment. Firstly, savings accounts pay very low interest rates. These 
might be a safe way to save highly liquid assets for emergencies, but they do not offer an 
adequate form of investment. Housing is a profitable alternative to saving and the property 
price hikes in recent years, have made this lucrative. However, with a central government 
increasingly worried about the threat of an asset bubble, it has passed a range of different 
regulation to discourage individuals from possessing more than two properties. In the course 
of 2017 restrictions have become more restrictive, with some cities restricting the number of 
properties to one per household and other forbidding a resale for up to three years (Ye, 2017). 
Comments by President Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress, where he maintained that 
residential property should provide a living space for individuals and should not be used for 
speculation, further highlight that the attractiveness of buying property for investment is likely 
to further decrease in the near future (Reuters, 2017). Lastly investments in the equity or bond 
markets is tricky. Due to the high levels of retail investors in the market, there is a high degree 
of volatility and speculative behaviour, as demonstrated by the 2015 stock market crash.  
Surplus-saving units hitherto have a low-risk/low-return option in form of savings, a 
medium-risk/medium-return option in form of real estate and a high-risk/high-return option 
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in form of equity markets available to them. Shadow banking provides an important function 
here: an additional avenue for investment. Many, if not most institutions in the shadow 
banking sector, are perfectly legal formal institutions, e.g. so called wealth management 
products (WMP) or P2P lending platforms. They are regulated and some are further backed 
by large banks or insurance companies. Others are informal institutions with varying legal 
status. Depending on the product and institution, the risk and reward ratio and also the wider 
social externalities might very well differ amongst different institutions. The issue with 
classifying the different institutions along those lines, is problematic for many are highly 
nebulous financial constructs, while others are outright fraudulent. What unites all of these 
institutions is that all of them are united by the sheer fact that they perform bank-like 
functions outside of the formal banking sector. The functions that they provide to those with 
excess funds is the same. They allow for investment outside of the regulated banking sector 
and they allow a diversification of investment portfolio. 
 For the surplus-spending units, this sector is equally important for the function it 
provides. First of all, it often provides much needed access to finance. This reason might seem 
trivial, yet for companies seeking short-term access to lines of credit, banks in China are not 
necessarily the first point of call26. We have discussed in great length the SOE lending bias that 
many of the banks in China display. If banks prefer lending to large SOEs, then POEs have to 
seek finance from elsewhere. Judging by the increasing importance of the private sector in 
China, they do not only seek it but are also finding it. The formal financial sector appears to 
be ill-equipped to provide adequate lines of credit in a timely manner. Interviewees of this 
study have repeatedly said that a loan application for any amount takes between 3027 to 9028 
                                                        
26 Interview NJ-14-12-001, NJ-14-12-005, NJ-15-08-001, NJ-15-02-001 
27 Interview NJ-14-12-001, NJ-15-03-001, BJ-14-11-002, NJ-15-03-003 
28 Interview NJ-14-12-003 
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days Sometimes the loan approval takes up to one year29 Even after this period, the bank 
might not approve the full amount required30. The approved amount is mainly dependent on 
the value of the pledged collateral. This means, that even if the bank approves a loan, the 
entrepreneur might still need to seek finance from the shadow banking sector in order to 
secure the amount required. Different institutions within the shadow banking sector will have 
different loan approval times, ranging from minutes, e.g. in informal finance31, to a day, e.g. 
in P2P finance32, to a few days, e.g. for loans from a microloan company33  or a wealth 
management company34,  to a week, e.g. from a private fund35. The only outlier are venture 
capital funds, where the approval process and due diligence for equity investments can take 
months36. The latter is still lucrative for POEs because an equity investment does not incur 
costs for debt-servicing, i.e. interest. The other advantage over shadow banking over formal 
banking is the role of collateral. In the absence of a well-working credit rating system, banks 
in China further tend to provide lines of credit only if there is collateral. This means, that 
surplus-spending units with no access to collateral, guarantors or access to limited collateral 
will have to rely solely on the shadow-banking sector.  
‘There is a metaphor in the banking system: If it is sunny, the bank will give you an 
umbrella, but if it is raining, the bank will take the umbrella back.’ –  
Incubator (Nanjing, 2015)37 
                                                        
29 Interview NJ-15-05-001 
30 Interview SH-15-03-001 
31 Interview NJ-15-06-002 
32 Interview BJ-14-11-006 
33 Interview NJ-14-12-006 
34 Interview NJ-15-03-003 
35 Interview NJ-14-12-005 
36 Interview NJ-15-06-001 
37 Interview NJ-15-02-001 
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Generally, and in contrast to what conventional literature would suggest for a bank-
based financial system, commercial banks are not seen as partners by entrepreneurs in China. 
The metaphor cited symbolises this quite well. Banks will not work with borrowers, if they 
encounter problems. So if a business is doing well, the bank will support it, but if it does not, 
it will simply withdraw its support. This begets the question to what extend banks can provide 
one of their key functions in a bank-based financial system: that of a delegated monitor. They 
are outsiders and thus far many have not been able to overcome the asymmetry of 
information that exists between the lender and the borrower. Some even feel, that shadow 
banks, e.g. microloan companies, are better suited at lending to POEs, because they will have 
greater knowledge of their business38.  
This creates a uniquely Chinese problem: Even if entrepreneurs have a line or credit 
from a bank, they are unlikely to approach the bank, if they encounter short-term cash-flow 
issues. Anecdotal evidence would suggest that whereas most commercial banks in bank-based 
financial systems would work with their debtor to allow business to continue, Chinese banks 
tend not to. In fact, as loan officers will freely admit, companies encountering cash-flow 
problems will not seek a bank loan from the formal banking sector to overcome these 
problems39. This has wide-ranging implications. A bank can never know exactly how financially 
healthy a debtor is. The debtor will not seek help from their commercial bank, if they are 
experiencing cash-flow problems, meaning that the bank will continue to believe that they are 
healthy borrowers. Bankers will openly admit that in China, financial reports do not 
necessarily reflect the actual performance of the company40. If a bank cannot trust the reports 
it receives and also is not the first point of call for a struggling business, then can it really act 
                                                        
38 Interview NJ-15-02-001 
39 Interview SH-15-03-001 
40 Interview NJ-14-12-008 
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as a delegated monitor? Furthermore, some debtors will at times have a line of credit from 
both the formal and the shadow banking sector, without having to disclose this in their 
financial statements. For a cash-flow bridge, a short term loan to maintain the business, 
entrepreneurs are often willing to pay exorbitant and usurious interest rates. This means that 
from the outside a business might look healthy, but the bank is unlikely to be in a position 
where it can ascertain how healthy their borrower actually is. 
 In addition to the providing services to surplus-saving and surplus-spending units, the 
shadow banking sector also provides key functions to the formal financial sectors, i.e. the 
banking sector and financial markets. One core element of this function is provided by wealth-
management products (WMPs). Essentially, WMPs are securities, which much resemble 
money-market mutual funds and allow banks to obtain deposit-like funds from the general 
public. Many retail investors in these products even believe that they are as safe as bank 
deposits and that ultimately the bank is liable for those products.41,42 Legally, WMPs are not 
bank deposits and therefore are not included in banks desposit-to-loan ratios. This means that 
banks can use the funds from the sale of WMPs to extend more loans. This is just one example 
of the regulatory arbitrage that the shadow banking sector is involved in the interbank market. 
Due to minimum reserve requirements, little ability to deviate from the PBOC’s interest rates, 
loan quotas and strict deposit-to-loan ratios, commercial banks have created a web of 
different shadow-banking institutions to further advance their own business. This is another 
core function that the shadow banking sector provides.  
                                                        
41 Interview SH-15-03-001 
42 Popular media reports have suggested that banks have at times accepted liability for 
missold WMP products, despite not being legally liable to do so. Interviewee SH-15-03-001 
has confirmed that this is not an unusual practice. 
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 Based on this, it is my opinion that we should classify shadow banking not in form of 
the legality or illegality of its institutions, but according to the function it provides to the 
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Table 6 - Institutions in the Chinese Shadow Banking Sector by Function 
Based on the literature review and informed by my own interviews, we can identify 
three core functions of the shadow banking sector. The first is the an alternative to loans. 
Under this umbrella we can identify all institutions of the shadow banking sector, which offer 
an alternative to the formal financial sectors for deficit-spending units. Individuals and 
enterprises can seek a loan from all of these institutions. The second group provides an 
alternative to bank deposits. Surplus-saving units can choose to put their money in a variety 
of shadow banking institutions and/or products. In addition to offering a higher return than 
traditional bank deposits they also tend to incur a higher risk. Lastly, we can group the 
institutions according to their function to the other financial sectors. These are institutions, 
which provide functions to the banking sector and the financial markets.  
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has sought to bring some light into the nebulous term that is shadow 
banking. By firstly acknowledging and defining the bank-like activity exists outside of the 
regular banking sector, I have highlighted one of the key shortcomings of financial systems 
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design theory. If there is another third sector, which is almost as big as China’s financial 
markets, then this sector must not be omitted in any discussion on China’s financial system. 
This chapter has then used an institutional approach to identify and discus the 
different institutions, which make up this sector. While being largely descriptive, the 
institutional approach allows us to grasp the different actors of this sector. As the literature 
has largely used the legal status of the different institutions, I have stuck to it for the purpose 
of simplicity and comparability. As this chapter has highlighted, the fluid nature of the legal 
status and the different legality of actors within the same type of institution, e.g. interpersonal 
lending vis-à-vis usurious loans, make this a largely inadequate way to understand shadow 
banking as a whole. 
Lastly, this chapter has used a functional approach to identify the functions provided 
by the shadow banking sector. I believe that this is a better approach to understand and 
analyse shadow banking, for it does not rely on changing legal norms or modus operandi. We 
can sum up the functions that Chinese shadow banks provide in three key themes. First is 
investment opportunities for surplus-saving units, which provide higher interest rates than 
conventional bank deposits but also leave the investor exposed to greater risks. The second 
function is an alternative to deposits. Surplus-saving units have limited investment 
opportunities available to them through the formal financial sectors. Shadow banking 
therefore provides an alternative for all of those, who desire higher returns on their savings 
Lastly for the banking sector, shadow banks provide regulatory arbitrage. Commercial banks 
can circumvent regulation designed to limit risk-taking. This begets the question, what impact 




4.6 Presenting the key hypothesis: the supplemented financial 
system 
 In this study, I explore whether the absence of the shadow-banking sector exposes in 
fact a significant gap within financial system design theory. Must one take this third financial 
sector more into account to fully analyse all components of financial systems? What if formal 
financial sectors do not provide the functions that they ought to? This dissertation proposes 
an alternative analytical framework for the analysis of the Chinese financial system: the 
supplemented financial system.  
In a financial system, where neither banks or financial markets perform the functions 
they ought to, capital is likely to find an alternative intermediary. As a result, a large shadow-
banking sector develops, which supplements various aspects of the two formal financial 
sectors, the banking sector and the financial markets. Formal here does not imply that all 
institutions of the shadow-banking sector are informal institutions. As outlined before, the 
definition of shadow banking in itself gives us neither a coherent picture of formality or legality 
of institutions within this sector. An extremely large array of various institutions is grouped 
under the term and at face value they differ on multiple levels. For example, the difference 
between illicit finance, i.e. usury loans, and microloan companies could not be greater. What 
both institutions have in common nonetheless is that they all supplement the functions 
usually provided by the banking sector and the financial markets. They are by-products of a 
financial system, which requires more than a banking sector and financial markets to channel 
capital to the most efficient use in an economy. 
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The diagram illustrates the interactions in a Supplemented Financial System. Surplus-
spending units do not solely deposit their money in banks or invest their money in the financial 
markets. They also invest their surplus capital in the shadow banking sector. Here the 
destinations of said investments are manifold, ranging from the purchase of Wealth 
Management Products, over loans through P2P financing platforms to investments in the Curb 
Market, i.e. informal finance. Because of this integral role played by the shadow-banking 
sector, these interactions deserve further investigation. The lack of understanding for the 
systemic role of said sector not only warrant further research, it demands it. 
Similarly, we find that deficit-spending units tend to originate their capital not merely 
through bank loans or equity investments from the financial markets. They also tend to rely, 
some would argue in the case of China quite heavily, on both formal institutions in the 
Diagram 8 - The Supplemented Financial System 
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shadow-banking sector and informal finance. While this study analyses privately owned 
enterprises’ use of the shadow banking sector, it is important to note that they by no means 
the exclusive recipients on this side of the financial system. Also private borrowers often 
diversify their sources of finance. For example, individuals wishing to buy apartments borrow 
some of the initial down payment from informal lending networks, e.g. their wider family, to 
qualify for bank loans to purchase their desired residential property. In essence, any of the 
deficit spending units have some form of interaction within both macro-sectors of the financial 
system, the formal financial sector and the shadow-banking sector.  
Shadow banking is credit intermediation which takes place outside of the formal 
banking system either partially or fully. If only partially, we can expect interaction between 
the two financial systems. For example, banks might sell private wealth management products 
and use those funds to extend loans without being covered by provisioning requirements. 
Microloan companies might seek to go public in order to raise more capital to extent more 
loans. The shadow banking sector is one that is woven into the wider fabric of financial 
relationships in an economy, supplementing the shortcomings of the formal financial sector. 
The literature reviewed in this chapter has shown that financial systems design theory, 
albeit applicable to many financial systems around the globe, is problematic as an analytical 
backbone to analyse the Chinese financial system, which relies heavily on a shadow-banking 
sector. It may also be problematic in examining other financial systems, as shadow-banking is 
to various degrees prevalent in all countries. Understanding the supplementary function of 






Chapter 5: The Shadow Banking Sector in Nanjing 
The first case of of this study is the city of Nanjing. Nanjing is one of the high-
technology hubs in China. It has a vibrant high-tech start-up, biotechnology and venture 
capital scene. Many places in Jiangsu present a a similar macroeconomic setup, namely 
Suzhou , where the majority of the world’s laptop computers are built or Hangzhou

, the home of the large internet conglomerate Ali Baba . In a cross-
provincial comparison for China, Jiangsu province is the second most economically active 
province after Guangdong, with a Gross Regional Product (GRP) of 491trn CNY (National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2014). Even when accounting for the different population sizes, the 
industrial output of Jiangsu is impressive: it has the fourth highest GRP per capita in the whole 
of China (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Jiangsu Province therefore provides a very 
interesting case study for the shadow banking sector in China. Its economy is increasingly 
moving away from heavy industries towards a knowledge- and skill-based industries. With a 
maturing economy, banks should have been able to adapt well to the importance of POEs for 
regional development. They should in theory have responded to this by providing much of the 
funding that is needed to achieve and continue the remarkable growth pattern. The reality 
however looks starkly different. When interviewed for the World Bank Enterprise Survey, only 
13.1% of all firms in Nanjing had access to a bank line of credit, compared to 25.3% of firms in 
China overall and only 0.4% of investments in Nanjing were financed by banks, compared to a 
cross-country average of 4.5% (World Bank, 2012). This begets the question, which actor in 
the financial system is providing POEs with access to finance? 
This chapter will first provide an institutional analysis of the shadow banking sector in 
Nanjing. Drawing on empirical interview data, I will identify the most important institutions. I 
will then move on to describe their properties and the services they provide to enterprises in 
 144 
Nanjing. Which of the institutions, which I discussed in the previous chapter, are found in 
Nanjing? While the previous chapter looked at the existence of shadow banks in the whole of 
China, this chapter seeks to establish which of the institutions are presently operating in one 
of China’s Tier II cities. I will further describe each institutions properties vis-à-vis traditional 
banks to explore what function they play in the local formal financial system in Nanjing.  
Following the institutional analysis, this chapter will engage in a functional analysis. 
Understanding the institutional landscape of the local shadow banking sector in Nanjing is an 
important first step. Nonetheless, it is more important to understand if we can understand 
the entire sector through the core functions they provide. Based on the thorough analysis of 
my empirical interview data, I identified four core functions. It provides access to finance and 
an alternative to traditional bank deposits. It further provides a service to the formal banking 
sector, i.e. traditional formal commercial banks. Lastly it provides a method for the local 
government to stimulate and promote growth of high-tech industries through the direct 
allocation of financial resources. 
5.1 Institutional Analysis 
 The institutional approach was initially developed to analyse various financial 
institutions and the central bank as the central unit of analysis. For the shadow banking sector, 
this approach is slightly adapted to analyse the various institutions in the shadow banking 
sector and their relationship with other financial institutions. I will therefore qualitatively 
describe these institutions based on the empirical data collected. Institution here both 
describes hard institutions and soft institutions. Hard institutions are legal entities, e.g. P2P 
financing platforms or microfinance companies, which are engaged in credit intermediation. 
Soft institutions are informal institutions, e.g. interpersonal lending. Each section will discus 
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the potential benefits and drawbacks of each institution, as well as negative externalities, if 
there are any to be expected. 
During the semi-structured interviews, most interviewees frequently mentioned the 
following shadow banking institutions: interpersonal lending, followed by microfinance, P2P 
lending platforms, trust companies, venture capital (VC), wealth management companies and 
credit guarantee companies. The following section will discus the experiences that 
interviewees had with these institutions and the way in which they operate. The purpose of 
this is to analyse, which of the institutions that exist in China at a national level are actually 
present in a Tier-II city like Nanjing. Understanding the institutional landscape of the local 
shadow banking sector will allow us to better understand and analyse the functions they 
provide.  
5.1.1 Interpersonal Lending 
 Despite Nanjing’s high level of economic development, private lending continues to be 
important to of high importance. Interviewees made repeated references to the role that 
interpersonal loans continue to play for POE finance in Nanjing. The main advantages of 
interpersonal loans are processing times, in some cases funding costs and flexibility43. The 
disadvantages are at times high funding costs, as well as dubious lenders and business 
practices.  
Banks and formal institutions have complex approval procedures to limit the risk they 
expose themselves to. Loans from one person to another does not rely on the same principals 
and is hence much quicker. One entrepreneur stressed that this is their preferred source of 
finance for urgent financing needs44. Another entrepreneur said that for them interpersonal 
                                                        
43 Interview NJ-15-05-001; NJ-15-03-001; NJ-14-12-005; NJ-15-03-003; NJ-14-12-003 
44 Interview NJ-14-12-005 
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lending is the last resort, if all other options have failed 45 . In those cases, they would 
sometimes also borrow money from their own employees and pay them back with interest. 
Lenders have told me that as they can make their decisions instantaneously, so people borrow 
from them if they need money urgently46. Even borrowers, who would qualify for bank loans 
but do not want to wait, resort to interpersonal lending as an alternative due to the quicker 
loan approval, as an experienced JSCB loan officer pointed out47. All of this would suggest that 
interpersonal loans provide somewhat of a supplementary function. Formal banks and other 
hard institutions in the shadow banking sector cannot provide the same service, i.e. short-
term loan approvals. 
In some cases, interpersonal loans are outright substitutes for all other lines of credit. 
One entrepreneur stressed that he prefers to use interpersonal loans over bank loans48. In his 
case, his friends and he have in the past extended the courtesy of interest-free interpersonal 
loans. His friends do not receive a financial reward but rather rely on the borrower to return 
the favour in the future. Similar concepts are known in informal finance in rural China, where 
farmer extend interest-free loans to others. The loans that this particular entrepreneur can 
acquire through his friends can range up to one Million CNY. His business, a biotech company, 
has relatively low profit margins, meaning that he would not be able to pay high interest rates. 
The line of credit from his friends is therefore vital for his business and has allowed him to 
flourish. He went on to stress, that their relationship and the relationship between their 
families serves as collateral for the loan. If he fails to pay the loan, he would loose his standing 
within his wider social network. There is also a good chance that he would become a social 
                                                        
45 Interview NJ-14-12-003 
46 Interview NJ-15-06-002 
47 Interview SH-15-03-001 
48 Interview NJ-15-05-001 
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outcast, if he failed to honour the loan agreement. We could see it as peer pressure, which 
compels him to repay the loan. Amongst his interpersonal lending network, his friends would 
not seek any tangible assets to secure the loan. 
A range of interviewees have emphasised that Guanxi, the interpersonal relationship 
between people, often serves as collateral for interpersonal loans 49 . A good personal 
relationship between the lender and the borrower ensures, that the latter services and 
ultimately repays the loan. One interviewee stressed in particular that he does not accept 
anything but Guanxi as collateral.  
“I only lend money to people I know very well. Even if you can present me with 
collateral, like a house certificate, I won’t accept that. I will mainly look at how 
trustworthy you are. So yes, Guanxi is a kind of collateral.”50 
Even if borrowers offered him tangible assets as collateral, he would not base his lending 
decision on it. Instead he would only lend to people, if he found them trustworthy and knew 
them well51. The wide ranging role of relationships and extended personal networks was 
brought up repeatedly during other interviews. This form of relationship lending in the 
shadow banking sector differs profoundly from concepts found in the literature on banking. 
Within the literature on banks, relationship lending describes the collection of information 
over time, in an attempt to overcome the asymmetry of information. The relationship aspect 
here is interesting, for it absolves the lender from collecting any information and allows him 
to purely rely on his interpersonal relationship. A non-tangible asset with no commercial value 
is used to secure their loan agreement. This suggests that a greater degree of flexibility allows 
shadow banks to provide a service, which the formal banking sector cannot provide. It also 
                                                        
49 Interview NJ-14-12-006; NJ-15-03-001; NJ-14-12-003; NJ-15-05-001 
50 Interview NJ-15-03-001 
51 Interview NJ-15-03-001 
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suggests, that this competitive advantage of the shadow banking sector is part of the reason, 
why entrepreneurs turn to it.  
An entrepreneur, who was originally from Zhejiang Province, stressed that a network 
of entrepreneurs from this province had organised in a chamber of commerce and through 
that he had access to finance52. These entrepreneurs frequently lend money to each other. 
Unlike the other interpersonal loans, these are not interest free despite being organised 
through extended personal networks. Interest rates vary but can easily be as high as 10% per 
month. This means that these loans are classed as usurious loans. This makes these loan 
agreements illegal and impossible to enforce through the formal legal system. Despite all of 
that, the entrepreneur said that this has helped him often. He further went on to stress that 
the interest rate was considerably lower than other interest rates for interpersonal loans. 
From the interviews conducted for this study, it appears that relationships matter in 
interpersonal loans. Lenders use them to secure loans and borrowers rely on them to get 
access to finance. Lenders further need relationships amongst other lenders too. This is the 
only way to ensure that they can serve all borrowers. A moneylender said, that although he 
could not personally extend loans of one billion CNY, if the chance arose, he could ask his 
friends to cooperate with him and they would jointly lend the money and jointly carry the 
risk53. He further highlighted that there might be a cultural explanation for this, as Chinese 
people tended to trust their friends more than they trust banks54. Hence investing in your 
friends would guarantee a better return than depositing it in or investing it through banks, 
unless one likes their friends enough to not charge them interest. 
                                                        
52 Interview NJ-14-12-005 
53 Interview NJ-15-06-002 
54 ibid. 
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The role of Guanxi as a form of collateral somewhat romanticises the notion of shadow 
banking. These loans almost appear as selfless acts of friendship rather than business 
transactions. Friendship also replaces the need for collateral for loans, because friends trust 
each other. While this might be true for some aspects of interpersonal lending, we must not 
forget that much of shadow banking relies on hard tangible assets as a security for loans. The 
advantage here is a much higher degree of flexibility, when it comes to accepting various 
forms of collateral. Interpersonal loans can be secured through a range of different valuable 
objects, such as watches or high-value items55. One former moneylender said he had at times 
even accepted student ID cards as collateral for loans up to 30,000 CNY56. Together with this 
ID, their home address and the parent’s phone number, this would suffice as collateral for an 
interpersonal loan. The interviewee responded vaguely, when asked about the way this claim 
could be enforced, if the loan became non-performing. The flexibility of interpersonal lending 
is another reoccurring theme in the interviews. They are more flexible when it comes to what 
form of collateral they can accept, the interest rate they charge and the way and speed in 
which they approve loans57. One interviewee went as far as saying that because of this, the 
shadow banking sector is better at responding to their business requirements than the formal 
banking sector58.   
While having multiple advantages for the borrower and the lender, interpersonal 
lending also has disadvantage for both and wider society. First of all, usurious loans () 
also fall into this category, because they are extended between actual people. Many usurious 
loans are extended by lenders with questionable ethics, e.g. the former money lender who 
                                                        
55 Interview NJ-14-12-005 
56 ibid. 
57 Interview NJ-15-06-002 
58 Interview NJ-14-13-003 
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did not want to explain how he can enforce a loan, which had been ‘collateralised’ by a student 
ID card. An entrepreneur, who used interpersonal lending before said that he does not borrow 
from certain lenders, because it was very dangerous, the interest rate is very high and 
‘something bad’ could happen to him59. Other interviewees have expressed their wish that in 
the future more effective regulation was passed to protect both the lender and the borrower 
and allow a more formal environment for interpersonal lending60. Borrowing money from 
professional money lenders might be easy61, but it can also be a dangerous endeavour with 
severe consequences for one’s own personal safety. 
The second issue is the level of interest rates. For example, if a borrower requires a 
10,000 CNY collateralised loan from a professional moneylender, the monthly interest 
payments in 2015 would have been around 400 CNY. This is equal to an annual interest rate 
of 48%62. Without collateral, the monthly interest payment would range between 500 CNY 
and 800 CNY per day or 60% – 96% annually 63 . The highest interest rate is charged in 
underground gambling houses, where a loans of 1000 CNY can easily result in daily interest 
payments of 300 CNY to 500 CNY64. This is equal to an annual interest rate of 10800% to 
18000%. Interest rates of this magnitude make capital extremely costly. They are also very 
likely to generate negative social externalities. As these claims cannot be enforced legally 
through the judiciary system, they are likely to be enforced using illegal and criminal means. 
This is what the interviewee was referring to, when he said that ‘something bad’ could happen 
to him. 
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It is important to note that usurious loans are sub-group of one form of shadow 
banking. Even within the field of interpersonal loans, my interview data does not suggest that 
they account for the majority. A former professional money lender stressed that lending 
money at such high interest rates is short-sighted. He said that no legitimate business would 
operate with profit margins high enough to afford these interest rates. He would personally 
not charge more than 20%, which he claimed was a widely used benchmark in interpersonal 
lending65. Another unrelated interviewee confirmed that this is what they would normally 
charge for an interpersonal loan66. It is important to note here that this is approximately the 
threshold for a loan to be considered usurious. We should therefore not assume that they 
have not charged higher interest rates in practice, but rather avoided saying so during the 
recorded interviews. 
From the research conducted for this study, we can conclude that interpersonal loans 
have provided much needed lines of credit for two types of businesses. The first are those, 
which are not eligible for a bank loan. The second type are businesses, which need the funds 
urgently. There is no uniform picture on the level of interest rates charged for interpersonal 
loans. Some loans are entirely interest free. Other lenders charge exorbitantly high interest 
rates, which go far beyond legal caps. Interest rates as well as lending facilities in general 
depend largely on the personal relationship between the borrower and the lender. In some 
cases, this relationship serves as a form of collateral. It is therefore important to make a clear 
distinction between those interpersonal loans, which provide a positive supplementary role 
and those, which do not. Positive interpersonal loans are those, which provide capital with 
the much needed flexibility and also at a cost, which allows businesses to flourish. Negative 
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interpersonal loans are those, which charge exorbitant and usurious interest rates. Firstly, 
these loans can often send borrowers into a spiral of debt. Interest payments are likely to 
accumulate into new debt. Secondly, these loans cannot be recovered using the legal system 
and are likely to result in negative social externalities, i.e. crime and violence. 
5.1.2 Microloan Companies 
“The microloan just depends on the personal or the companies’ credit [history]. 
So if you have a good image, you can always get a loan and also it is quicker. 
If I need a lot of money in a short time, I can apply for a microloan.”67 
Microloan companies also play a large role in POE finance in Nanjing. In Nanjing, 
Microfinance companies only became important in the last 13 years68. Microloan companies 
were established to with the support of the local and municipal governments. These 
companies were set up for two reasons: to make microloans more transparent and address 
the shortcomings of traditional banks to fund SMEs69. After banks, these are usual the first 
point of call for POEs seeking to obtain a line of credit70. According to the Jiangsu financial 
authorities, microloan companies can lend a maximum of three million CNY per loan or, if their 
assets exceed 200 million CNY, they can lend up to six million CNY per transaction71. The loan 
maturity is set by law and must not be longer than one year but can be significantly shorter, 
for example 10 days or a month 72 . The advantages of using a microloan company are 
somewhat similar to those of interpersonal loans, namely faster processing times and leaner 
approval procedures than traditional banking loans. Commercial banks in China need at least 
one month to process a loan application. The disadvantage are the higher funding costs. As 
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this section discusses, these are lower than in most interpersonal loans but higher than bank 
loans. Lastly, another disadvantage of microloan companies, which does not affect the lender-
borrower relationship is the limited geographical scope of their operation. A microloan 
company based in Jiangsu Province can only extend loans there. 
Loan approval procedures in microloan companies are significantly faster than in 
traditional banks. As the executive of a local microloan company pointed out, banks require a 
long report about potential lenders, which easily exceed 20 pages73. Microloan companies on 
the other hand only require a report of three to four pages74. We can only accept his claim on 
face value and cannot confirm that the three to four-page report allows for the level of 
information as a bank’s 20-page report. He said they also have to consider the personal 
background of the borrower, for example criminal convictions or bankruptcy. They also have 
to investigate the current financial situation of the borrower and his enterprise. Lastly, they 
also have to evaluate his collateral. Only then would they make the decision, whether to 
extend the loan or not. The question remains, whether a report of 20 pages can easily be 
replaced by a report of three or four pages and offer the same level of scrutiny and limit 
exposure to risks from NPLs. Comprehensive data on NPLs within MCCs or the shadow banking 
sector is not available to confirm his statements. The shorter report does however significantly 
reduce loan approval times to a few days or a week at most, which is shorter than the loan 
approval times at commercial banks75. Quicker loan approvals further enforce concerns that 
procedures sacrifice due diligence and risk control for faster decision-making. As many 
microloan companies are not publicly traded, it is hard to assess the systemic risk emanating 
from them or the quality of loans they hold in their books. 
                                                        
73 Interview NJ-14-12-004 
74 ibid. 
75 Interview NJ-14-12-004 
 154 
 Overall we can see the appeal of lines of credit from microloan companies for POEs 
with urgent financing needs, who are unable or unwilling to service debt at higher funding 
costs. As a high-tech incubator pointed out, banks are the preferred choice for finance for 
most entrepreneurs. If they cannot qualify for a bank loan, then they will go to a microloan 
company76. Within the shadow banking sector, the procedures of MCCs do not offer the same 
amount of flexibility as interpersonal loans. Interest rates charged for microloans vary largely, 
depending on maturity and collateral offered to the microloan company. Interviewees have 
usually described them to be between 14% to 24% per annum77. This means the funding costs 
are significantly lower than some of the interpersonal loans, but still higher than those of bank 
loans. The problem is that many high-tech companies, especially in their start-up stage, are 
unable to service loans at these interest rates. Their relatively low profit margins are simply 
not large enough to support such high interest payments 78 . The interview data further 
suggests that borrowers use microloans as a substitute for a bank loans. They use either one 
or the other but not both at the same time.  
Our data also suggests that MCCs are better equipped to evaluate the credit risks 
associated with SMEs. An incubator interviewed for this project said that often microloan 
companies are better suited for SME lending than banks 79 . Because of their limited 
geographical scope, they have a better knowledge of the borrower, his local business 
environment, and therefore can evaluate risks much better than traditional banks. This would 
mean that microloan companies are much better at overcoming the asymmetry of 
information between lender and borrower than traditional banks. This means that the 
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geographical limitations placed on MCCs is not necessarily negative. This research suggests 
that this allows MCCs to have a positive impact on SME development. On the other hand, 
these limitations also restrict their own development: they cannot outgrow the area, where 
they were first established. Due to regulatory requirements, microloan companies are not 
allowed to seek deposits from the public but must only lend funds that they have raised as 
equity investment from investors. This severely limits the total amount of loans that any 
microloan company can extend to its borrowers, especially if they are focusing on a limited 
geographical location. Microloan companies have in the past circumvented this by raising 
investment through equity markets, both domestically and abroad80. This has allowed them 
to extend their capital base, but this option is not available for everyone. Chapter Three 
discussed in great detail why initial public offerings in China are a complicated matter and are 
only available to very few companies at all. Therefore, only a handful of MCCs can actually rely 
on financial markets to broaden their own capital base. Another regulatory issue, which limits 
the potential growth of MCCs are leverage requirements. Microloan companies have different 
leverage requirements than banks and therefore need to raise much more capital to give out 
the same amount of loans as a bank would. Some microloan companies would therefore like 
to become commercial banks but thus far struggle to obtain the correct licenses81.  
Overall we can say that MCCs provide a positive function to the local financial system 
in Nanjing. Microloan companies provide a range of valuable functions to POEs by expanding 
access to finance. They provide this function without any of the negative externalities 
associated with some forms of interpersonal loans. The interest rates of these loans are 
significantly higher than for bank loans, which can be seen as a problem for companies with 
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low profit margins, e.g. high-tech companies or start-ups. If they cannot get bank loans and 
cannot afford microloans, they can only rely on low-interest interpersonal loans or other 
forms of finance, e.g. equity finance. The ability of microloan companies to effectively provide 
enough credit for those POEs, which currently do not have access to bank loans without access 
to bank loans is further hindered by the limited capital they can accumulate through 
investment and limitations on their leverage. These regulations are meant to prevent systemic 
risk emanating from the sector but also limit their ability to effectively replace traditional 
banks in POE and SME finance.  
5.1.3 Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms 
 Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms are the third most mentioned shadow banking 
institution in Nanjing. As discussed in Chapter Four, P2P finance is one of the most debated 
trends in the formal shadow banking sector. For years there was little agreement about what 
it constitutes it and what its modus operandi should be.  
 Generally my interview data suggests, that P2P lending tends to serve the lower end 
of the market, because ‘if a company seeks a loan from P2P, it must be badly in need of 
money’82. The typical borrower is likely to be one, that has not been able to secure a bank loan  
or a loan through a microloan company83. They also do not have the necessary personal 
network to source finance from interpersonal loans. Serving this sub-section of the market 
means that the borrowers bear a higher risk to the lender. The significantly higher risk that 
these platforms take leads to significantly higher interest rates. Interest rates range from 
12%84 to 30%85 for loans extended through P2P financing platforms.  
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Despite the high costs of loans, P2P has an advantage over most of the formal banking 
sector: faster approval times. Much like many of the institutions within the shadow banking 
sector, they are not bound by complicated, multi-hierarchy loan approval procedures. For 
most loans in P2P, an application can be processed and approved in one to a maximum of five 
days86, compared to potentially months in traditional banks. These two are the major reasons, 
borrowers turn to P2P for funding: a greater access to finance and fast processing times. This 
in itself is potentially a positive thing. Faster credit intermediation and a broader access to 
finance is likely to have a positive impact on economic development. The question is to what 
extend this benefit might be outweighed by other negative externalities. 
In an interview with a national P2P platform executive, she highlighted that the NPL 
rate in P2P finance companies are significantly higher than in traditional banks87. According to 
the regulation at the time, P2P lending platforms were allowed to have a NPL rate of 5%. 
Commercial banks were by law required to keep theirs below 1%. She went on to indicate, 
that many P2P platforms face NPL rates of far greater than 5%. This included the one that she 
worked for. P2P works with a higher risk for a higher profit margin88, but it seems as if this 
higher margin might be risk due to a growing NPL problem. In the time since I conducted my 
empirical fieldwork, many P2P platforms have been shut down and exposed a giant pyramid 
schemes. 
One reason that P2P platforms face higher levels of NPLs might be that borrower and 
lender do not know each other89. As highlighted earlier, other forms of shadow banking, e.g. 
interpersonal loans, rely heavily on the concept of interpersonal relations, or Guanxi. This 
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relationship often compels borrowers to service loans so as to not damage the underlying 
relationship. It glues together the borrower and the lender. In microfinance, due to their 
limited geographical scope, the microloan company will also have a good working relationship 
with their borrower as they have gathered information on them over time. In P2P and other 
forms of internet finance, the borrower and lender do not know each other. Therefore, 
traditional soft institutions like Guanxi will not compel the borrower to service his debt. If the 
borrower does not service his debt, his social network will not know and will not treat him as 
an outcast.  
 Another reason that P2P financing platforms face much higher NPL rates than other 
institutions also lies within the general business model. These lending platforms are relatively 
new and, at the time this research was conducted between 2014 and 2015, were poorly 
regulated. Many interviewees have thus expressed concerns that P2P lending platforms do 
not operate a viable business model and have poor risk control90. Additionally, there is a 
problem with transparency of these institutions91. The regulatory framework stated that the 
NPL rate must not be over 5%. Therefore, many platforms reported that their rate is 5%, 
despite facing much higher levels of NPLs. If the regulation states that the NPL rate is only 5% 
but in reality it is much higher, than this lack of transparency is dangerous for both, potential 
borrower and potential lender. At the time of the interview, approximately 30 traditional 
banks were also keen on starting their own P2P financing platforms92. This, paired with the 
underlying problems surrounding the business model and its regulation, creates an amplitude 
of different problems. In China, many retail investors hold the belief that an investment 
product sold to them by a commercial bank is as safe as bank deposits – a belief that has often 
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been nurtured by banks paying for losses, for which they were not legally liable93. This creates 
potentially destabilising issues of moral hazard, because risk control becomes near impossible 
for regulators. In the time that elapsed since the fieldwork for this project, regulators in China 
have issued various rules and regulation of the P2P sector, often fuelled by high-profile nation-
wide defaults and bankruptcies of platforms. 
 P2P finance is still a relatively new concept and is not to be taken as a viable alternative 
to take the lead in the shadow banking sector or even to replace any shadow banks. It surely 
widens access to finance for entrepreneurs and private households alike. However, it does so 
by not using the same soft institutions, e.g. Guanxi, as other shadow banks. In its pursuit to 
widen access to finance it also seems to not use the same level of risk-adverse behaviour as 
for example microfinance institutions or even interpersonal loans. 
 
5.1.4 Trust Companies  
Trust companies are more important than P2P or microfinance institutions in terms of 
their size and lending power94. In the case of Nanjing, we can divide trust companies into two 
distinct institutions95. The first is to provide leverage so that commercial banks can lend more 
money. Chapter Four has outlined the method in which trust companies operate. Commercial 
banks often own trust companies, although legally they are financially independent from 
them96. The second institutions are institutions, which are designed to facilitate the rolling-
over of bank loans. Before commercial banks can renew a loan in the People’s Republic, they 
first have to document that the initial loan was repaid. Therefore, enterprises often need a 
short-term loan from the shadow banking sector in order to pay off the initial loan and wait 
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for the renewal of the bank loan. This is discussed in greater detail in the functional analysis 
of Nanjing’s shadow banking sector, because it is one of the key functions this sector provides 
to the formal banking sector. 
Trust companies further allow the spread of risk of a loan amongst different investors. 
Investors typically buy an investment product through a bank or a third-party. The trust 
company subsequently uses this money to extend loans97. Trust companies can operate safely 
and provide a much needed addition to the financial landscape in China. In order to to that 
their products and underlying loans need to designed and extended according to legal and 
risk-adverse principals. The problem is however that often they are not. In the past, loans 
were extended without collateral, while the trust company financed the endeavour either 
through a bank loan or investment products98. A banker, who had personally been involved 
with trust companies, said that this this has in the past lead to the default of loans and 
bankruptcy of many trust companies99.  
Trust companies have further not diversified their lending operations and are relying 
heavily on the real estate sector for growth 100 . A real estate developer said that trust 
companies were preferred institution in the shadow banking sector for the real estate 
sector101. He stated that the loan approval times for these loans were also very quick. It would 
often take less than a week between a loan application and its approval. He further 
emphasised that the last time his enterprise had received a loan from a trust company, the 
loan had been non-collateralised. Trust companies saw the real estate sector as a safe 
investment and therefore collateral was not needed. This does once again raise issues of moral 
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hazard, for the trust company can surely not fulfil its obligations to its investors, if it gives out 
non-collateralised loans between ten and two hundred million CNY102. This is even more so 
the case when the borrower had been turned down by a commercial bank before. The interest 
rate for these loans is also too low to factor in the inherent risk with only 12-15% p.a. in 2014103. 
As the before mentioned banker pointed out, the trust company’s profit margin is only 5-6% 
and thus any default on a loan is likely to completely quash any profit overall104.  
The extension of loans without collateral at low interest rates also make trust 
companies a potential systemic threat. A default on any of these loans could have dramatic 
knock-on effects, especially if they have used bank loans or are subsidiaries of commercial 
banks105. In the absence of a deposit insurance scheme, the government is often seen as the 
guarantor of bank deposits. Many retail investors, i.e. households, have bought trust company 
investment products through banks. They often believe that these are as safe as bank deposits, 
and that the government would bail them out. The core issue here is the lack of transparency 
within and between trust companies, which make both informed decisions about investments 
as well as vital risk assessments a near impossible task106. 
A venture capitalist further said that the government had also used a trust company 
to allow commercial banks to move underperforming loans off their books107. These loans had 
often been extended to POEs. This trust company, Sukedai, would effectively encourage 
commercial banks, state- and privately-owned, to lend capital to POEs. It would give a 
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guarantee to buy the loan if it became under- or non-performing. It was impossible for us to 
validate these claims, for research into this trust company was not fruitful.  
Trust companies themselves are a valuable addition to the Chinese financial landscape, 
if they adhere to rules and regulations. They provide a great supplementary service to the 
banking sector by providing access to bank loans, where banks are unwilling to lend. In order 
to safely fulfil this function, they need to be sheltered from banks in order to prevent a 
dangerous knock on effect. Furthermore, retail investors need to be fully aware that they are 
purchasing an investment product, even if they do it in the office of a commercial bank. It also 
appears that there is a strong functional relationship between the formal banking sector and 
trust companies. The rolling-over of loans for example is only necessary because commercial 
banks do not typically extend loans with a maturity over three years108. However, many 
investments are unlikely to offer a full-return within those three years. As banks require the 
full loan to be paid back before it can be re-extended, an underbelly of shadow-banking 
institutions has developed to serve as short-term/high-interest lenders. 
5.1.5 Venture Capital 
‘The banks cannot earn much when the enterprise is doing well but can loose a 
lot, when the enterprise is doing bad. There comes VC – they have equity in the 
private enterprise.’ – Venture capitalist on the advantages of equity over over 
debt-finance109 
Venture capital (VC) was the fifth most mentioned shadow bank. It might also be the 
only shadow bank, which is often not seen as one. When I interviewed VC fund managers and 
other venture capitalists, they often did not see themselves as belonging to the shadow 
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banking sector. They do however take a form of deposit by taking money from investors and 
promising a return on this investment.  
The advantage VC has over traditional banking and much of the shadow banking sector 
is that due to the nature of equity finance they are not bound by interest rate requirements110. 
Equity investments do not incur an annual interest, because they are not loans. The return on 
the investment is materialised, when the investor exits and sells his equity share. VC firms do 
expect large growth rates and often do have returns, which exceed those of usurious loans. 
The difference, as a venture capitalist was eager to make clear, is that they only expect a 
return on their investment within the next one to five years111. For the entrepreneur, this 
makes it more attractive than traditional debt-finance. Entrepreneurs will not have to make 
regular interest payments but the return is generated when the investors exits the venture – 
either as it is being sold entirely or as he is bought out by the other equity holders. 
Furthermore, the capital is committed for a longer period of time, than bank loans. The 
maturity of bank loans can be up to three years, but in reality it rarely exceeds one year112. VC 
funds are therefore a growing business in Nanjing as well as a rest of China113. 
VC companies are funds, which offer long-term committed capital. Due to the due 
diligence involved in purchasing equity in an enterprise, a decision to make an investment is 
not quick. In many cases, it takes as long or even longer than the application process for a 
traditional bank loan. With their due diligence and their checks, VC firms take about three 
months to make a decision on whether to invest in a certain venture114. It is therefore the only 
shadow bank, which does not have a comparative advantage in loan approval times over 
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traditional banking. All shadow banks we have discussed thus far in this chapter have this clear 
advantage, whereas VC does not.  
The interview data further revealed that much of the venture capital firms in Nanjing 
are supported or owned by the municipal or provincial governments. The aim was to to 
improve the funding opportunities of POEs, especially technology companies115. The function 
that this group of VC firms provides is clearly supplementary. They provide investments for 
enterprises, which did not qualify for a bank loan and could not afford the interest rates 
charged by other financial institutions. This was an immensely interesting insight into the local 
finance nexus. In order to address poor access to finance, the local and provincial government 
did not want to improve existing institutions and build up the institutional knowledge required 
to lend to POEs, and SMEs in particular. They rather sought to establish new institutions, which 
would use equity- over debt-finance for their ventures.  
In some cases, these VC firms would also provide expertise to the government and 
traditional banks. In Nanjing, high-tech companies can apply for credit guarantees from the 
government, if they hold a special patent or have developed a special technology116. In order 
to qualify for these government guarantees, enterprises have to submit their financial reports 
and an investment plan to a government-backed VC firm. They then issue a recommendation 
on whether to extend the guarantees or not. It would appear that the provincial and local 
government have used VC firms rather than traditional banks to build up institutional 
knowledge about the profitability of a business venture and, at least partially, overcome the 
asymmetry of information. As a general manager of one of these VC funds was eager to point 
out, they are providing funding to ‘innovative companies’117.  
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5.1.6 Wealth Management Companies and Wealth Management Products 
 Wealth Management Products (WMPs) are financial products, which are sold by banks, 
independent financial advisors, and firms. The structure of the products is very opaque and 
since 2016 has seen a wave of regulatory efforts in China. Much of this sector caters towards 
banks diversifying their risks and moving loans of their books into structured financing vehicles. 
However, many wealth management companies (WMC) also cater towards POEs and POE 
finance. The core advantages of WMCs are shorter processing times and a greater acceptance 
of different forms of collateral. The disadvantage is also similar to many of the institutions we 
have discussed, namely higher funding costs.  
When I interviewed the CEO of a local WMC in Nanjing, he explained that the approval 
times of a loan through his WMC depends on the collateral offered to secure it118. In the best 
case scenario, loans could be approved on the same day. Larger loans would have to be 
examined more closely and discussed with his board of directors. Here he was expecting a 
turn-around time of three to five working days. He explained to me that if a borrower used a 
car as collateral for a small loan, his loan would be approved without a long wait. He illustrated 
that the the borrower had two options. He could leave the cars with the WMC until such time 
as he repaid the loan. The car would be in an impound lot and upon full repayment of the loan, 
it would be released back to the borrower. He could also choose to let the WMC install a GPS 
tracker in the vehicle. This would allow him to continue to use it until he repaid the loan in full. 
The WMC manager stressed that this was a fully legal practice. Such trackers would not be 
simply installed but had to be registered with the authorities. In either case, the interest rate 
for these loans would range from 3% to 3.5% per month, or 36% to 42% p.a. This case is 
interesting for a variety of reasons. First of all, it demonstrates that one of the key reasons for 
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borrowers to approach shadow banks over traditional commercial banks is flexibility. 
Commercial banks in China only really accept real estate as collateral for bank loans. Shadow 
banks can be more flexible. Secondly, it also demonstrates that the borrower is willing to pay 
a higher interest rate in return for this flexibility. In this case here, he even accepts to pay a 
usurious interest rate for a loan.  
Overall, most interviewees talked about investing in WMPs rather than receiving loans 
from WMCs. One entrepreneur said he had bought a WMP from a bank to diversify his own 
investment portfolio119. The interest rate he received here was 5-6% p.a. Most WMCs, which 
are issued and sold by banks, are born out of regulatory arbitrage. They allow banks to collect 
capital, which does not count as bank deposits. These funds therefore do not affect deposit-
to-loan ratios and allow. This allows banks to extend more loans120. In the case of Nanjing, 
WMCs also directly extend loans to SMEs121.  
Since the research for this project was conducted, regulators in China have intensified 
efforts to regulate WMCs and WMPs. They have identified the systemic risk posed by opaque 
investment products and companies. It was interesting, that NJ-15-03-003, the CEO of a WMC, 
told me he would welcome stronger and tougher regulation on WMPs. This would allow 
companies like his to create a brand that investors can trust122. Nevertheless, the exact role 
of WMPs in the Chinese financial system remain somewhat obscure, as they serve both the 
function of a traditional lender but also provide a range of functions to the formal financial 
sector and other commercial banks. They role in credit intermediation is less clear than other 
shadow banks. 
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5.1.7 Credit Guarantee Companies 
 Credit guarantee companies offer a service whereby they provide a credit guarantee 
to a bank for a traditional bank loan and collect a few from the borrower. The advantage that 
they have over other forms of lending is that they can provide access to bank loans, even if 
the borrower cannot offer enough or the right kind of collateral. The disadvantage for the 
borrower is the higher funding cost they incur for this credit guarantee. The systemic 
disadvantage is that loans might be extended on the basis of a credit guarantee, which should 
have not been extended at all. This means that there is a potential systemic risk emanating 
from this form of shadow banking institutions.  
 Credit guarantee companies charge a fee for providing a guarantee and charge 3-4% 
on top of the initial lending rate of the commercial bank123. Other credit guarantee companies 
charge as much as 30% interest per year124. As one interviewee explained, a credit guarantee 
companies will usually not give the entire loan to the borrower but will keep between 10-20% 
to manage their risk. So if a borrower receives a loan of 100,000 CNY, he will effectively only 
receive 80,000 CNY. The remaining 20,000 CNY will go towards interest payment and debt 
servicing. She went on to explain that because of the high fees associated with credit 
guarantee companies, many entrepreneurs only use them for short-term financing. 
 The relationship between traditional banks and credit guarantee companies is not 
always clear. Loan officers in banks allegedly receive payments from credit guarantee 
companies to refer customers to them125. This entrepreneur described a case of a friend, who 
sought a collateralised loan from a bank. Despite having collateral to pledge, the loan officer 
referred him to a credit guarantee company. He eventually secured the loan through the them 
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and had to pay a premium, despite formally qualifying for a bank loan. According to a JSCB 
loan officer this business practice is outright illegal, yet not completely uncommon for loan 
officers126. He insisted that if anyone was found out, they would face severe consequences 
and possibly criminal charges. The JSCB loan officer did go on to acknowledge that some of 
the people he knew have engaged in this practice for personal gains. Credit guarantee 
companies further can further pose a systemic risk, if the underlying loans become non-
performing. The business practices of some of these companies would suggest, that they have 
in the past lend to borrowers, who should have not qualified for loans. This led to bankruptcies 
and defaults on loans127.  If the picture drawn by our interview data is correct, the relationship 
between credit guarantee companies and commercial banks is worrying. Firstly, it would 
artificially inflate borrowing costs for all borrowers, even those, who qualify for a bank loan.  
 Credit guarantee companies can have a positive impact on enterprise development, as 
they broaden access to finance at a manageable interest rate. If the borrowing costs is as low 
as 10% p.a. it is still significantly lower than a loan from a P2P lending platform, WMCs, or 
interpersonal loans. If credit guarantee companies are being used to charge borrowers higher 
interest rates by forcing them to obtain loan guarantees, then this practice is unlikely to have 
a positive impact on enterprise development. It is therefore hard to assess the impact of credit 
guarantee companies overall. In the case of Nanjing, a high-tech incubator pointed out, that 
credit guarantee companies would be the third point of call for an enterprise in need of a line 
of credit128. This demonstrates that despite the drawbacks and unethical business practices of 
some, these companies do provide an important service for the local business community. 
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5.2 Functional Analysis 
 Understanding the institutional landscape of the local shadow banking sector is a good 
starting point for our analysis. It provided us with a good descriptive overview over the diverse 
set of institutions that are shadow banking. The functional approach to understanding 
financial systems stems out of the critique that functions and not institutions are at the heart 
of the system. Institutions might change but the functions will not. If they cease to provide 
them, another institution will take their place. The functional approach is helpful in 
understanding the functions that the shadow banking sector provides in Nanjing. Based on 
the analysis of my empirical interview data, I was able to identify four central functions 
provided by shadow banks in Nanjing. 
 The first can be defined as access to finance. This means that the sector provides access 
to finance to those, who are excluded from bank finance. They simply have no alternative but 
to seek a loan from a shadow bank. The sector also provides a service to those, who seek 
funding outside of the banking sector due to the shortcomings of traditional banks, e.g. long 
loan approval times. The second core function is the alternative to traditional bank deposits. 
Surplus-saving units are offered a higher return on their shadow bank deposit than they would 
receive from a formal bank deposit. The third function is that it provides services to the 
traditional banking sector, e.g. extending short-term loans so enterprises can roll-over their 
bank loans or allowing banks to move assets off their loan books. The fourth is the function 
that it provides to local governments. For example, it allows them to provide funds to private 
enterprises without relying on the formal banking sector. This section will now discus each of 
these functions in relation to the local financial environment in Nanjing. 
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5.2.1 Function I: Access to Finance 
 Almost all interviewees mentioned that one of the key functions of shadow banks in 
Nanjing was to provide a broader access to finance for POEs and private individuals129. This 
means that regardless of the price at which they offer loans or the negative externalities, in 
case of usurious loans, all of these institutions provide an important function: they allow 
deficit spending units to borrow capital. The question that remains is why they do it? Is it 
because banks do not want to lend money to them at all, because they are geared towards 
providing funds for SOEs? Or is the service provided by the shadow banking sector faster and 
better than that of commercial banks? Our data suggests that it is both. 
 Many entrepreneurs said that they will first seek a line of credit from a commercial 
bank. If they are not successful and banks refuse to extend a loan to them, they would seek 
finance from the shadow banking sector 130 . The executive of a microfinance company 
confirmed that most of the customers that approach his company have been rejected by 
traditional banks and now seek alternative sources for finance 131 . Those engaged in 
interpersonal lending also stressed that their borrowers come to them, when they do not 
think that they can borrow from a commercial bank132.  
The typical borrower in the shadow banking sector is a small- and medium-sized 
enterprise133. This finding in itself is not surprising. We could even say based on the literature, 
this was to be expected. As much of the literature points out, commercial banks in China are 
not the ideal business partner for POEs. The question still remains is if this is the only group of 
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customers that seek finance from shadow banks, the ones that are being ignored by 
commercial banks? 
What became apparent throughout the course of the interviews was that 
entrepreneurs did not only use shadow banks, when banks would not lend money to them 
but also when the commercial banks were not able to offer loans at the terms they required. 
There are situations, where an entrepreneur requires an urgent loan for a short-term. For 
example, if an enterprise encounters a short-term cash-flow problem. A real estate developer 
emphasised, because he often required loans with a short maturity, he actually preferred to 
use shadow banks over commercial banks134. In his case, the most common use of shadow 
banks was in fact, when we needed money urgently. He has qualified for bank loans in the 
past, but due to the lengthy loan approval procedures at commercial banks, he cannot rely on 
them for urgent financing requirements. Other entrepreneurs have voiced a similar rationale, 
with loans from shadow banks having a maturity of one to three months135, sometimes just 
days136. Another entrepreneur expressed similar sentiments, saying that even if they have had 
a bank loan in the past, they would often seek finance from shadow banks, if he needed the 
money quickly137.  
This is interesting, because the literature tells us that banks should have been able to 
use their business relationship to reduce the asymmetry of information between lender and 
borrower. They should have been able to acquire soft and hard information about the client 
and his creditworthiness. Ultimately, this should have ultimately improved access to bank 
loans. It appears that for banks, it does not matter whether a borrower is a returning or a new 
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customer. It still takes at least 30 days for a loan to be approved, regardless of the size of the 
loan.  
 Entrepreneurs also made clear, that they tend to use shadow banks for small loans and 
banks for larger loans138. Despite the assurances by moneylenders that in theory they can lend 
as much capital as a potential borrower requires, it appears as if the the shadow banking 
sector is only used for small loans139. One high-tech incubator explained that in his experience, 
POEs and SMEs only resorted to shadow banks, if they encountered cash-flow problems140. 
They will not use these funds to finance large long-term investments. As the JSCB loan officer 
made clear in his interview, his bank will not give out any cash-flow bridge loans, i.e. short-
term loans to cover a cash-flow problem, and customers knew that141. The data suggests that 
there is a two tier system for finance in China. Long-term and low-cost loans come from 
commercial banks. Short-term and high-cost loans come from the shadow banking sector. 
 When we discus access to finance, the case of a biotech entrepreneur in Nanjing was 
particularly interesting142. He had so far only relied on shadow banks and interpersonal loans 
in particular. He emphasised that even for his peers, his experience was somewhat usual. His 
friends and he and engaged in mutual lending of 500,000 to 1m CNY. What made his example 
so interesting is that him and his friends had never charged each other interest on the loans 
they had extended. Especially when he started his biotech company, his profit margins had 
been too low to service an interest-bearing loan. This concept of interest-free interpersonal 
loans is not unheard of in China. Especially in rural China, farmers often lend money to other 
farmers without interest. What is striking here is that this soft institution seems to have 
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survived even among modern and upcoming entrepreneurs. In the rest of my interviews, I 
have not encountered any other examples of interest free interpersonal loans. This does 
suggest that this is an isolated incident. Nonetheless, it is one that is worth highlighting. 
 Overall we can see how shadow banks have improved the access to finance by 
supplementing traditional commercial banks. In some cases, shadow banks offer a necessary 
substitute to enterprises, which cannot get access to finance. In others, shadow banks offer 
an additional option with a faster service and a higher price. We see that shadow banks are 
quicker to make lending decisions and more flexible when it comes to the terms of the loan. 
They are more flexible when it comes to loan maturities as well as when it comes to the type 
of collateral they accept – if any. Across all interviewees, this increased flexibility is understood 
to be worth the price of higher funding cost, mainly because this loans are only taken out for 
a short period. 
  
 174 
5.2.2 Function II: Alternative to Bank Deposits 
 
‘When you look at it, the shadow banking system is just about the high interest 
rates to attract the savings.’ – Local Economics Professor in Nanjing143 
 
 Due to the nature of China’s financial system, investment avenues for surplus-saving 
units are traditionally very scarce. Because of capital controls, the average Chinese citizen 
cannot simply invest their money abroad. As discussed in Chapter Three, the domestic stock-
market in China makes investing in the equity and bond markets not appealing to everyone. 
Real estate has often been able to draw much investment but in an attempt to curb rising 
housing prices, regulation has made it more difficult to own multiple residential properties. 
So what will surplus-saving units do with their hard earned financial capital? Is it save to say 
that it will find another productive use within the economy? What became apparent in my 
research is that the shadow banking sector is needed by both groups: those who need money 
and those who have it. The shadow banking sector is not only driven by the demand for loans 
outside of the traditional banking sector, but also by the supple of capital from those, who 
hold plenty of it. Following the analysis of my interview data, we can distinguish between two 
types of investments made in the shadow banking sector: investments, which are made 
because of a lack of alternatives research, and high-return-seeking-investments. The latter are 
highly speculative investments made by surplus saving units.  
 I often heard that low deposit interest rates and very limited ways to invest money 
were the cause of excess funds flowing into the shadow banking sector144. It provides an 
‘important parallel use for funds’145. A venture capitalist further pointed out that especially in 
Jiangsu province, many entrepreneurs were used to extending loans directly to other 
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entrepreneurs, because they have enough information about these businesses to make an 
informed decision to invest146. For the CEO of a WMC, it was his declared goal to create a 
product, which would rival bank deposits147. He would be able to absorbs funds from the 
average citizen. Customers should then make an informed choice of whether to invest their 
money in the stock market, deposit it in the bank or invest it in a WMP. They may also still use 
WMPs and other shadow banking products in order to supplement their investment portfolio, 
when they seek higher-risk investments in addition to low-risk bank deposits. 
 Within the shadow banking sector, there are also various institutions, which use high 
interest rates to attract financial capital from surplus-saving units for high-risk investments148. 
They value high returns in the short-term over small or medium returns in the long-run. The 
issue is that due to regulatory restrictions on deposit interest rates, surplus-saving units are 
actively looking for any return that is higher than that of bank deposits149. At the moment 
deposit interest rates in the shadow banking sector are not subject to any regulations. Shadow 
banks can promise surplus-saving units high interest rates, often more than double of the 
deposit interest rate150.  
 The issue with ‘depositing’ once funds in the shadow banking sector is the risk that is 
associated with it. A moneylender said that those institutions promising interest rates in 
excess of 20% were dishonest, because no company’s profit margin could afford it151. He went 
on to say that even 20% is hard to achieve across all loans and if he managed to do that, I 
would just sit at home and do nothing. It was his way of saying that any institution, which 
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promised 20% or more return was likely to be dishonest to their investors. On a similar note, 
many interviewees made anecdotal references to pyramid schemes, where they or their 
friends had expected high returns but often lost their entire investment. These stories are not 
only limited to small time lenders. One of China’s largest P2P financing platform, which was 
discovered to be a US$7.6bn Ponzi Scheme (Mitchell, 2016). Following the 2008 financial crisis, 
similar stories emerged about western investments products, most notably about Bernie 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. What is different here is the Chinese investor’s motivation to invest 
in shadow banking products. On the one hand there is little denying the fact that high interest 
rates are attractive. On the other hand, surplus-saving units do not have many other avenues 
for investment. An investment banker with a large SOCB, also emphasised a cultural 
component when they talked about Chinese investments in high-risk high-yield products or 
institutions152. In his view, many Chinese people are drawn towards gambling and speculative 
behaviour. This attitude towards risk means, that they like to invest in high-risk, high yield 
products, e.g. P2P financing platforms. This implies, that investors are aware of the dangers 
of such investments. If it is successful they win, if not they loose. While I am personally not 
convinced by generalisations of certain cultures and personality traits, at the time, my 
research assistant nodded in agreement. 
When investors, or quasi-depositors, loose their money, it is most likely to be a 
personal tragedy. However due to the opaque nature of some of the shadow banking sector, 
in particular the interbank asset sector, it can have wide-ranging ramifications. Due to the 
implied deposit guarantees, commercial banks might feel obliged to cover their customer’s 
losses. In the past they have repeatedly paid their customers, despite being under no formal 
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obligation to do so153. Banks often do that out of fear that a mass of angry customers might 
lead to a CBRC investigation, which would ultimately lead to the discovery of great wrongdoing.  
Shadow banks and their products are not necessarily negative and if investors are 
aware of the risks involved, it is their own personal issue, if the investment product does not 
work out. If on the other hand banks start feeling obliged to compensate investors for their 
losses despite being under no legal obligation to do so, and frankly only do that to hide other 
wrongdoing, this create serious systemic risk for the entire financial system. The selection bias 
of my sample might mean that this is an isolated incident. We will not know, until large 
defaults make it impossible for banks to compensate investors. 
Overall we can rightly say that China’s repressed financial system, combined with a 
money-saving culture amongst its citizens, means that surplus-saving units are actively looking 
for avenues to invest their money. Interest rates on deposits at commercial banks are low. 
Therefore, large amounts of capital are eagerly waiting to find a productive use. The issue is 
that due to the regulatory environment of the sector, paired with regulatory arbitrage, it is 
riddled with institutions, which do not provide a high-quality investment product or which 
purposefully mislead investors. Shadow banking therefore provides a valuable service, 
however experiences and operations vary largely across the sector. 
5.2.3 Function III: Services to the Formal Banking Sector 
The third function provided by the shadow banking sector in Nanjing can be broadly 
described as services to the formal banking sector. As my interview data has uncovered, 
shadow banks exist in the underbelly of traditional commercial banks and provide valuable 
functions to them. These functions range from providing additional liquidity directly to 
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commercial banks, over allowing banks to roll-over existing loans, and to extend loans, which 
they otherwise could not. 
The issue of loan roll-overs is widely documented in China. It is not unique to the local 
financial environment in Nanjing. This is clearly one of the key function, that the sector 
provides to banks and banks’ customers alike154. In China, the maturity for bank loans is 
usually one year155. The issue is that many investments will not be profitable or even break 
even after a year. If an entrepreneur buys a piece of machinery for example, it will not 
generate profit in the first year of its use. When the loan matures after one year however, the 
commercial bank needs to collect the entire outstanding balance before it can re-extend the 
loan. This is a regulatory requirement to prevent the built up of NPLs. It is a lesson learned 
from the end of 1990s, where banks had re-extended loans over and over again, without the 
slightest chance of repayment. The roll-over process takes between 5-7 days. It is not as long 
as a new loan application, which would take at least 30 days. The roll-over is not considered 
as a new loan application. Many shadow banks, from interpersonal lenders to microloan 
companies, WMPs, or P2P financing platforms, will offer the entire loan at an excruciatingly 
high interest rate for a short period of time. For example, on a 2m CNY loan for a loan roll-
over, the lender will ask for 2% interest rate (182.5% p.a.) or around 30-40000 CNY for a few 
days156. This loan is considered safe, because banks are likely to re-extend the loan.  
Loan roll-overs can however also have negative consequences. An investment banker, 
who was originally from Zhejiang Province, highlighted that this practice had failed in 
Wenzhou a few years ago, when banks did not re-extend the original loans and entrepreneurs 
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had to service debt at astronomically high costs157. This comes at little surprise, as loans in 
China are allocated not on a market price but through loan quotas. These quotas can change 
without any prior warning. If this happens the borrower is left with the shadow bank loan as 
debt. As he had planned to pay off the entire balance within a week, he is now stuck with a 
loans that he cannot afford. In the case of Wenzhou, this led to suicides of entrepreneurs, who 
saw no way out158. In order to address these issues, the city of Nanjing has set up a ‘capital 
pool’ that allows POEs to borrow money at a lower rate in order to roll-over their loans159. 
POEs can borrow for money for a loan roll over at 2% interest rate per month. The interviewee 
told us that it mostly took banks in Nanjing a maximum of 10 days to roll-over a loan. As the 
borrower therefore only needed the loan for 10 days, he was able to afford a monthly interest 
rate of 2%. After all he would pay interest pro rate. It still leaves them exposed to the risk of 
a changing loan quota while their initial bank loan is re-extended. This ‘capital pool’ can be 
seen as an attempt by the municipal government to curb shadow banking and its business 
model on relying on loan roll-overs, while not addressing the core of the problem: the rigidity 
of rules governing bank loans in China. I was also not able to find more information on the 
longevity of these capital pools and how successful they were in the long-run. 
If we see this function as undesirable, it could easily be curbed if not eradicated 
through a change in regulation. If banks were either willing to extend loans with a longer 
maturity or were more flexible, when it came to loan renewals, the shadow banking sector 
would not need to provide this function. After all it traps, at least for a short period, a 
potentially healthy borrower in a loan, he can hardly afford. Loan roll-overs are a China-
specific phenomenon and the existence of a Nanjing city capital pool to address them shows 
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that local authorities are aware of the issues surrounding them. For banks, this system clearly 
works well and does help prevent the built up of NPLs in commercial banks – at the expense 
of a potential NPL built up in the shadow banking sector and the expense of the borrower. 
The shadow banking sector further provides an important function by providing more 
liquidity to commercial banks. Especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the 
government stimulus and the following loan expansion, this form of shadow banking has 
grown immensely160. Entrusted loans for example allow banks to extend loans, without those 
loans appearing in the books of the commercial bank. This allows banks to lend more money, 
for it does not affect their loans to assets ratio. Investors can purchase financial products from 
a bank-owned trust company, but these offer not the same protection as bank deposits and 
offer a higher yield161. These trust companies have to be legally separated, as their loans to 
not appear on the bank’s balance sheets. The problem is, as we have seen in the section on 
Function II, that investors might not be aware that the product they bought does not offer the 
same protection for their money as a traditional bank deposit. If a bank is ultimately liable for 
it, despite not being on the bank’s balance sheet, this creates unforeseeable systemic risk162. 
A former banker turned venture capitalist expressed his deep concerns and worries about the 
hidden systemic risk, induced by the shadow banking sector’s supplementary function to 
commercial banks163. The research conducted for this PhD only grazed the issue but repeated 
references to this risk means, that I ought to address it. 
Many of the supplementary functions that the sector provides to commercial banks 
are the by-product of regulation. In the case of loan roll-overs, it is the direct result of 
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regulatory efforts to curb NPLs. In the case of off-balance sheet lending, it is a regulatory 
arbitrage. Regulators seem to be oblivious to the first as at the time of writing, the practice of 
loan roll-overs continues. Local authorities seem to have a different view on it. As the creation 
of the capital pool in Nanjing demonstrates, local authorities are painfully aware that loan roll-
overs pose a significant financial burden on entrepreneurs. Hence they created these capital 
pools. Regulators seem however to be painfully aware of the systemic risk emanating from 
the shadow-banking sector. Both 2016 and 2017 saw a wave of regulation and crack downs 
on what is assumed to be systemically risky shadow banking. 
5.2.4 Function IV: Services to Local Governments 
My interview data further highlighted a fourth function of the shadow banking sector. 
Shadow banks provide services to local governments. In particular, our interview data points 
towards two distinct examples. The first is that it allows local governments to circumvent 
restrictions on local government financing by issuing debt even though, they are legally not 
allowed to. The second is that it allows local governments to disperse financial capital to 
enterprises without having to rely on commercial banks. Both are functions to the local 
government, but their effect and impact is very different. 
Circumventing restrictions on local government finance through the shadow banking 
sector is nothing that is Nanjing-specific164. In fact, it has been a reoccurring phenomenon in 
Modern China. The scale on which this has happened has become increasingly worse with the 
2008 the stimulus package after the global financial crisis. Here it was left to local governments 
to generate the funds necessary to finance infrastructure investments. According to Chinese 
law, local governments cannot issue debt. As a result, many used financial engineering to 
design products like local-government financing vehicles (LGFC). LGFCs are financial products 
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that can be bought by banks and other institutional investors. They are not meant to be sold 
to retail investors, i.e. private households and citizens. From the perspective of institutional 
investors, these LGFCs provided a good and foremost save investment. As this is a loan to the 
government, these are considered to be perfectly safe. The problem is that through other 
shadow banking products, e.g. WMPs, these LGFCs found their way into the investment 
portfolios of retail investors. We could rightly ask, why this is a problem? The issue is that this 
financial capital was given to local governments as loans to fund long-term investments with 
low-returns, but it was used to fund the 2008 government stimulus package. Therefore, the 
underlying investment for the LGFC is most likely not as safe as it should be, but has 
nonetheless found its way into many financial products for retail customers, e.g. WMPs or 
other securities. This prompted one of the interviewees to say that most risk within the 
shadow banking sector comes from local governments165.  
Local government finance is an interesting topic in China and one that requires more 
attention. The problem in assessing the complex relationship between local government 
finance and the shadow banking sector in its entirety is access to data. There is no dataset 
with coherent and comprehensive data, which would allow us to analyse of many and which 
LGVCs are at risk or have become non-performing. My research purely uncovered that there 
are linkages, which might pose a threat to the overall stability of the financial system. If local 
governments are increasingly unable to service their debt-like liabilities, this puts many 
financial products at risk. Such products were often sold to retail investors with implicit 
guarantees, which made them sound as safe as bank deposit. If they are not, this poses a 
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significant risk. Without wanting to explain it further, one interviewee said, that in Nanjing 
this is already the case166. 
The other function provided by the shadow banking sector to local governments is one 
we best describe as assistance to local economic development. The sector allows local 
governments to disperse funds to local POEs without having to rely on commercial banks. It 
further allows them to steer local the local economy towards a certain type of economic 
development. My institutional analysis covered the role of government-backed VC funds. 
Through these funds, the municipal and provincial governments can make equity investments 
in local high-tech start-ups and growth-stage enterprises. This is particularly interesting for 
two reason: first it highlights an institutional understanding of the shortcomings of capital 
allocation through commercial banks. The local government seems to be convinced that it is 
more beneficial to make equity-investments in companies rather than give money to banks 
for them to engage in POE and SME lending. Secondly, it highlights another potentially positive 
impact of the shadow banking sector. In local governments use it to actively steer economic 
development towards knowledge-based industries. 
Overall the functions provided by shadow banks to local governments is a very 
interesting function of the shadow banking sector. The analysis of my interview data allows 
me to sketch some of them. Many of the issues surrounding LGFCs have since been addressed, 
but local government finance in China is still a very interesting topic.  
5.3. Concluding Remarks 
 The analysis of my empirical interview data has uncovered a vibrant and highly active 
shadow banking sector in Nanjing. As the institutional analysis described and analysed the 
institutions within it range from interpersonal lending, over microloan finance, to P2P 
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financing platforms and WMCs. The institutional landscape is diverse, covering formal and 
informal, legal and illegal institutions. What unites them is that they are all engaged in some 
aspect of credit intermediation. They are also united in their key competitive advantage over 
commercial banks: flexibility. A common theme in my interviews was that they are more 
flexible in accepting different forms of collateral. Chinese commercial banks are very limited 
in what they consider as collateral for loans. They almost exclusively focus on real estate and 
do not accept any other forms of collateral, e.g. purchase orders or intellectual property. This 
categorically excludes certain type of entrepreneurs from access to bank loans. If an 
entrepreneur does not own real estate, he cannot get a bank loan. If he has already pledged 
his real estate for a loan and requires additional finance, even if it is only short term to fund 
an existing order, he can also not get a bank loan.  
My analysis also discovered that all but one shadow bank has a competitive advantage 
over commercial banks. With the exception of venture capital, all institutions in the local 
shadow banking sector are able to provide loans much faster than commercial banks. Rather 
than wait between one and three months, the potential borrower can find out within days, 
sometimes even hours or instantaneously, if he is entitled to a loan. He will also know in 
advance how high this loan will be. With a commercial bank, a potential borrower has to wait 
at least 30 days to find out, if he gets a loan and only then will he find out, how much the bank 
is willing to lend to him. Even formal shadow banks, e.g. microfinance institutions, offer much 
shorter loan approval times than commercial banks. According to the interviewees in this 
sample, they are still able to control risk as good as commercial banks would be. As there is 
no comprehensive data available, it is difficult to validate these claims.  
All of these advantages come at a cost: higher funding costs. With two exceptions, all 
shadow banks charge high interest rates. Except for venture capital firms, which do not 
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provide debt-finance, and some interpersonal loans, all of the institutions covered here charge 
interest rates which go far beyond the benchmark lending rate for commercial banks. There 
are two reasons we can conclude from our analysis. On the demand side, the customer is 
willing to pay a higher price for the service provided. The deficit-spending unit is willing to pay 
a premium for a quicker loan approval. As he uses the loan for short-term financing needs and 
plans to repay the loan quickly, his overall financial burden is limited. On the supply side, the 
surplus-spending unit is likely to demand a higher interest rate for their deposit-like 
investment. They invest in the shadow banking sector to receive a larger return than they 
would from the formal banking sector or the financial markets. So on the one hand, it is more 
expensive for shadow banks to acquire capital but on the other hand is a customer, who is 
willing to pay a premium for their loans. Lastly, the risk exposure of shadow banks and their 
NPL ratio is most likely also higher than that of commercial banks. This means they have to 
charge higher interest rates to account for loans in their portfolio, which are underperforming 
or not performing at all. 
 Another interesting finding was the role of interpersonal relationships in this sector – 
for loans from hard as well as soft institutions. Guanxi at times makes lending possible and 
can even serve as a form of collateral. In the case of the biotech entrepreneur, it had even 
replaced conventional interest payments. The concept of Guanxi as collateral is interesting to 
explore further. It appears as if those shadow banks, which rely on it (e.g. interpersonal 
lending) tend to do better than those, who do not (e.g. P2P lending). Interpersonal 
relationships seem to compel borrowers to pay back their loans in order to save face, i.e. not 
loose their social standing and fall into disrepute.  
 The functional analysis of the sector highlighted four distinct functions provided by the 
sector: access to finance, alternative to bank deposits, services to other financial sectors, and 
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services to local governments. Access to finance is the most obvious of all of these functions. 
As credit is intermediated through an additional financial sector, it gives more deficit-spending 
units the opportunity to obtain finance. At the same time, it provides surplus-spending units 
with an additional opportunity to deposit their funds within this sector. These are legally not 
deposits, as Chapter Three highlights that only banks are allowed to accept deposits in China. 
This is not always clear to surplus-spending units. The latter two functions are more surprising, 
because they highlight the interconnectedness of the shadow banking sector within the 
Chinese financial system. They expose two important relationships. On the one is the 
relationship with the formal financial sectors, i.e. the banking sector and the financial markets. 
This suggests that shadow banks provide an important function to them too. It does not exist 
in a vacuum alongside commercial banks or the stock market. As a sector, it is at varying 
degrees an active participant in the financial system. The second is the relationship with local 
governments. They which have in the past relied heavily on the sector for local government 
finance and continue to rely on it to fund and steer local economic development. This sheds 
some light on the very interesting field of local government financing in China. 
From an analytical perspective, there are no challenges posed to the economy by the 
first two functions. A broader access to finance will lead to higher investment levels and 
therefore stimulate the economy. An alternative to bank deposits would allow surplus-saving 
units to diversify their investment portfolio and enjoy higher returns on their investments (or 
quasi-savings). The latter two functions however are symptoms of underlying problems within 
the formal financial system as well as the commercial banking sector. The services it provides 
to the banking sector are largely the product of either ill-attempted regulation or outright 
regulatory arbitrage. For example, the process of loan roll-overs means that at any given time, 
the deficit-spending units need to borrow money outside of the formal financial sector just to 
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get their old loan renewed. Furthermore, regulation on deposit-to-loan ratios and loan quotas 
compel banks to move assets into the interbank shadow banking sector just to meet 
requirements. Similarly, the functions provided to local governments are symbolic for 
underlying issues. The rise of shadow banking as a source for local government financing is 
worrisome. The use of shadow banks for local industrial policy is a symptom of the wider 
problems of Chinese commercial banks and their loan policies. 
This chapter has an important implication for theory. The hypothesis developed in the 
previous chapter proposed that if the formal financial sectors cannot perform the functions 
they ought to, the shadow banking sector will. The analysis has demonstrated in Nanjing, this 
sector is providing four distinct supplementary services for surplus-spending units, deficit-
spending units, the banking sector and the financial markets. It has further at times raised the 
question of whether this role is strictly supplementary, i.e. in addition to the formal financial 
sector, or alternative, i.e. as an outright replacement. The case of informal finance and 
interpersonal loans has highlighted this question. If a borrower can get access to an interest-
free loan, what will compel him to even consider an interest-bearing bank loan. The following 
chapter will further investigate this aspect, drawing on survey data gathered in Beijing. 
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Chapter 6: The Shadow Banking Sector in Beijing 
Beijing, the capital of the People’s Republic of China, is one of the most developed 
cities in the country. Together with Shanghai and Guangzhou, she is what is considered a  
Tier-I city. Her striving local economy is fuelled not only by her role as the centre of power in 
the country, but also by a vibrant and diverse economic landscape. It is home to some of the 
largest enterprises in China, to SOEs, POEs, and start-ups alike. It therefore provides us with 
another great case study to examine, which functions the shadow banking sector is providing 
to the local economy?  
The methodology for this chapter is different than in the previous chapter on Nanjing. 
While the former relied solely on interview data collected through semi-structured interviews, 
this chapter seeks to combine findings from a survey to correlate and triangulate them with 
some of the earlier conclusions drawn in this study. Between October 2014 and August 2015, 
a total of 27 entrepreneurs provided key insights into which sources of finance they use, which 
sources of finance they prefer to use and how the access to finance has affected their business. 
I conducted an online survey aimed at entrepreneurs and finance professionals. This survey 
was posted online in simplified Chinese characters and the link was widely shared amongst 
entrepreneurs in Beijing and the rest of China. A very detailed description of the survey, its 
scope, target group and sample can be found in Chapter 2. A full list of all survey questions 
and their translation is included in the appendix. 
Using this data and combining it with the insights provided by interviews conducted in 
Beijing, this chapter will first provide an institutional analysis of the shadow banking sector in 
the city. The data allows us to examine, which shadow banks entrepreneurs used in the 12-
months before taking the survey. Which institutions are frequently used by the population of 
this survey? Furthermore, the survey data will allow us to answer the question, if 
entrepreneurs use shadow bank because they are accessible or whether they prefer using 
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them. The institutional analysis will examine, whether the usage of these institutions is a 
product of preference or necessity. Do entrepreneurs use the shadow banking sector, because 
there is little to no alternative from the formal financial sectors or because of the services 
provided by shadow banks? Following the institutional analysis, this chapter will engage in a 
functional analysis of the shadow banking sector in Beijing. Due to the limitations of the survey 
data, this chapter will only partly analyse the functions of the shadow banking sector, which 
were discussed in detail in the Chapter on Nanjing. While the qualitative data allowed a more 
comprehensive analysis of different functions, the scope of the survey data and its population 
only provided meaningful insights into one of its functions. Therefore, this chapter will solely 
focus on how the shadow banking sector is affecting the access to finance for entrepreneurs. 
Do entrepreneurs feel that the local financial system in Beijing is providing adequate access 
to finance?  Which enterprises, if any in particular, rely on this sector as a source of finance 
and what fraction of their total finance requirements derive from it?  
6.1. Institutional analysis of the shadow banking sector in Beijing 
Through the institutional analysis, this chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive 
overview over which particular kind of shadow banks make up the capital’s shadow banking 
sector. By mapping out the institutions in Beijing, we can identify and highlight differences 
with the institutional landscape of the sector in Nanjing.  
The data gathered for this study allowed us to analyse this at two specific points. First 
of all, through asking, which financial institutions entrepreneurs had used in the 12 months 
prior to taking the survey. Options included a range of financial institutions from the shadow 
banking and the formal banking sector. The literature review highlighted a broad array of 
different institutions, but the important questions is, which specific institutions entrepreneurs 
frequently use. Secondly, entrepreneurs were asked to rank the same institutions according 
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to their preference and according to their accessibility. The former allows us to get an 
understanding, which sources of finance are actively being used and sought after. The latter 
allows to get an insight into why they are used. Is it simply, because there is no alternative or 
do entrepreneurs enjoy using them? The findings will be discussed below and will allow us to 
refine our understanding of the institutional make up of the shadow banking sector in Beijing.  
6.1.1. Usage of financial institutions over a 12-months period 
 The two tables below show the use of various financial institutions over the twelve-
months period prior to taking the survey. The data is analysed according to industry, number 
of employees, turnover and years in operation (age). The various sources of finance were 
further grouped as internal finance, shadow banking, banking and others. Internal finance is 
a proxy for all forms of finance, which did not involve outsiders. This is in particular retained 
earnings and owner’s contributions. Shadow banking is a proxy for all shadow banking 
institutions, which were identified in the literature review. Banking is a proxy for loans from 
commercial banks, which include SOCBs and all other commercial banks. An option others was 
used to allow entrepreneurs to highlight forms of finance, which the author had not included 
in the survey. As there is no clear institutional breakdown of this option, we cannot establish 
the extent to which these were merely other institutions in the shadow banking sector, which 
were not included in the survey’s comprehensive list. The table provides an overview of the 
mean for this figures across the before-mentioned groups.  
 Table 8 provides an institutional breakdown according to industry, number of 
employees, turnover and years in operation (age). The table provides an overview over how 
much on the total finance each group received on average from each of the institution. As 
outlined in the methodology chapter, the survey allowed participants to choose from an array 
of different sources of finance. The table only included those, which were actually included by 









Industry Responses Internal Shadow	Banking Banking Others
Construction 2 0,00% 25,00% 50,00% 25,00%
Consulting 4 47,50% 45,00% 7,50% 0,00%
Food 1 50,00% 0,00% 0,00% 50,00%
Garments 1 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00%
IT 1 0,00% 20,00% 80,00% 0,00%
Machinery	and	Equipment 3 33,33% 43,33% 0,00% 23,33%
Other 5 73,00% 20,00% 0,00% 7,00%
Transport 1 60,00% 40,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Average 32,98% 36,67% 17,19% 13,17%
Note:	No	responses	for	firms	operating	in	Chemicals,	Textiles	and	Other	Manufacturing
Employees Responses Internal Shadow	Banking Banking Others
Self-employed 2 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00%
1-4	Employees 3 86,67% 13,33% 0,00% 0,00%
5-9	Employees 3 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
10	-	19	Employees 1 0,00% 20,00% 80,00% 0,00%
20	-	99	Employees 8 44,38% 30,00% 15,00% 10,62%
100+	Employees 1 0,00% 70,00% 30,00% 0,00%
Turnover Responses Internal Shadow	Banking Banking Others
<10,000	RMB 3 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
10,000	-	100,000	RMB 6 31,67% 43,33% 16,67% 8,33%
100,000	-	999,999	RMB 4 75,00% 25,00% 0,00% 0,00%
>1,000,000	RMB 5 25,00% 42,00% 26,00% 7,00%
Age Responses Internal Shadow	Banking Banking Others
≤	1	year 3 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
≤	5	years 10 55,50% 34,00% 2,00% 8,50%
≤	10	years 3 20,00% 20,00% 60,00% 0,00%




























Construction 2 0,00% 0,00% 50,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 25,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 25,00%
Consulting 4 47,50% 0,00% 7,50% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 5,00% 40,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Food 1 50,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 50,00%
Garments 1 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
IT 1 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 60,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 20,00% 20,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Machinery	and	Equipment 3 3,33% 30,00% 0,00% 0,00% 33,33% 10,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 23,33%
Other 5 14,00% 59,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 2,00% 11,00% 3,00% 0,00% 4,00% 0,00% 7,00%
Transport 1 60,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 40,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%























none 2 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 50,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 50,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
1-4	Employees 3 86,67% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 13,33% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
5-9	Employees 3 36,67% 63,33% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
10	-	19	Employees 1 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 60,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 20,00% 20,00% 0,00% 0,00%
20	-	99	Employees 8 20,00% 24,38% 12,50% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 1,25% 13,13% 15,63% 0,00% 0,00% 2,50% 10,62%























<10,000	RMB 3 100,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
10,000	-	100,000	RMB 6 15,00% 16,67% 16,67% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 8,33% 35,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 8,33%
100,000	-	999,999	RMB 4 22,50% 52,50% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 10,00% 2,50% 8,75% 3,75% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%























1	year 3 83,33% 16,67% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
2	-	5	years 10 28,00% 27,50% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 4,00% 1,00% 7,50% 21,50% 0,00% 0,00% 2,00% 8,50%
6	-	10	years 3 0,00% 20,00% 33,33% 20,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 10,00% 3,33% 6,67% 6,67% 0,00% 0,00%





On average across the sample, entrepreneurs indicated that overall they had used 
internal finance for 32.98%, shadow banks for 36.67%, and formal bank loans for only 17.19% 
of their financing needs. From this summative overview, we can see that enterprises relied 
more on external finance, i.e. banks and shadow banks, than internal finance. We can further 
see that enterprises relied more on shadow banks than on formal bank loans for their 
financing needs. These summative figures hence seem to confirm findings from the literature 
review as well as the fieldwork in Nanjing. Privately owned enterprises tend to rely more on 
internal finance and shadow banking, than they do on formal bank loans. As this chapter will 
explore in greater detail, bank loans are the most preferred source for external finance, but 
shadow banks are more accessible. So in the absence of access to formal bank loans, 
entrepreneurs have to rely on shadow banks.  
Due to the limitations of this sample, we cannot conduct a meaningful comparison of 
the use of various financial institutions across industries. However, the survey data allows us 
to look at the use of financial institutions across different sizes of enterprises. We can measure 
the size of an enterprise in two ways. One is in terms of its revenue and the other is in terms 
of the total number of employees. The different size categories were adopted from the World 
Bank Climate Investment survey to allow for comparability of our findings. The data further 
allows us to group enterprises according their age, i.e. years of operation. This is a particularly 
interesting insight, for the literature suggests that banks collect information on their 
borrowers and potential borrowers over time. Hence we should expect the use of bank finance 
to rise with age. 
We would expect that enterprises with fewer employees and lower turnovers use 
more shadow banks than any other group in the sample. Enterprises with fewer employees 
are less likely to possess physical assets, which they could use as collateral to secure bank 
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finance. Enterprises with a lower turnover can also be seen as less likely to honour loan 
agreements and make regular payments. They therefore pose a higher default risk than 
enterprises with a higher turnover. Our analysis of the survey data seems to confirm this: 
smaller enterprises with few staff or low turnover relied on internal finance or shadow banks. 
The two self-employed entrepreneurs received all of their finance from shadow banks. Half of 
their finance came from a P2P platform, while the other half came from interpersonal loans 
(loans from relatives). As enterprises get larger, they rely more and more on external finance. 
They first appear to use more shadow banking and ultimately move towards using bank loans. 
This suggests that shadow banking is an intermediary step on the between internal finance 
and formal bank loans. Smaller enterprises are excluded from external sources of finance, 
whether these belong to the shadow banking sector or the formal financial system. As they 
grow in size, enterprises are able to secure external finance but still cannot gain access to bank 
loans. Shadow banks on the other hand seem willing to lend to those entrepreneurs. At a later 
point in their growth trajectory, they qualify for bank loans and then make use of them. 
An interesting finding of our analysis was the use of shadow banks among large 
enterprises. While small enterprises certainly used shadow banks more than banks, the use 
amongst large enterprises was still widespread. For example, those with 20 to 99 employees, 
still received 30% of their finance from shadow banks. The largest enterprise in this set, with 
over 100 employees, still used shadow banks for 70% of its financing in the 12 months prior 
to the survey. The data here indicates that for the enterprises in this sample the reliance on 
shadow banking actually increases with size. Enterprises with 1 to 4 employees relied on 
shadow banks for 13.33% of their total finance, while the enterprise with over 100 employees 
used shadow banks for 70% of theirs. Given the sample size we should be careful with a broad 
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generalization. This finding is nonetheless an indication that the use of shadow banking is not 
merely restricted to small and micro enterprises. 
Large enterprises were also more likely to use bank finance. Enterprises with nine or 
fewer employees did not use bank finance at all over the 12-months prior to taking this survey. 
The one enterprise with 10 to 19 employees was even able secure 80% of its finance through 
formal banks. Enterprises with 20 to 99 employees, the largest group within this sample, relied 
on bank finance for 15% of their finance. While the enterprise with over 100 employees also 
used bank loans for 30% of their financing needs. This data suggests to confirm the findings of 
earlier studies and the literature review: the larger the company, the more likely it is to get 
access to bank loans. The smaller the company, the less likely it is to obtain any external 
finance. It also demonstrates that while small enterprises seem to be excluded from access to 
bank loans, enterprises with over 10 employees find it easier to get access to bank loans. 
This data further highlights something, which was not discussed in previous studies. 
The shadow banking sector does not only provide finance for the lower end of the market, i.e. 
small enterprises. Even enterprises with a larger workforce rely on shadow banks. Despite 
having access to bank loans, they still make use of shadow banking. As our data indicates, bank 
loans are the most preferred source for finance, yet those with access to it still use shadow 
banks. The data further suggests that the level of turnover plays no significant role in 
determining if an enterprise uses shadow banks. Enterprises with a large turnover also used 
shadow banks to a similar extend as enterprises with a low turnover. For example, those with 
an annual turnover of over 1,000,000 RMB used shadow banks for 42% of their total finance, 
while enterprises with a turnover between 10,000 and 100,000 RMB used them for 43,33%. 
The use of shadow banks hence seems to be relatively stable. 
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There is a significant difference when it comes to the sources of the remaining finance. 
Those enterprises with a lower turnover were more likely to rely on internal finance, i.e. 
savings, retained earnings or owner’s contributions. They only saw 16.67% of their finance 
stem from bank loans. Enterprises with a higher turnover tended relied less on internal finance 
and more on bank loans. Overall 26% of their finance came from banks, which is more than 
for enterprises with a lower turnover. A more detailed analysis further reveals that this group 
relies on a more diverse set of bank loans, namely from two SOCBs, JSCBs and other domestic 
banks. Enterprises with a turnover of 10,000 to 100,000 CNY received their bank loans from 
one SOCB. Enterprises with a turnover of under 10,000 CNY and between 100,000 to 999,999 
CNY did not use bank finance at all. This is surprising but might be the result of the relatively 
small sample size. The findings are insightful nonetheless, because they suggest that even 
enterprises with access to the most preferred source of external finance, i.e. bank loans, still 
use shadow banks. Regardless of their individual level of access to bank loans, enterprises use 
shadow banks for some of their financing requirements. As this study discovered in the case 
of Nanjing, shadow banks had a competitive advantage in providing certain types of loans. For 
example, due to the faster loan approval procedure, they were able to provide loans at short 
notice. This could be a possible explanation as to why large enterprises with access to bank 
loans still use shadow banks.  
 While the fraction of finance stemming from the shadow banking sector is similar 
across the two groups, the composition is not. Table 2 provides us with a further breakdown 
of different forms of finance and their use across the relatively small sample. If we look at the 
use of shadow banks more closely, we find that enterprises with a turnover of 10,000 to 
100,000 RMB were more likely to rely on informal finance. The majority of their shadow bank 
interactions came from interpersonal loans: 35% came from friends, making it the largest 
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source of external finance. In fact, they received more funds from friends, than they were able 
to provide internally. They also did not use any formal shadow banks, e.g. microloans or P2P 
finance. Enterprises with an annual turnover over 1,000,000 RMB only relied on informal 
shadow banks for 22% of their financial needs. They used formal shadow banks, namely P2P 
financing platforms, for an additional 20% of their financing. Those with an an annual turnover 
of 100,000 to 999,999 CNY relied on both forms of shadow banking, formal and informal. They 
used interpersonal loans for 12.5% of their financing requirements, while using microloans 
and VC for 10% and 2.5% respectively. All groups of enterprises used shadow banks to 
supplement other forms of finance, but enterprises with a high turnover were more likely to 
use formal shadow banks. This is an interesting finding, for it appears that formal shadow 
banks cater more towards the upper ends of the market, while informal finance is still strong 
in the lower end.  
The data suggests that with rising turnover and economic success, entrepreneurs 
change their financing behaviour. Small enterprises tend to rely solely on internal financing. 
As they grow, they start to use shadow banks as a source for external finance. Here they first 
seem to rely on informal finance. As they progress on their developmental trajectory, they 
soon switch from informal to formal shadow-banking. At one point, after they have grown big 
enough, they are then able to borrow money from banks.  
  The data further suggests that age of the enterprise is a factor in the use pattern of 
various sources of finance. One-year-old enterprises relied solely on internal finance. They did 
not use any forms of external finance, whether originating from the shadow banking sector or 
the formal financial sector. Enterprises, which had been in operation between two to five 
years, saw an increased reliance on external finance overall. They only financed 55.5% 
internally. Shadow banking was by far the largest source of their external finance, providing 
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34% of the funding for these enterprises. Enterprises between the age of six to ten years, 
relied on 80% external finance. They further relied heavily on bank loans for their financing 
needs, with 60% of all credit coming from formal banks. Their reliance on shadow banking 
dropped significantly, with only 20% of their finance stemming from this sector. This suggests 
two things. First of all, it suggests that as an enterprise becomes more mature and builds up a 
relationship with a formal bank, they can get better access to bank loans. Secondly, it seems 
to confirm an observation noted above. An enterprise will first rely on internal finance and as 
it grows, it will then seek external finance. At first, this external finance will come from 
informal institutions. As the enterprise matures, it obtains finance from formal shadow banks 
and ultimately from the formal banking sector. However, the two enterprises, which had been 
in operation between ten to fifteen years tended to rely on shadow banking more than any 
other group of enterprises. Shadow banks provided 85% of their financing in the 12 months 
prior to the survey. None of the finance came from internal sources and banks only provided 
15%.  
 This data demonstrates that entrepreneurs in Beijing use a variety of different financial 
institutions. Bank loans are mostly accessible to more mature and larger enterprises. Based 
on the literature review and the analysis of the formal financial sectors, we expected to see 
more mature businesses to rely more on commercial banks and their loans. An enterprise with 
a higher turnover is most likely considered less of a default risk as a small or micro enterprise. 
With an older enterprise, the bank can collect information and, with time, overcome the 
asymmetry of information. We further expected to see smaller and younger enterprises to 
rely more on shadow banks. Our analysis of the survey data confirms this. However, the 
analysis also highlighted that the use of shadow banking is not restricted to small and young 
 199 
companies. The use of shadow banks is widespread amongst enterprises of virtually all sizes 
and ages.  
Even those enterprises, which had access to bank loans still relied heavily on shadow 
banking. The literature reviewed in earlier chapters seems to suggest that this should not 
happen. More mature and larger enterprises with an access to bank loans, should use those 
as their primary source of external finance. Bank loans are the most desirable form of external 
finance and offer by far the cheapest and least invasive form of loan to an entrepreneur. Large 
enterprises should find it easy to get bank loans, because banks should be able to overcome 
the asymmetry of information over time. This should allow them to adequately cater for the 
financial needs of their borrowers. They should support a growing enterprise out of the desire 
to benefit from their customers’ long-term corporate development.  
Another interesting finding was that an increase in the use of bank loans does not 
coincide with a decrease in use of shadow bank loans but merely of the type of shadow bank 
used. When we examined the composition of shadow bank loans across the different groups 
of enterprises, an interesting finding was that larger enterprises tended to rely more on formal 
shadow banks than smaller enterprises. Smaller enterprises often relied on informal finance, 
e.g. interpersonal loans. Larger enterprises relied on various forms of shadow banking and 
made use use of a broader range of different shadow banks. This highlights an interesting 
finding of the survey. In general, the use of shadow banking is widespread throughout the 
sample. Enterprises of all sizes and ages used shadow banks and it is important to understand 
why enterprises still use shadow banks even if they have an access to bank loans? It is 
important to understand if this use of shadow banks is driven out necessity, i.e. the lack of 
other forms of finance, or driven by preference? Do entrepreneurs use shadow banks because 
they want to or because they have to? 
 200 
 
Table 9 - Sources of Finance ranked according to Preference 
1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings
2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares Bank	Loan 2Bank	Loan
3Bank	Loan Bank	Loan 2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3PE
4VC 3PE 3P2P	Finance 4Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares
5P2P	Finance 4P2P	Finance 4VC 5Microfinance
6Loans	from	friends 5VC 5Microfinance 6Loan	from	another	company
7Microfinance 6Loans	from	friends 6PE 7VC
8PE 7Microfinance 7Loans	from	friends 8P2P	Finance
9Loan	from	Relatives 8Loan	from	Relatives 8Loan	from	another	company 9Loans	from	friends
10Loan	from	another	company 9Loan	from	another	company 9Loan	from	Relatives 10Loan	from	Relatives
10Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 10Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends)












1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings
2Bank	Loan 2Bank	Loan 2Bank	Loan 2Bank	Loan
3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares
4P2P	Finance 4PE 4PE 4P2P	Finance
5PE Microfinance 5Loans	from	friends 5PE
6VC 5VC 6Microfinance Loans	from	friends
Microfinance 6P2P	Finance 7VC 6VC
7Loans	from	friends 7Loan	from	another	company 8P2P	Finance 7Loan	from	another	company
8Loan	from	Relatives 8Loans	from	friends 9Loan	from	another	company 8Microfinance











Table 10 - Sources of Finance ranked according to Accessibility 
Source:	Online	Survey	among	entrepreneurs	in	Beijing	between	October	2014	and	August	2015
1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings
2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 2Bank	Loan 2Loans	from	friends 2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares
3Loans	from	friends 3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3Bank	Loan
4P2P	Finance P2P	Finance 4P2P	Finance 4P2P	Finance
5Bank	Loan 4Microfinance VC 5Loan	from	Relatives
6Loan	from	Relatives 5Loans	from	friends 5Loan	from	Relatives 6VC
7Microfinance 6VC 6Bank	Loan 7Loans	from	friends
8VC 7Loan	from	Relatives 7Microfinance 8Microfinance
9PE 8PE Loan	from	another	company 9PE
10Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 9 Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 8 Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 10Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends)
10Loan	from	another	company 9PE
Trade	Credit 10Trade	Credit













1Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings 1 Internal	funds	or	retained	earnings
2Bank	Loan 2Bank	Loan 2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 2Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares
3Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 3P2P	Finance 3Loans	from	friends 3P2P	Finance
4P2P	Finance 4Loans	from	friends 4Bank	Loan 4Loans	from	friends
VC 5Microfinance P2P	Finance 5Bank	Loan
Loan	from	Relatives 6Owners’	contribution	or	issued	new	equity	shares 5VC 6Microfinance
5Loans	from	friends Loan	from	Relatives 6Loan	from	Relatives 7Loan	from	Relatives
6Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 7VC 7Microfinance 8VC
7PE 8Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends) 8PE 9PE
8Microfinance 9PE 9Loan	from	another	company 10Loan	from	private	lenders	(but	not	family	or	friends)











6.1.2. Preference vs. accessibility – the use of financial institutions in Beijing 
The previous section of this chapter established how widespread the use of shadow 
banking is throughout the sample. All survey participants have used one form or another. The 
service of the shadow banking sector was by no means a full substitute for formal bank loans. 
Even entrepreneurs with a line of credit from a commercial bank, who in theory have access 
to the most cost-efficient form of debt-finance, have relied on the shadow banking sector. 
This raises an important question: why do they continue to rely on shadow banks? Do 
enterprises rely on shadow banks still because they have to or do entrepreneurs use them, 
because they want to? Do shadow banks provide a service, which the customer finds 
desirable? Or could it just be that it is the most accessible form of finance? 
In order to gain a better understanding into the driving factors behind the use of 
shadow banking, the survey asked participants to rank a range of sources of finance in terms 
of their accessibility and in terms of their preference. Participants were provided with a list of 
various sources of finance, which included formal and informal sources. For example, it 
included both bank loans, formal shadow banks (e.g. P2P finance), and informal finance (e.g. 
various forms of interpersonal loans). Options such as initial public offerings or corporate 
bonds were not included in the list as options, because of the general issues associated with 
China’s financial markets outlined in Chapter Three. For survey participants, taking their 
company public on the stock market or issuing corporate bonds on the capital markets were 
not a feasible method of acquiring new capital.  
All Participants were then asked to rank these sources of finance according to two 
criteria. The first criterion is preference. Entrepreneurs had to tell us, which of these sources 
they liked to use and provide a hierarchy of preference. The second criterion is accessibility. 




This allowed us to establish, if a source of finance was used because it is available or because 
they preferred using it. Table 3 and Table 4 provide the hierarchy across the sample. The table 
further provides an overview of the averages according to the size of the company. 
Participants were asked to rank 
a range of sources of finance according 
to their personal preference. Across all 
27 participants, the 10 most preferred 
sources of finance were internal funds 
and retained earnings, owner’s 
contribution and equity issuance, 
followed by bank loans, venture capital 
(VC), P2P finance, loans from friends, 
microfinance, private equity (PE), loans 
from relatives and loans from another company.  
Internal funds and owners’ contributions were expected to be the two most 
preferential forms of finance. Entrepreneurs are more likely to prefer the least invasive forms 
of capital, i.e. their own. Capital from an outside lender or investors is at varying degrees more 
invasive for the borrower. Invasive here means that the entrepreneur is no longer as free to 
make decisions in his company as he was before. An external lender or investor is likely to 
seek influence in the decision making after they have made an investment or given a loan. 
This allows the external party to ensure that the debt is serviced in the case of debt finance. 
In the case of an equity investment, it ensures that the return on his investment is maximised. 
For example, in a publicly traded company, the shareholder’s meeting will decide over the 




















means some form of loss of control or at least limits on the entrepreneurial freedom. 
Entrepreneurs should hence prefer internal forms of finance, such as internal funds, retained 
earnings, owner’s contribution or the issuance of new equity for existing owners. We find that 
across the entire sample and in each sub-group, internal funds rank as the most accessible 
and the most preferential forms of finance. This confirms a phenomenon widely mentioned 
in the literature. The entrepreneurs in this sample also prefer the least invasive capital. 
The third most preferential source of finance are bank loans. Bank loans expected to 
be the most preferential source of external finance. By their nature they are relatively cost-
effective forms of debt-finance and minimally invasive. The commercial bank is very unlikely 
to seek involvement in the actual operation of the debtor’s enterprises. They will monitor the 
debtor, his interest payments, and the repayment of the principal loan. They are unlikely to 
seek control beyond these external checks. This makes bank loans the least invasive form of 
external finance. Additionally, interest rates on bank loans are lower than in any other form 
of debt finance available to entrepreneurs167. Chapter One further discussed in much greater 
detail the advantages of bank loans in much greater detail. 
Venture capital (VC) is seen as the fourth most preferential source of finance. The high 
position of venture capital is surprising nonetheless. By its very nature, venture capital is 
highly invasive. VC investments are equity investments, so entrepreneurs will give up part of 
their equity in exchange for an investment. Most venture capitalist will want to exercise a 
degree of involvement in the operation of an enterprise. They will seek to exercise some form 
of control over the company that they have invested in. So how can we explain that 
entrepreneurs find this the second most desirable form of external finance? The advantage of 
VC and other forms of equity investment are the costs associated with it. Venture capital does 
                                                        




not incur any interest, for it is an equity investment. It is therefore fundamentally different 
than an interest-bearing loan. The venture capitalist is rewarded or remunerated for their 
investment, when the company goes public, it is sold to a competitor/other investor, or he 
sells his equity through another channel. This might explain the relative popularity of VC. It is 
an invasive but low-cost form of finance. 
Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending ranks as the sixth most desirable form of finance. Despite 
the high interest rates charged for P2P loans and the resulting high borrowing costs, the 
sample group found on average that it's the third most desirable external source for financial 
capital. The findings in Beijing are in stark contrast to this study’s earlier findings in Nanjing. 
In Nanjing P2P finance was mostly seen as a source of funding for companies, who ‘must need 
be badly in need of money’168. P2P lending platforms and loans were largely branded as 
undesirable by most of the interviewees. The majority of borrowers and finance experts often 
denounced them entirely because of the very high funding costs169. So what might cause 
entrepreneurs in Beijing to feel differently? Their relative popularity might be a product of 
their clear competitive advantage over many other forms of external finance: the simplicity 
and speed in which P2P financing platforms make decisions and extend loans. At the time of 
the fieldwork, P2P platforms were still largely unregulated and loans were approved in hours 
or days the most. There exists a much higher degree of flexibility in regards to the maturity of 
P2P loans and the collateral they could use. Without a doubt, these institutions were much 
more flexible than commercial banks170. Entrepreneurs appear to find this degree of simplicity 
and flexibility appealing. For them the higher funding costs might just be the price they are 
willing to pay for this high degree of flexibility.   
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Loans from friends are the sixth most preferred source of finance. This relatively low 
rank, as the fourth most preferred source of external finance seems to contradict in part the 
findings of our analysis for Nanjing and also much of the existing literature on the matter. 
Much of the literature describes that interpersonal loans are often extended at very 
favourable rates and conditions. The fieldwork in Nanjing even suggested that these loans are 
often entirely interest-free. At the very least, the interest rate is below that of P2P loans. They 
were also said to offer a much higher degree of flexibility to negotiate and re-negotiate the 
terms of the loan. All this has led previous studies and the analysis of my interview data to 
conclude that interpersonal loans are highly attractive to the borrower. Entrepreneurs are 
said to frequently lend and borrow money from/to friends. What is interesting is that despite 
very favourable conditions survey participants in Beijing on average would prefer to seek 
finance through some other shadow banks. Even loans with a high interest rate, e.g. loans 
from a P2P lender, or highly invasive forms of finance, like venture capital, are more attractive 
than borrowing money from friends. The case of Beijing suggests that entrepreneurs prefer 
loans from formal shadow banks, even at a higher cost, over interpersonal loans.  
Survey participants ranked microfinance institutions as the seventh most preferential 
form of finance. The data for Beijing suggests, that entrepreneurs will only seek a microloan, 
after they have exhausted, bank loans, P2P finance and loans from friends. This too suggests 
that there is a large regional variance between Tier-I and Tier-II cities. An incubator in Nanjing 
highlighted that for a POE, microfinance was indeed the most preferential form of external 
finance outside the formal banking sector171. According to him, if a POE cannot get access to 
a bank loan, their first point of call would be a microloan company. A possible explanation for 
this might be a more advanced local financial system in Beijing. Bank loans and other forms of 
                                                        




shadow banking may already provide enough capital, so that entrepreneurs do not have to 
rely on microloans. After all, the interest rate for microloans is higher than that of a bank loan 
or loan from a friends. At the same time, it does not provide the borrower with the same level 
of convenience as a loan with higher borrowing costs, e.g. P2P finance. Lastly, microloans in 
Beijing might also not be as widely available and thus entrepreneurs do not see them as an 
appealing source of finance.  
The eighth most preferred source of finance is private equity (PE). PE, as a form of 
equity finance, is also a pervasive form of finance. Accepting an equity investment from a PE 
firm is therefore similar to the investment from a VC firm. The lower rank of PE is therefore 
difficult to understand. The size of the PE sector and the access to these investments might 
explain the lower attractiveness for an entrepreneur. While VC is readily available and VC firms 
are actively looking for investments, private equity firms in Beijing are not as prominently 
featured. 
The interview data revealed loans from relatives as the ninth most preferred source of 
finance. The relatively is surprising. Much like loans from friends, this form of interpersonal 
loan often comes at favourable costs and conditions. We should therefore expect it to be on 
of the most preferred forms of external finance. They are often considered as relatively cost-
effective, because lending rates tend to be favourable. However, it appears that 
entrepreneurs much rather borrow money from outsiders than from their own kin. A possible 
explanation might be closely connected to the concept, which in the case of Nanjing made 
interpersonal loans in general so attractive and convenient: Guanxi. Family relationship are 
important in network-based societies. Should a borrower find themselves unable to service a 
debt or pay a loan to a relative, his social network might hold him accountable or treat him 




risk of a possible deterioration of a relationship over a loan and ultimately looses access to the 
important family network. Another possible explanation might be the ability to raise enough 
money through relatives. Loans from banks or other formal shadow banks provide an access 
to large amounts of financial capital. Loans from relatives may simply not provide enough 
capital for the entrepreneurs in this sample. 
In the tenth place, we find loans from another company. These other companies 
include a range of NBFIs, credit guarantee companies and other lending companies. Due to 
the often exorbitantly high interest rates and premiums charged by these lenders, it is 
understandable, that entrepreneurs rank this in the tenth place overall. 
Participants were also 
asked to rank the same sources of 
finance according to their 
perceived accessibility. Table six 
shows the ten most accessible 
sources of finance. They were 
internal funds and retained 
earnings, owner’s contribution 
and equity issuance, followed by 
loans from friends, P2P finance, 
bank loans, loans from relatives, 
microfinance, VC, PE and loans from private lenders (not friends or family). Again, the two 
most accessible internal sources of finance. This was to be expected as one’s own funds and 




















Loans from friends were considered the third most accessible form of finance and the 
most accessible form of external finance. This means that for our participants, it is easier to 
get a loan from their friends than it is to get a loan from any other external source of finance. 
This is particularly interesting, because entrepreneurs found this only the sixth most preferred 
source of finance. A possible explanation is that the somewhat romanticised concept of 
‘Guanxi as collateral’172just disguises the fact that entrepreneurs borrow money from friends, 
because it is easy. The data here suggests that the widespread use of private lending amongst 
friends is driven out of necessity rather than preference. Entrepreneurs rely on interpersonal 
loans from their friends not because they want to or because they offer favourable conditions. 
They use them as a source of finance only, because it is the most accessible form of external 
finance available to them.   
The fourth most accessible form of finance was P2P finance. This is also not a surprise. 
Due to the poor regulatory background at the time173, these platforms existed throughout the 
country. Advertisements for loans over the internet promised easy and quick loans. Poor 
regulatory oversight meant that loans were freely extended to borrowers. This often also 
meant relatively poor corporate oversight over lending decisions and approval procedures. In 
a city like Beijing, it would take between 1-3 days between the time that a loan application 
was submitted and funds were dispensed174. Funds were released so quick, that due diligence 
was a difficult task. A financial executive of a large and now defunct P2P financing platform in 
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Beijing said, that she believed that the NPL rate of her platform was beyond the legal limit. 
Following the extensive growth of her platform and its loan portfolio, she said that the NPL 
rate was ‘officially [..] 5%’, be she was ‘sure it is more than 5%’175. If loans are extended rapidly 
and to all kinds of borrowers, it casts doubt over the entire procedure. How can the platform 
ensure that the debtor can service the debt and repay the loan? For the entrepreneurs this 
makes it an easily accessible form of external finance, because there is no red tape to cut. This 
easy access, quick loan approval and general flexibility may have also contributed to the 
attractiveness of this form of finance, while at the same time contributing to the systemic 
instability emanating from it. 
Bank loans are the fifth most accessible form of finance and the third most accessible 
form of external finance. Despite bank loans being the most desirable form of external finance, 
entrepreneurs polled for this study did not find access to them as easily accessible. It appears 
that in general the issues within the wider Chinese banking sector, e.g. multiple principal 
conflict and an SOE lending bias, also restrict the access of POEs to bank loans. In addition to 
the issues discussed in the previous chapters, a local finance expert in Beijing highlighted, that 
it is indeed rational and economical for banks to focus on large SOEs176. 
“A 1bn RMB loan at 4% is a lot easier to make than a bunch of 1000 x 
1m RMB loans at 8%, just from a transaction cost perspective.”  Finance 
Expert (BJ-14-11-001) 
As this survey’s population are small and medium-sized enterprises, they are likely to find 
access to bank loans difficult. If they were large POEs, with higher financing needs, they might 
find it easier to get a bank loan. This implies that there are rational non-political considerations 
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for lending predominantly to large enterprises and SOEs. It is not simply the role of the 
omnipresent and omnipotent state, which affects the corporate governance of commercial 
banks and pushes them towards lending to SOEs. Even outside of China, large enterprises will 
find it easier to obtain a bank loan. The picture provided by the analysis of this study’s survey 
data does not necessarily support this. Self-employed entrepreneurs found bank loans the 
most accessible form of external finance, while enterprises with 100+ employees found it the 
fifth most accessible. For the latter, it was as accessible as loans from friends, relatives or 
microfinance.  
It is important to emphasise that the dataset for this study is not representative. The 
survey further did not collect any data on the economic situation of the entrepreneur himself. 
There is a chance that entrepreneurs, who were able to pledge personal assets as collateral 
for bank loans, found access to bank loans easier, than those entrepreneurs, who could not. 
It is also important to note that while they ranked them highly, self-employed entrepreneurs 
did not indicate using them in the 12 months prior to taking the survey.  
Loans from relatives rank as the sixth most accessible form of finance and the fourth 
most accessible form of external finance. After loans from friends, loans from relatives are the 
second most accessible form of interpersonal finance. This is an interesting insight, because 
entrepreneurs found this source of finance largely unattractive, ranking it the ninth most 
preferential form of finance. Interpersonal loans, whether from family or friends seem to be 
used out of necessity. Entrepreneurs would prefer to use formal financial institutions and 
some other forms of shadow banking. Nonetheless, these traditional forms of interpersonal 




Microfinance follows in the seventh place. While interviews have suggested, that 
microfinance is widely accessible177, the research for Beijing suggests a regional variance in its 
accessibility. In Nanjing, interviewees suggested that local and provincial authorities 
encouraged microfinance to allow entrepreneurs access to finance, because of a lack of access 
to bank loans178. In Beijing on the other hand this data suggests, that entrepreneurs on 
average find it easier to get a bank loan than microloan. This is indicative for a regionally more 
mature financial system, where banks do provide some of the functions, which they are ought 
to provide.  
VC and PE follow in eighth and ninth place respectively. This in itself is not surprising, 
because both the PE and VC sectors in China are still relatively small. This makes it more 
difficult to as widely available as bank loans or other forms of finance.  
Loans from private lenders rank tenth in the list in terms of accessibility. They are also 
the only source of finance in this list, which was not included in the list of the the most 
preferred sources. This is an interesting finding, because it highlights the issue of unregulated 
informal interpersonal finance. Interpersonal loans based on Guanxi are accessible but still 
somewhat desirable, with the exception of loans from relatives. Interpersonal loans from 
people, with whom the borrower has no interpersonal relationship however seem to be 
completely undesirable, but available. Said loans come at high costs. First of all, their high 
interest rates make them undesirable. Whereas P2P financing platforms charge high rates, 
bordering on or exceeding the threshold for usury, interpersonal loans often fully surpass 
them. Furthermore, there are non-material costs involved in this type of lending: negative 
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social externalities caused by the extrajudicial methods, in which their claims are often 
enforced  (“bad things can happen to you”179).  
 Through this study’s analysis of survey data, we were able to establish which sources 
of finance entrepreneurs would like to use vis-à-vis to which sources they find accessible. This 
provides us with a much better and nuanced understanding of the local financial landscape of 
Beijing and the role of shadow banking institutions. This descriptive analysis has resulted in 
some important findings. First of all, it appears that entrepreneurs do not like to rely on loans 
from friends, relatives or private lenders (i.e. interpersonal loans). Our survey data suggests 
that entrepreneurs use them, because they are accessible and not because they are desirable. 
This contradicts the idealised and romanticised picture of interpersonal loans, drawn in the 
literature review and the interviews in Nanjing. Interpersonal loans are used to supplement 
the shortcomings of the other financial sectors and not because they are attractive.  
The same cannot be said for loans from formal shadow banks. Here our analysis 
suggests that deficit spending units use them, because they want to and not necessarily 
because they have to. The case of P2P finance provides a very good example. Our data 
suggests that despite their cost, loans from P2P financing platforms are a sought after source 
of finance for entrepreneurs. In Chapters Four and Five we discussed the high interest rates 
charged by some of these platforms. It is therefore somewhat puzzling, that entrepreneurs 
still prefer to use them over other and cheaper sources of finance. The reasons might not have 
to do with the cost of the loan but rather the service they provide. While they are expensive 
to use for the borrower, they possess a competitive advantage over the formal financial 
sectors with the service. They provide quick and easy access to finance. In this, they 
supplement the functions of the formal financial sector. The more detailed breakdown of 
                                                        




sources of finance in Table 7 and 8 further highlights this. Even entrepreneurs with an access 
to bank loans used P2P financing platforms. 
 The data provides us with a more nuance understanding of the institutional landscape 
of the shadow banking sector in Beijing. It demonstrated that Beijing too, possesses a wide 
variety of formal and informal shadow banks. While the institutional landscape is somewhat 
similar to the landscape in Nanjing, there is a significant difference: borrowers in Beijing prefer 
to use formal financial institutions in general. This includes commercial banks and formal 
shadow banks. They would much rather rely solely on those forms of finance and not use 
interpersonal loans at all. The fact that they do and often have to use interpersonal loans, 
highlights that despite Beijing’s high degree of economic development, entrepreneurs still 
have to seek finance from outside of the formal financial sectors.  
On average across the sample, entrepreneurs would like to use bank loans as their 
main source of external finance. Across all sub-groups, bank finance ranks as the second or 
third most preferred source of finance and is always the most preferred source of external 
finance. Apart from self-employed entrepreneurs, none of the participants ranked it as the 
most accessible form of external finance. What is surprising is that despite ranking them as 
the most accessible form of formal finance, none of the self-employed entrepreneurs had 
relied on ban loans in the 12 months prior. This casts a shadow of doubt over their responses 
concerning their own access to bank loans. The data nonetheless suggests, that entrepreneurs 
want to but cannot use bank loans as their preferred source of finance.  
The analysis highlights, that in the absence of widespread access to bank loans, 
another financial sector has provided a function to those in need of capital. It demonstrates 
that the shadow banking sector is providing a supplementary function for enterprises in 




we ought to focus our attention on the functional analysis of the sector. The following section 
will therefore aim to establish, if the functions provided by the local financial system in Beijing, 
i.e. the banking sector and the shadow banking sector, are seen as adequate enough to allow 
for continued corporate development. Due to the structure of the sample, which relies on 
micro, small- and medium-sized enterprises, financial markets are not taken into 
consideration when further examining the local financial system. 
6.2. Functional analysis: how has the shadow banking sector affected 
access to finance for enterprises in Beijing? 
 Due to population of the survey and the scope of the questionnaire, the functional 
analysis of the shadow banking sector in Beijing is limited to one function only: access to 
finance. As the survey was designed for entrepreneurs, it did not focus on other functions, e.g. 
alternative to bank deposits or services to the other formal financial sectors.  
How has the access to finance affected the different businesses in our dataset? Do 
entrepreneurs, who had access to bank loans feel, that access to finance had a more positive 
impact on their business than those entrepreneurs, who had to rely on shadow banks? As the 
institutional analysis established, the use of shadow banking is widespread amongst Beijing’s 
enterprises. If all entrepreneurs in this sample have used shadow banking to various degrees, 
did it have an impact on their overall access to finance? Did entrepreneurs, who used shadow 
banking more than others, feel that their access to finance was any better than that of others?  
The survey asked participants to rank on a six-point scale from good to bad, how the 
access to finance had affected their business. Responses of one or two points were counted 
as negative, while responses of three and four points were counted as neutral and responses 
of five and six points were counted as positive. Out of the 27 participants in the survey, 25 




How Has Access to Finance Affected Your Business? 
Employees Negative Neutral Positive 
Self-employed 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 
1-4 Employees 50,00% 50,00% 0,00% 
5 - 9 Employees 0,00% 33,33% 66,67% 
10 - 19 Employees 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
20 - 99 Employees 10,00% 50,00% 40,00% 
100+ Employees 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
Turnover Negative Neutral Positive 
<10,000 RMB 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 
10,000 - 100,000 RMB 50,00% 50,00% 0,00% 
100,000 - 999,999 RMB 0,00% 33,33% 66,67% 
>1,000,000 RMB 10,00% 50,00% 40,00% 
        
Years in Operation Negative Neutral Positive 
≤ 1 year 12,50% 0,00% 87,50% 
2 - 5 years 7,69% 61,54% 30,77% 
6 - 10 years 0,00% 50,00% 50,00% 
10 - 15 years 0,00% 66,67% 33,33% 
Source: Online Survey among entrepreneurs in Beijing between October 
2014 and August 2015 
Table 13 - How Has Access to Finance Affected Your Business? 
 On average, 52% of enterprises felt that their access to finance had positively affected 
their business, while 8% felt that it had a negative impact on their business’ development. This 
puts into perspective the use of internal finance, shadow banking and banking across the 
sample. As Table 7 showed, in the 12-months period before the survey, entrepreneurs used 
bank loans for only 17.19% of their total finance, while relying on shadow banking for 36.67% 
and internal finance for 32.98%. Despite relying on internal finance and shadow banking for 
over two thirds of their total financing needs, access to finance in general had positively 
affected the participant’s business. This would suggest, that in the absence of a well-
developed banking sector, the shadow banking sector has taken over part of its function and 
provide sufficient amounts of capital to a range of enterprises. It then begets the question, if 




 On average, the two self-employed entrepreneurs indicated that access to finance had 
no effect or a positive effect on their business. This is particularly interesting, because this 
group relied solely on shadow banking and received no line of credit from the formal financial 
sectors. Enterprises with one to four employees on the other hand felt that access to finance 
had no or a negative effect on their business. This group also did not receive any finance from 
the formal financial sectors, but relied largely on internal finance. Only 13.33% of their total 
financing came from external sources, all of which were shadow banks. Enterprises with five 
to nine employees predominantly felt that access to finance had positively affected their 
business. This is interesting, because they did not rely on any form of external finance, 
whether from shadow banks or from the formal financial sectors. The enterprise with ten to 
nineteen employees also indicated  access to finance had a positive effect overall. In their case 
80% of their finance stemming from bank loans and 20% from the shadow banking sector. The 
largest group, enterprises with 20-99 employees felt that access to finance had either no or a 
positive impact on their business, while 10% felt that it had a negative impact overall. It is 
interesting to see, that this group relied on internal finance for 55% of their financing 
requirements, and on banks for 30% and shadow banks for 15%. Lastly, the enterprise with 
the second largest reliance on both shadow banks and banks, 70% and 30% respectively, felt 
that access to finance had a positive impact on their business. 
 Enterprises with an annual turnover under 10,000 CNY also felt that access to finance 
had positively affected their business. In contrast to any other group in the sample, they only 
relied on internal finance. Enterprises with an annual turnover of 10,000 to 100,000 CNY on 
the other hand indicated, that access to finance had largely negatively affected their business. 
This group relied on shadow banking for 43.33% of their total finance requirements and on 




100,001 and 999,999 CNY felt that access to finance had positively affected their business, 
despite solely relying on shadow banking for their external finance. This means that despite 
the relatively higher funding costs for shadow bank loans, they had been able to run successful 
enterprises. The majority of enterprises with a turnover of over 1,000,000 CNY felt that access 
to finance had no impact on their business. An additional 10% felt it had negatively affected it 
and 40% had felt a positive impact. These entrepreneurs had relied on shadow banks for 42% 
of their financing and on banks for 26% 
 The data suggests the use of shadow banking or banking does not coincide with a more 
positive or negative impact of access to finance. Enterprises which relied more on shadow 
banks than formal banks did not indicate that their access to finance was better than that of 
enterprises which relied less on shadow banking. What the data does suggest is that a more 
positive impact of access to finance for the entrepreneur does coincide with a certain type of 
shadow bank. Entrepreneurs, who relied less on informal/interpersonal loans, generally felt 
that access to finance had a more positive impact on their business. Enterprises with a 
negative or neutral perception of their access to finance generally received fewer loans from 
formal shadow banks and relied more on interpersonal finance. Entrepreneurs with a more 
favourable view of their access to finance, relied on a mix of loans from formal shadow banks 
as well as interpersonal loans. This is an insightful finding, because it disputes the often 
idealised picture of interpersonal loans and the role of personal connections within China’s 
network-based society. It is off course difficult to establish causality from this. Due to the 
sample size, this can only serve as an indication.  
6.3 Concluding Remarks 
Beijing serves as an interesting case of what role the shadow banking sector plays 




other parts of the country. It is home to a range of different enterprises, in terms of their size 
and industry. When I examined the use of different sources of finance over the 12-months 
period prior to taking the survey, the most interesting finding was that virtually all enterprises 
had used some form of shadow banking. Enterprises with access to bank loans still relied on 
shadow banks and in some cases rather heavily. On average in the sample, enterprises tended 
to rely more on shadow banking than on formal banks. The use of shadow banking was not 
confined to the small- or micro-sized enterprises, which simply had no other method of 
financing their business activities. What was particularly interesting was that the level of usage 
remained almost stable across different sizes of enterprises. As their business grew, 
entrepreneurs did not substitute shadow bank loans for bank loans. They did not seek to 
reduce their reliance on shadow banks or external capital for that matter. They were much 
more likely to substitute their own internal finance for bank loans, with a relatively stable 
share of loans from the shadow banking sector. 
 What made this analysis insightful is that due to the anonymity of an online 
survey, it appears that entrepreneurs were more open about the type of finance they 
preferred. Whereas earlier studies had often drawn an idealised picture of interpersonal loans 
and the underlying cultural norms and relations, our data did not support this.  
The case of Beijing was interesting for a variety of reasons. First of all, due to the type 
of data, the analysis had to be structured differently than in the case of Nanjing. On the other 
hand, due to the anonymity of an online survey, it appears that entrepreneurs were more 
open about the type of finance they prefer. A key finding of this analysis was that 
entrepreneurs tend to rely on interpersonal loans because they have to and not because they 




interpersonal finance. Entrepreneurs prefer loans from formal financial institutions, whether 
banks or shadow banks. 
Overall the data in this chapter has confirmed that the supplemented local financial 
system, which exists in Beijing, is providing the functions needed by the city’ vibrant business 
community. 52% of the enterprises in this survey felt that access to finance affecting their 
business positively. 40% of the sample did not feel that this had any impact on their business 
and only 8% felt that it had affected their business negatively. 
 The overall size of this survey’s population means, that these findings can be seen only 
as indications. The data furthermore did not allow us to analyse the remaining supplementary 
functions, which the shadow banking sector provides for the financial system, namely an 











The evidence presented and analysed in this study points towards one key finding: 
shadow banking is important. From the low level interpersonal loans to the securitized assets, 
the shadow banking sector provides a valuable function to the entire financial system. Its role 
is deeply enshrined within credit intermediation in China. While research on this sector has 
become increasingly more popular over the last few years, no study has so far sought to 
understand shadow banking systemically through the functions it provides to the entire 
financial system. Existing research has focused on limited groups of institutions to further our 
understanding of shadow banking. It was quick to argue that, e.g. informal finance, will wither 
away in time as a financial system grows more mature. This makes the case of China even 
more interesting. Her economy is growing, but the shadow banking sector has not withered 
away. 
 This study has sought to first understand the shadow banking from a functional 
approach. The aim was to account for the sector’s role in the wider financial system. In order 
to understand the functions, we first had to understand the wider fabric of the Chinese 
financial system. If Chinese banks are now the biggest banks in the world, why are they not 
functioning like the theory suggests? What stops them from effective credit intermediation 
and why are the financial markets not a valid alternative? This analysis enabled us to 
understand why China needs a shadow banking sector today. Understanding the 
shortcomings of the formal financial sectors allows us to analyse the functions provided by 
the shadow banking sector. The first part of this conclusion will focus on these two aspects: 
the need for and the function of the shadow banking sector. 
For the lack of a better alternative, financial systems design theory formed the 




design theory to the Chinese financial system, we discovered an anomaly. The theory did not 
provide the adequate tools to analyse, what lay in front of us. By all indicators, China has bank-
based financial system. China is home to some of the largest commercial banks in the world. 
Following the theoretical premises of financial systems design theory this means banks should 
provide enough capital to fund economic growth and the development of privately owned 
enterprises. This is the idea behind a bank-based financial system. The theory tells us that 
commercial banks are able to collect information on a borrower over time and overcome the 
asymmetry of information between creditor and debtor. This role as an information gatherer 
also allows banks to act as an efficient delegated monitor. This role and the function of banks 
greatly benefits POEs in general, and SMEs in particular. 
Previous studies, which we reviewed in Chapter Three, found that in China, strong 
banks did not benefit POEs. They found that banks in China are ill-equipped to respond to the 
needs of POEs. They conclude that this leads to a skewed capital allocation in favour of large 
SOEs. The state, who owns the largest commercial banks likes to use them to ensure that SOEs 
have access to cheap lines of credit. The lending policies of SOCBs and other large JSCBs are 
said to be heavily biased in favour of SOES. It is because of this lending bias that commercial 
banks simply do not lend to POEs. The omnipotent and omnipresent state forces the banking 
sector to lend money to their own enterprises. The average shareholder or depositor is 
powerless and has to accept this as a reality. This is a view widely held within academia and 
the financial industry. The problem is just one thing: it is not true. This study confirms that 
POEs do not have an easy access to formal bank loans. Entrepreneurs are forced to seek 
financial capital outside of the formal financial sectors. The reason for this is only partly the 




First of all, this view implies that all state actors in China are working in perfect 
harmony and pursue state-led development as a common goal. While this might be true for 
policy banks, whose sole purpose it is to fund the implementation of government policy, it can 
hardly be true for all banks with partial state-ownership. As I demonstrated in my analysis of 
the Chinese banking sector, virtually all large commercial banks in China have some degree of 
state-ownership but also varying degrees of private ownership. Commercial banks need to be 
profitable and work with moderate to high efficiency. They cannot survive economically, if 
they only lend money to SOEs. Especially if these SOEs tend to be less productive than POEs. 
Furthermore, if commercial banks actively excluded POEs from all bank loans, it would imply 
that all POE finance takes place outside of the formal banking sector. If commercial banks with 
partial state ownership do not lend money to POEs, then there are hardly enough banks left 
to fund private sector development in China. This would be an easy answer to the question, 
why this country desperately needed a shadow banking sector. POEs are denied access to 
formal bank loans and in their absence, they have to seek finance somewhere else. 
This study has demonstrated that this is an oversimplified argument for why Chinese 
enterprises rely on credit intermediation outside of the formal banking sector. All 
entrepreneurs interviewed for this study have described issues surrounding their access to 
bank loans. That much is true. Banks are ill-equipped to handle POE lending and do not 
particularly like lending to SMEs. Chinese commercial banks have not been able to use their 
position at the core of credit intermediation to overcome the asymmetry of information and 
become delegated monitors. The reason for this is not that they are pre-occupied with lending 
to SOEs and have no resources left to lend to POEs. It is rather that their complex internal 
procedures are at the heart of the problem. These procedures result in long and tedious 




banks for a quick line of credit. From the perspective of a commercial bank, the procedures 
encourage lending to large enterprises, which often are SOEs. The procedure for a loan 
application is the same for a 10,000 CNY loan and a 1,000,000 CNY loan. From a rational 
perspective it therefore makes sense to look for large borrowers and neglect smaller ones. If 
the costs for both loans are identical, extending the larger loan is more cost-efficient. 
The internal procedures of commercial banks also do not encourage entrepreneurs to 
be open with their banks. The tongue-in-cheek saying that a bank will lend you an umbrella 
when the sun is shining, but if it starts raining, it will take it away means precisely that. Even 
if an entrepreneur has been able to obtain a bank loan, he will not contact his bank if he 
encounters short-term financial difficulties. If he did, the bank would probably take away the 
umbrella (i.e. recall the principal loan). This is common procedure across most large 
commercial banks, regardless of whether they are SOCBs, JSCBs, or CCBs. For the 
entrepreneur, this means that he can use his house bank for some of his financing needs but 
not all. These findings are new, because they reveal that entrepreneurs in China have to rely 
on the both, the formal financial sector and the shadow banking sector. Their use is not 
mutually exclusive. Entrepreneurs do not just use one or the other, but tend to use both.  
For the bank, this presents a challenge. Their own procedures mean that they can 
never be certain how financially healthy their borrower actually is. For the financial system it 
means, that due to the way commercial banks operate, there is a demand from deficit-
spending units outside of the formal financial system (where enterprise leads, finance follows). 
These procedures do not exist in a vacuum. They were introduced as a response to the NPL 
problem within the Chinese financial system in the late 1990s and served well to prevent a 
new built-up of NPLs in the formal financial sectors. The problem is that they have not been 




The need for a shadow banking sector is not only driven by the demand side. It is not 
just that deficit-spending units need to source financial capital outside of the regulated 
banking sector. Surplus-spending units, those who hold more financial capital than they would 
like to consume, are faced with another challenge within the financial system. They lack 
adequate investment opportunities within formal financial sectors. Deposit rates of 
commercial banks in China are relatively moderate. At times they are said to be below annual 
inflation. This means that in real terms, surplus-spending units loose wealth by depositing 
their money with commercial banks. The Chinese financial markets provide an opportunity to 
make equity investments, but as Chapter Three has demonstrated they suffer from high 
volatility. There therefore exists an abundance of financial capital waiting to be invested for a 
higher return than bank deposits and a lower risk than local financial markets. Investments in 
financial markets abroad is also not feasible, because of capital export regulation. In the 
absence of adequate investment opportunities and with a never ceasing supply of deficit-
spending units, the shadow banking sector steps in and helps with the intermediation. It exists, 
because it has to provide a valuable function to the financial system It is important for us to 
understand this, because it means that we cannot pass a normative judgement on the whole 
sector. The regulatory environment and internal procedures of commercial banks lay the 
foundation for shadow banking. It is needed by those, who hold capital as much as by those, 
who are looking to borrow it. As long as the regulatory environment in China does not change, 
there will always be a need for a large additional financial sector to provide functions to the 
economy.  
Understanding the need for a shadow banking sector is the first step to understanding 
the functions it provides. This study has identified four distinct functions: access to finance, 




local governments. The two most important functions are access to finance and alternatives 
to bank deposits. The shadow banking sector is able to attract the funds from surplus-saving 
units and provide them as loans to deficit-spending units. The bright reader will notice 
immediately that by providing these two services, the sector is engaged in the most important 
process of the financial system: credit intermediation.  
Within the shadow banking sector credit intermediation takes on various forms. The 
simplest form is informal finance. Here the borrower does not receive a loan from a hard 
institution but from friends, family or other private individuals. From the data gathered 
through interviews and the survey, it became apparent that this is still widespread in China’s 
economy. In Beijing and Nanjing, entrepreneurs often use informal finance. In Nanjing, 
interviewees often described a romanticised version of shadow banking, where individuals 
lend money to others at favourable rates. Sometimes these loans were given on an 
understanding, that should the lender require a loan at a later date, he too would be able to 
borrow money from the borrower at favourable terms. Our survey in Beijing did not support 
this view. It discovered that individuals borrowed money from friends, family and other 
lenders, because they had to, not because they wanted to. This is in stark contrast to some of 
the loans provided by formal shadow banks. Formal shadow banks describe legally registered 
business entities that are engaging in credit intermediation. Our study here discovered that 
these institutions provided a sought after service for which customers were willing to pay a 
premium. Deficit-spending units with financing needs used loans provided by formal shadow 
banks and often combined them with other loans.  
In addition to the structural reasons, which create the general necessity for credit 
intermediation outside of the formal banking sector, this study identified another key reason: 




all aspects of the credit intermediation. Surplus-saving units do not have to commit their 
capital long-term, like they would have to with classic equity investments. They can invest 
their money in a P2P product today and in another shadow bank next week. They can lend the 
funds at a flexible interest rate, which is determined between creditor and debtor. It is not 
subject to the regulatory rigidity of an interest rate set by a central authority. For deficit 
spending units, the terms of the loan and the form of collateral is far more flexible than with 
a commercial bank. They can pledge their personal possessions as collateral and borrow the 
funds for hours, days, weeks or years. For this flexibility, the debtor is willing to pay a premium. 
He does not mind the higher interest rate, because that is the price he has to pay for more 
flexibility. 
The third function identified by this study are services to the formal financial sectors. 
The function covers many different aspects. For example, through credit guarantee and trust 
companies, commercial banks can engage in off-balance sheet lending. They can move loans 
off their balance sheets. These complex products of financial engineering also allow banks to 
arrange for loans, which have a higher interest rate than a bank would be allowed to charge. 
This allows them to creatively use regulation and risk-adjust interest rates for certain 
borrowers. It also allows banks to offer more diverse investment products to surplus-saving 
units and attract their deposits or deposit-like investments. Lastly, in some cases their 
regulatory arbitrage also allows them to hide problematic assets in their investment products. 
These findings highlight that formal financial sector also directly benefits from the shadow 
banking sector’s existence. It benefits directly from engaging in credit intermediation outside 
of the regulated banking sector. It allows them to absorb more financial capital from surplus-




the different financial sectors was not the main scope of this study. It is an interesting function, 
which undoubtedly warrants further research. 
The last function provided by the shadow banking sector are services to local 
governments. This study in particular highlighted two areas, in which the shadow banking 
sector is providing services to local governments. The first are the now defunct local 
government financing vehicles (LGFV). These were largely used to fund the Chinese 
governments stimulus package following the global financial crisis. They allowed local 
governments to accumulate debt, even though this is generally prohibited by law. The second 
area was an interesting conclusion from our analysis in Nanjing. Local governments use 
different institutions within the sector to steer local development. In the case of Nanjing these 
were mainly trust companies and VC firms. It seemed as if local governments were painfully 
aware of the shortcomings of commercial banks in POE finance and therefore sought to 
stimulate their growth by other means. 
Before we discus what these four functions have in common and discus if they are all 
merely aspects of the same phenomenon, it is important to engage critically with the 
terminology proposed by existing literature: the term ‘shadow banking’. The term shadow 
banking is hardly self-explanatory. When we discus the concept amongst scholars, there will 
be little disagreement about what it is and what it does. The informed academic will have 
been exposed to debates surrounding the threats and opportunities emanating from it. When 
speaking to average and uninitiated citizen on the street, they might have a totally different 
understanding of a shadow bank is or what it does. In the Chinese context and throughout my 
fieldwork, people often took it to mean informal finance. More often than not, the term 
shadow bank(iUÅ² ) was understood as quasi-legal or illegal finance. This included 




of a microloan company, took offence to the term, when I associated his institution with the 
wider sector. He highlighted throughout the interview that his operations were legal and 
followed the letter of the law. My frequent references to his institution as a shadow bank lead 
him to believe that I did not understand, that his business was legal and by no means a front 
for a loan shark, for gaolidai (Ñ*º).  
For him and others, the term shadow banking included a normative judgement of his 
institution and ultimately his person. Other entrepreneurs and people working in the sector 
had similar views and shared them with me. They often took the term to mean quasi-legal or 
illegal finance. For them it was not a non-normative term for any bank-like activity, which 
takes place outside the formal banking sector. In subsequent interviews, I adopted the term 
non-bank financial institution (ÊÅ²) in order to avoid confusion. So despite there being 
numerous definition of shadow banking, the term causes confusion amongst some. The PBRC 
may base its use of the term on widely accepted international definitions, but the general 
public does not understand it that way. The term shadow banking is prone to result in 
confusion and therefore might not be the ideal way to describe the sector, which supplements 
the rest of the financial system. 
 The term is also ill-fitted, because it creates further confusion by using an existing 
dichotomy, which is widely used in academic literature and everyday vocabulary. As Chapter 
One highlights, virtually all literature on financial systems uses the binary distinction of banks 
and financial markets. If we say that there are shadow banks, does logic not imply that there 
ought to be shadow markets too? If there are, why did this study not cover them? There is 
anecdotal evidence to suggest, that in the interwar period unregulated equity markets existed 
in Shanghai. There the unregulated sale of equity and debt often resulted in highly speculative 




financial activity outside the regulated financial markets, is the very recent phenomenon of 
crypto currencies. These are traded on market places, which bear resemblance to financial 
markets, but with no regulatory oversight. At the time, when the fieldwork for this study was 
conducted, block chain technology and crypto currency were in their infant stages and 
therefore there was no attempt made to include them in the research design. They do raise 
an interesting question of whether there are shadow financial markets in addition to shadow 
banks. As it stands today, the definition of shadow banking also includes activity, which 
involves the financial markets. One of the three core functions of the shadow banking sector 
analysed in this study is the services it provides to banks, often as a tool to issue financial 
products with links to the financial markets. As the section on interbank shadow banking 
highlights, much of the financial markets are also closely connect to the shadow banking 
sector. It therefore begets the question of whether it is wise to include the term ‘banking’, 
when discussing ‘credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or partly) outside 
the regular banking system’ (Financial Stability Board, 2014:1).  
As it is my desire to add to our understanding of the design of financial systems in 
which a third sector supplements the work of the formal banking sector and the financial 
markets, I propose to call it exactly that: the third financial sector. This term highlights that it 
is a financial sector in its outright, which sits somewhere between the banking sector and the 
financial markets. It includes elements of both. Rather than seeing financial systems design as 
a two-dimensional concept, we should include the third financial sector.  It also demonstrates 
that this sector includes any and all institutions, which do not belong to its other two 
counterparts. In order to enhance our understanding of how it supplements the work of 
financial systems as a whole, it is important that the use this study’s findings to highlight how 




The key finding of this study were the four functions of the third financial sector. These 
functions have one thing in common. They all supplement functions of the banking sector and 
the financial markets. Chapter four presenting the key hypothesis of this study: the 
supplemented financial system. After conducting empirical fieldwork, we can rightly say it is 
more than a hypothesis. It adequately describes the nature and character of the Chinese 
financial system. The diagram below has been adapted with the findings of our study. 
 
Diagram 9 - The Third Sector in the Supplemented Financial System 
All functions provided by the third financial sector are supplementary, because they do not 
seek to replace any of the other two financial sectors. Credit intermediation takes place in the 
third financial sector. Deficit-spending units seek loans from it and surplus-spending 
units ’deposit’ their hard-earned financial capital in it. However, both still make heavy use of 
the formal banking sector. As entrepreneurs in Beijing and Nanjing both confirmed, bank loans 
are still the most desirable form of external finance. Households in China still deposit most of 




properties. The third financial sector does not seek to replace the banking sector or the 
financial markets; it merely supplements some of their functions. Commercial banks in China 
still reign supreme. They are still at the core of the vast majority of credit intermediation as 
well as the other services provided by the financial system. 
Chapter One provided an outline and detailed discussion of the functions provided by 
a working financial system180. The most crucial function is that of credit intermediation. A 
functioning financial system mobilises highly liquid assets, i.e. savings of surplus-spending 
units, and converts them into less liquid assets, e.g. loans or equity investments. This process 
is at the core of any financial system. It ensures that financial capital flows from the economic 
units, who have accumulated more than they can consume, to the ones, who need to consume 
more than they can accumulate alone. The financial system should also provide a payment 
mechanism, which allows payments across time and space. They provide other financial 
services, such as insurances and pensions. Lastly, a well-functioning financial system also 
provides financial vehicles, which enable the disaggregation and trade of financial risk. These 
are the core functions every financial system has to provide. 
 Looking at these core functions of a financial system, we can relate them back to the 
four functions provided by the shadow banking sector. We concluded at the beginning, that 
the functions access to finance and alternatives to bank deposits mean that the third financial 
sector is deeply involved in credit intermediation. Given the size of the entire sector vis-à-vis 
the size of the banking sector, we can argue that this involvement is merely supplementary. 
The the third financial sector cannot replace the credit intermediation of the formal banking 
sector.  It is a by-product of the shortcomings and inflexibility of most of China’s commercial 
banks. If commercial banks were able to fulfil the functions assigned to them in financial 
                                                        




systems design theory, enterprises would have less incentive to seek credit intermediation 
outside of the formal banking sector. The third sector would still exist, because there will 
always be deficit-spending units, who are unable to get formal bank loans. Its size and its 
importance however would be immensely reduced. The third financial sector has also been 
able to provide financial vehicles, which allow for the disaggregation and trade of risks. WMPs 
and other financial products have fulfilled this functions, while being outside of the formal 
financial sector. For example, a trust company product is not issued by a bank but is also not 
a product, which falls under the regulatory framework, which governs financial markets. 
Despite to fully belonging to the formal financial sectors, it surely does does not exist in a 
vacuum. These products are issued by or at least in close cooperation with the formal financial 
sectors. The third financial sector could not create these financial vehicles fully outside the 
formal financial system. There is one function of a financial system, which the third financial 
sector has not supplemented. The provision of a payment mechanism is still a task of the 
formal financial sector.  
 The third financial sector exists, because it is needed by the financial system. As this 
study has demonstrated, China relies heavily on an additional sector to supplement the 
functions of the financial system. This was at the core of our hypothesis. China presents a case, 
where banks find themselves unable to fulfil all their assigned functions to the economy. In 
this situation a third financial sector develops to take on the functions, which banks do not 
provide. Its existence is testament to its need. Its existence also absolves its negative 
externalities. The third sector reacts to the shortcomings of the formal banking sector and the 
financial markets. The only way to reduce the importance the the third sector is by 

























Appendix I – Semi-structured Interview Questions for Business 
Executives and Entrepreneurs 
Q1: What are the three main obstacles in receiving a bank loan? 
Q2: Is the financial sector in China too heavily regulated when it comes to private 
enterprise finance? 
Q3: Does regulation affect access of private enterprises to formal bank loans? 
Q4: What are the three main obstacles in receiving a bank loan? 
Q5: What are the usual loan approval times for bank loans? 
Q6: Do you think these days it is easier or hard to get a bank loan? 
Q7: Have you heard about initiatives in Jiangsu to accept non-real estate collateral for 
loans? Do you think that system could work elsewhere? 
Q8: Does China need a shadow-banking sector today? Can we identify three main 
reasons? 
Q9: Is the shadow banking sector better at responding to your business requirements 
than the formal banking sector? If you had to name three main reasons of why that is 
the case, what would they be? 
Q10: Can new institutions, e.g. P2P finance, replace the old actors in unregulated 
finance? 
Q11: How important are interpersonal relationships (Guanxi) for securing a loan? 
Q12: Does the banking sector need more competition? If yes, does China need more 
foreign banks or domestic banks as competitors for SOCBs? 
Q13: Thinking 20 Years ahead, do you think China will still need a shadow banking 
sector? 




Q15: Which financial service provider, e.g. banks, financing companies, P2P or 
interpersonal loans, do you use? Which ones do you feel most comfortable with? 
Q16: How high is the interest rate on loans your received from the unregulated financial 
sector? 
Q17: Is the shadow banking sector better at responding to your business requirements 
than the formal banking sector? If so, why do you think that is? 
Q18: Do you think higher funding costs make innovation in China more difficult? 
Q19: Have you had a loan to a bank rejected in the past? If yes, what did you do 
afterwards? 
Q20: Has a shortage of lines of credit ever adversely affected your business? What did 
you do to overcome this? 
Q21: Have you yourself invested in any shadow-banking institutions? 
Q22. Is there anything we have not covered but you feel is important when we talk about 





Appendix II – Semi-structured Interview Questions for Finance 
Professionals 
Q1:Is the financial sector in China too heavily regulated when it comes to private 
enterprise finance? 
Q2: Does regulation affect access of private enterprises to formal bank loans? 
Q3: Does the banking sector need more competition? If yes, does China need more 
foreign banks or domestic banks as competitors for SOCBs? 
Q4: What does your institution accept as collateral? 
Q5: Have you heard about initiatives in Jiangsu to accept non-real estate collateral for 
loans? Do you think that system could work elsewhere? 
Q6: Does China need a shadow-banking sector today? 
Q7: Can new institutions, e.g. P2P finance, replace the old actors in unregulated finance? 
Q8: Will China still need a shadow-banking sector in 20 years? 
Q9: Do you think for China, the shadow banking sector is a good or a bad thing? 
Q10: Are decisions in SOCBs are made on purely economic grounds? 
Q11: If banks were allowed to make decisions more freely, would that limit the shadow-
banking sector? 
Q12: How does the loan approval procedure look like and how long does it take from 
application to approval? 
Q13: Do your internal policies make your work more difficult? 
Q14: Do you feel incentivized to give loans to a certain type of business? If so, which 






Appendix III – Semi-structured Interview Questions for Incubators 
Q1: Does regulation affect access of private enterprises to formal bank loans? 
Q2: Is the financial sector in China too heavily regulated when it comes to private enterprise 
finance? 
Q3: How does the loan approval procedure look like and how long does it take from application 
to approval? 
Q4: If banks were allowed to make decisions more freely, would that limit the shadow-banking 
sector? 
Q5: I have heard about initiatives in Jiangsu to accept non-real estate collateral for loans? Do 
you think that system could work elsewhere? 
Q6: Can new institutions, e.g. P2P finance, replace the old actors in unregulated finance? 
Q7: In your experience, how difficult is it for start-up companies to get access to formal lines 
of credit?  
Q8: How difficult is it for companies at the growth stage to get a bank loan? 
Q9: Does the banking sector need more competition? If yes, does China need more foreign 
banks or domestic banks as competitors for SOCBs? 
Q10: Does China need a shadow-banking sector today? 
Q11: Will China still need a shadow-banking sector in 20 years? 
Q12: Do you think for China, the shadow banking sector is a good or a bad thing? 
Q13. Is there anything we have not covered but you feel is important when we talk about 
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